

OF ART AND ARTEOLOGY
THE REFORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF ART FOR A BETTER WORLD
PREFACE, INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITION OF TERMS

(C)

Raffaele Martini Pandozy. Ph.D. Dallas Texas, 2017

1. Preface

I believe that art should be the greatest product of humanity and that artists should honor the great heritage of cultural history and humanity as a whole. With close reference to this important belief, I recognize that there has not been production of great art since the Renaissance. The problems of art must be imputed in particular to linguistic forgetfulness, which inevitably causes deprivation of cultural heritage, concern and mindfulness for the causes of humanity. From the aesthetic, sociological, and political standpoints these are problems of cognitive perception, which can be summarized and subsumed under the following categories: (1) critical and historical, (2) socio-political, (3) reductivist, and in the sum, (4) educational.

1. Critical and Historical: The multiple and contrasting historical notions of art, as a result of linguistic forgetfulness carried out in the historicity of art under the influence of myths, false beliefs and prejudice, have altered the perception of art, both on the part of the artist and on the part of society. Artists have lost the spirit of research, advancement, and excellence while art has lost its legitimate functions in society. Museums and other public institutions perpetrate the fallacies of history, of culture, of commerce, and of politics which are being subjected to private interests, to private entrepreneurs and to the financial control of the art market. This study aims at reestablishing a rational order of ideas, and at re-defining the functions of art, artists, historians, and critics by bringing to the fore their role and the true meaning of human expression as ontological values to be cherished and cultivated to advance the excellence of human nature. Art can be an intrinsic part and a positive stimulus of intellectual life if it is intended in the context of these essential values. By the same token, artists can stimulate intellectual growth and transcendence in society if they see themselves operating within this contextual basis.

Critics who do not understand the humanistic functions of art remain on the empirical periphery of both art and life. This seems to reflect the actual *status quo* and the paradoxes of art criticism today. Critic historian Lawrence Alloway (1970) typified criticism as a “service function,” but soon enough dismissed the ideas of

action and involvement in the edification of the meaning of art as humanistic endogenous endeavor. Contrarily, he was preoccupied with art's methods of "production and distribution," but not with researching and applying its ontological principles (*Ib.*, p. 7).

Taken that criticism can be historical and that history can be critical, both critics and historians of art must understand and apply the fundamental philosophical principles of science, history and criticism exerted in the text. This is because they must rely on the contextual givens of all disciplines of knowledge or else fall into the preconceived notions of their predecessors. In order to determine quality in art, all disciplines must meet nature's common ground of causal necessity and continuity. Otherwise, the critic ends up writing for and about his or her predecessors, which becomes a subjective undertaking, hedonistic and counterproductive. Historian Barbara Rose affirmed that there are no criteria for determining quality in art except for what has been said, which leaves ample argument for the subjectivist's prejudicial approach, and to dispel the true possibilities of good criticism that identifies the true quality in art. Quality, she said, can only be verified "through the passage of time" based only on historical consensus, which is very simplistic approach—that is, on "the ability to survive the judgments of successive generations" (*Ib.*, p. 13), which does not qualify as "analytical" pursuit. Her statement is not only simplistic but also superficial and, certainly, too prejudicial to offer any useful knowledge for substantial growth.

Such art criticism does not provide the rational foundation for a constructive argument of truth. Criticism must have in sight the truth under one hand and the dispersion of it on the other. The reader of critical work must at once undertake a comparative historical work, otherwise he or she will not be offered an opportunity to understand the principles and the function of critical work in time, which must be clear like the laws that govern society. In response to this assumption, I can prove that quality equals to substance and that the purpose of art history should not be devoid of its political interest in humanity, which overcomes all forms of empirical aestheticism.

Thus, we must be watchful and aware of Ms. Rose's criticism, which can spread and protract the fallacies of history indefinitely. In fact, her work appears to be at the center of the fallacious historical tradition that has produced the current intellectual apathy. This phenomenon, as I said must be tied in with Heidegger's mentioning that the human mind often falls out of consciousness because of "forgetfulness," and new anomalous conditions can be caused by intellectual derangements turning into inexplicable, accidental psychic phenomena. In practice, Barbara Rose, with her false assumptions and empty rhetoric, contributed to the serious historical derangements, which prevented the general expansion of

intellectual capacity to erect a constructive idea of art, to dispel old and inadequate beliefs and to advocate individual freedom on the basis of substantial knowledge. In the sum, what is certain and preoccupying is that Ms. Rose's inadequacies are being bequeathed to posterity in schools and universities, which also reflect the widespread ill tradition Michael Brenson spoke about.

2. Socio-political: In this regard, we must reflect on the meaning of true history and constructive criticism, and differentiate them from mere reportage. This study shows how art history and art criticism can be instrumental in establishing the social roles of art, and how new and advanced social theories that positively act on society can be introduced. The critic and the historian, like anyone else, must play a constructive role in establishing new values in society. Thus, art's social role must be redefined, and a transcending attitude must be implanted and nurtured in the context of all art productions. Art history is indeed a social and political history of art, as Hauser confirmed. It is the history of the humanity in art and artists: that is why a humanistic thematic must be restored in schools and universities.

When the preponderance of critical judgments are centered on subjective prejudice, false beliefs, private interests, and political hegemonies, which all steer the arts away from the established universal principles of ethical-aesthetic reason, as in the way Kant understood it, achieve a powerful preponderance. As a result, we have historical chaos, rather than a structural order of thought. Allow reason to advance and rule over the arts, and you will improve the entire political climate of a given country and of the world. At this point in history, I do not believe that any of the readers can deny that post-Renaissance arts did not excel in humanity. Nevertheless, Hilton Kramer's paradox remains stuck to the idea that criticism should act as an "informal intelligence" at a commonsense level of thought that denies the advancement of rational judgment. His statement is anachronistic, to say the least, because it does not grant art criticism to play an active role in contributing to the general intellectual advancement of art, and consequently, does not promote the acculturation of to society as a whole. He said, "I myself have never believed that the function of criticism is to change art" (*Ib.*, p. 24). This confusing statement casts further doubts upon whether art criticism has presently any function at all, except to pursue personal ends at the expense of the entire history of art and of society as a whole. Contrarily, this study shows that both art and art criticism can join forces toward ethical, aesthetic, and socio-political progress. Above all, that it may come to possess the needed internal capacity to produce socio-political dynamic changes.

Support for the arts, both spiritual and economic, cannot be targeted before defining art's social and intellectual functions to a degree of specificity and universality of values. We can no longer think of art in subjectivist terms, once we

realize its universal potential. I mentioned earlier that energy and support should be placed on crucial areas that promise social and cultural development. I believe this study offers to all the instrumental knowledge to establish valid political criteria for material and spiritual support.

3. Reductivist: The phenomenon signaled by Branson denotes a general state of intellectual poverty and apathy, typical of art's reductivist and iconoclastic tendency of the postmodern age. Artists, who are not interested in cognitive research, show disinterest and non-participation in social and political cultural life. The mind-body connection—i.e., between the physicality of art and its theoretical counterpart—is all but a unity of thought, which makes art so much less significant to anthropology as a final end. A theoretical structure must serve as a methodological forge where meaning and values are shaped and where ideas are conceptualized and expanded. In the absence of a theoretical structure of thought, the work of artists—and consequently, of critics and historians who adapt to the situation—is likewise contrived and reduced to mere imagery or description of imagery, while society is deprived of the central stimulus that allows normal perceptual expansion. Intellectual growth demands greater and more important goals in society as stimuli for the intellect. When artists are limited to the manufacture and supply of commodities that serve no other purpose than play, decoration, and ingratiation of the senses, society in general is deprived of the values and of the experiences that would otherwise enhance the quality of life.

A low concept of art reduces the cultural interest to a low perceptual level of mass consumption, like any other ephemeral items that flood the marketplace and that fail to produce the necessary stimulus to the intellect. After having described this point with more accuracy in the study, I like to mention that this condition has the short-term effect on society of failing to enrich the level of cellular cognitive complexity and the long-term effect of retarding anthropological development. The de-intellectualization of art is a condition often identified with forms of hyper-realism and sensationalism which tend to excite, provoke, and entertain rather than educate our senses. Sensuous stimuli do not demand causation, being at the physical level of response, while intellectual stimuli do question and challenge our sense faculties. When mere excitation of the senses is placed at the center of the art experience, the same is often equated with mystery and spirituality in the good sense. Indeed, this should be equated with illusion and the misapprehension of spirituality, consequently with the kind of fetishism that endows objects with illusory spiritual powers. Levi-Strauss describes in his totemic studies how totems, independently of rational judgment, are bequeathed automatically to generation after generation and become linguistic symbols. Our ancestral anthropology is not advanced when we speak of art symbols in such a way. We are today in the electronic age, and we are not thinking of bringing the art experience back to its

antipodes--only to advance it by rational judgments. Art limited to sensorial experiences conditions reality and produces the same mental exaltation found by Levi-Strauss in aboriginal tribes, rather than projecting a true perception of the world. If we can arrive at the realization that, in this way, the art experience is enormously impaired and that the functions of art in society are now quite limited, we can also arrive at the realization that a reawakening of thought can bring a climate of reflection which allows the arts to realize their potentialities and abandon those beliefs that produce intellectual atrophy, prejudice, political and material hegemony, etc. In the sum, a reawakening of thought will produce a new definition of art in society which is open to the development of anthropology.

A positive anthropology ultimately depends upon the satisfaction of intellectual needs of society, upon the application of the principles of constructive history and criticism, and upon determining the ideal functions of art in society and in the world. This realization urges artists, historians, and critics of art to move toward greater consciousness of the world and to be united in the same effort in researching the essential values of reality.

Brenson, in the article cited in this text, referred to Michelangelo's conflict between the real and the ideal, addresses the movement of the mind from mental to physical representation of reality. Michelangelo believed that the struggle between the real and the ideal delivers greater spirituality and what brings the artist closer to God. In order to extricate the essence of reality, he engaged body and mind to fulfill the greatness of human art. By all means, the making of great art belongs to the same humanistic intention of materialization of thought. Michelangelo performed this task so well. Beyond metaphysics, the essence of the meaning of reality, he believed, should always be intended as possibility as reality itself—partially envisioned, but realizable at the end, after an internal battle against the artist's belief in his or her own faculties. Contemporary artists do not know that such belief finds reinforcement in science and philosophy. These two disciplines tell us that the validity of art must ultimately be found in humanity's essential values that are yet to be uncovered. Eugene F. Kaelin advocated this type of phenomenological criticism, which inevitably places a definite distinction between reality and illusion in art. He said:

Phenomenological criticism begins with a description of what the artist has actually done. The phenomenological critic starts out by practicing the 'reduction' or suspension of belief in what he knows to be true of the world, either through common sense or through scientific knowledge. (*Ib.*, p. 33)

I believe this is not phenomenology at its best, for I have explained in my study that phenomenological criticism is to arrive at the artist's original intention and then relate the work to the ideal value of the world of reality. That is where one finds the essential values as the universal constituents of reality. The work of the critic is to identify the universal values hidden in the intentional phenomena initiated by the artist after re-ascending the sequence of causal actions leading to the work of art. From the object to the intentional value of the work of art, the analytical journey may not be so arduous if a contextual basis is established and is known to all. The temporal succession of phenomena and their causal interdependence identifies the contextual value, which the critic reproduces in writing with the employment of phenomenological reduction, analysis, and synthesis. This shows that the work of art may become an entity after the critic assesses the original meaning that the artist did or did not embody in the object toward the general realization of the universal idea of art.

To this end, the critic, before approaching the work of art, must already have an ideal structure of values in the mind to compare, for he or she cannot place values where there are none. This exemplifies the task of criticism—a task that establishes true reality and true possibilities of both the art and the world. This conviction has accompanied me throughout the study. A critical mind must possess sufficient broad rational basis for qualitative evaluative judgments, and that basis must not be subjective, but objective.

4. Educational: Having asserted that art is a product of human life and that it cannot be separated from the objectivity of nature, I must now reiterate that the dichotomy between art and nature, being postulated by Modern Art since Baudelaire, has produced disastrous philosophical and psychological consequences at the root of art education as well. Disunity from nature is the same as being against nature, which is detrimental and self-defeating to art and at all levels of existence. I referred to Baudelaire's personal despite for Jean Jacques Rousseau who emphasized the importance of nature. Today, more than ever, it can be demonstrated that, whenever art is separated from nature, either one suffers disastrous consequences. In the study, this fundamental fact has been treated from every angle in the book. The Husserlian natural standpoint and the Heideggerian rational concept of *being-in-the-world* are used by me as tools to support that our perceptions of nature and art are interdependent and that the perception of one is not possible without the other. Therefore, one is the other. Art is a product of human nature at its highest, which in turn advances our notion of both art and nature. The implementation of advanced notions of reason, of perception, of intuition, of imagination, of cognition, of consciousness, of understanding, of will, of action, and of behavior advances our nature and shapes the concept of art. This point sets the logical premises that justify radical reforms of the educational system

of the arts, which is still to come. The reform speaks about art is about intellectual cognitive completion and integration of all forms of knowledge. The application of interdisciplinary knowledge and the highest capacity of human nature is what determine the intellectual completion of the artist and what determine the quality of the work of art.

This reasoning is as circular as that of the nature of perception and consciousness of the artist. It allows an expansion of the intersubjective capacity of art in promoting evolutionary processes of human nature and individual finitude through education of the intellect. The possibility that art be essentially educational and heuristic of the intellect at all levels—perceptual, cognitive, and even genetic as long term evolutionary development establishing the internal qualities of human nature. This means that art can produce positive changes in the individual and in society at the level of anthropology.

To this effect, coincidentally, Irving Sandler (Ecker, Hausman and Sandler, 1970, p. 41) reproached the changes in art as being “revolutionary rather than evolutionary,” lamenting a certain dislocation between the past and the present, while himself failing to make essential connections with the generality of causes and effects. As we see, the need for providing a general theoretical structure of meaning calls for particular attention to art’s conventional educational criteria and for the reformation of curricula in schools. Again, historical fallacies occur because of the missing interdisciplinary links and holistic synthetic judgments from the standpoint of proven universality of knowledge. The critic and the historian can no longer judge a work of art from a subjective standpoint. This condition has to be met if we want to make the future artist into an active member of society. Assuming that art belongs to humanity, the problems of art are the problems of schools and teachers who do not keep abreast with humanistic values or who do not engage in this type of research. The entire study constitutes material for a holistic and interdisciplinary approach to art education and for designing new and advanced humanistic curricula.

Viewed in this contemporary vein, art education is necessarily interdisciplinary and necessarily humanistic because it contributes to the formative process of the individual and society as a whole. The idea of a New Humanism defined by me in the main text is based on the fact that, by advancing the sensibility of the artist, we advance the quality and sensibility of all members of the social whole.

The body of my research indicates that art education must be treated as an extended social aesthetic and existential problematic—and that means that it must be studied from all philosophical angles—just as if we were to provide full significance to higher forms of life. This is because the humanistic values of art embody both the ethical and aesthetic philosophy that give art a special type of

existential character in the world, i.e., that distinguish the artist by his or her particular intellectual development. No one can think of constituting the intrinsic values of human nature or, like Baudelaire, dissociating the same from the notion of art. This idea compels reconstituting art's historical and critical tradition as well—not its glory, but its essential purpose and values. What is incorporated into human nature as ontological and anthropological richness is at the essence of that kind of human potential Kant speaks about in the context of a natural history, a history yet to be written. Artistic values are to be understood as humanistic values alone, because they improve the nature of humanity. This synonymy of ethical and aesthetic values has been established in Kantian critical philosophy and taken by me to prove that, indeed, its adoption produces the education and *sensibilization* of the senses. The right of the individual to evolve according to his or her potential nature also ties into this ethical-aesthetic philosophy and into the Age of Enlightenment as well. It is up to us to find such potential nature to deliver aesthetic values and ethical wisdom to art. As a result, the possibility that art be a transcending force for humanity is real. This idea is not too lofty and abstract. The search for this possibility must be implemented in art education and fostered by school curricula as well as by artists as part of the social functions of art and culture, or, according to my prediction, art will become a nullity in the future.

A theory of art history and criticism, as heuristic educational instruments, shapes the art, the artist, and the future of society, which must ultimately embody the perceptions and the superior knowledge art projects and communicates. The need for dealing with this aspect is particularly evidenced in the statement of Professor David Ecker of New York University (my teacher). According to him, the solution to the problems presented is to be found in an adequate critical education. He said, “College departments of art and education must assume the responsibility of seeing that future art teachers are provided with a formal training in art criticism” (*Ib.*, p. 51). At this point, it must be agreed that my project intends to go beyond formal structures so as to incorporate the *arke* and the *telos* of art. I have rendered, quite satisfactorily, I believe, the notion of tradition in the book. Therefore, I would like to associate what Ecker said with the correct interpretation of “tradition.” To be premised that the teaching of art criticism does begin with traditional structures of judgment. What substantially affects the arts and provides a reliable methodology for the education of art and art criticism is, though phenomenological and ontological in kind, not at all empirical because it sustains basic human values – not just cultural ones. So, we are not speaking here of empirical judgments, but of phenomenological judgments. Only the latter provide the conviction of true existential values. New professional artists, critics, and historians must be given sufficient phenomenological and ontological preparation in order to be accomplished art practitioners and educators later.

Phenomenology is the study of all phenomena that affect human existence and the world. This is why most human sciences now embody its principles. Ecker, as a phenomenologist *par excellence*, added this new dimension to art criticism when he directed the attention to the kind of knowledge that determines aesthetic disciplines. Nevertheless, he emphasized that the study of art must be undertaken interdisciplinarily because art is greatly affected by all sorts of socio-humanistic phenomena. I, as his former student, took the following words literally in order to design my original research and draw my own conclusions:

Recent writing in art education places a premium on the understanding of the aesthetic response and consequently upon the full range of disciplines which relate to response; not only aesthetics, art history, art criticism, but also the psychology of art, the sociology of art, the anthropology of art. (*Ib.*, p. 55)

It becomes more obvious that what is implied in Ecker's quotation dispels Barbara Rose's quotation mentioned in the main text and renders it anomalous for critics and historians who will for life dwell in a sea of insecurity and doubt. Ecker makes her statement remains even more limited in scope and gives me ample space to extend the problematic of art criticism. In sum, Barbara Rose altered the perception of art tradition so as to rest her judgment on mere generalities, which are still with us. This shows that Modern and Post Modern Art have made no humanistic progress during the last 100 years. As I have elucidated in the introduction, the problems of art criticism originated well before the 1960s. Ecker simply opposed Rose's statement when he said:

I believe that criticism must redefine its goal and intentions at present, toward the end of eliminating some of the confusion created by the various cultural shocks and explosions of the 60s. (*Ib.*, p. 17)

This generalization does not help to structure the art criticism of the future. The things to do is to deconstruct and reconstruct from the ground up beginning with Kant's "categories." At this point, it would seem logical for Rose to establish the antecedents that drove art criticism out of its humanistic heritage and discard entirely what she believed to be a useless pursuit toward this legitimate end. However, because she represents the general fallacy of contemporary art, in order to satisfy the dialectical argument, I have had to prove the following assumptions:

1. That art can and should be regarded as an intellectual perceptual activity open to all knowledge and experiences, other than solely to subjective, sensuous, instinctive, introspective, or emotional or unconscious experiences.

2. That art should initiate a new historical development of conscious reflection, self-analysis, and a reevaluation of human values, as well as a synthesis of the entire historical knowledge of the world—scientific, philosophical, historical, sociological, anthropological etc.—thus defining its contextual functions and its existential reasons as a humanistic discipline accordingly.
3. That artists, art critics, and art historians should be united in the intent to deliver constructive and acceptable work toward the ontology of art.
4. That, if by this study it can be proven that art is an activity that constitutes true ontological value, then the role of art and art criticism is to produce work that serves the cause of humanity.

Advancing the perception of art in the world is not a dream, but a mission and should be the main reason of artists' existence and critics alike. I must reiterate that I have tried to design and structure this entire study in the same way logical perceptions constitute themselves naturally in the mind as part of the structure of human consciousness. It seemed logical to me that, in order to change the perception of art, the study should reflect the natural genealogy of perception. I am convinced that by learning the genealogy of perception, starting with Chapter One, the reader can pass logically and spontaneously from point A to point B of the general argument and easily arrive at a logical conclusion of his or her own.

2. Conceptual Structure of the Book.

Because of this distinction, the entire study then is divided in three parts: The Metacritic Circle of Perception, The New Theoretical Structures of Artistic Behavior, and The Anthropological Reasons for the Existence of Art and Conclusion.

1) The Metacritic Circle of Perception. In this part, I deal with the genesis of perception and determine how the meaning and the idea of an art object are perceived and apprehended by the mind and with acquiring the bases for greater perception of the same. This section also explains how the mind passes from an idea to the determination of substantial knowledge—that is, from cognition to perception and to the implementation of action and behavior as art. This genesis of perception is important because, as opposed to traditional theories, it is phenomenologically indivisible from the faculties of reflection, reason, cognition, understanding, and judgment. I believe this notion alone has the potential to change the course of art and that of the world as a whole. The intellectual faculties are now known to have equiprimordial functions. Their working together discounts Kant's dichotomy of "noumenon" and phenomenon and the possibility

that cognition may be separated from perception. The phenomenological approach to the perception of any ideas, concepts, and their objects leads to the perception of reality and to all non-dissociable forms of understanding, which separate the rational from the other psychological and uncontrollable structures of the mind. Therefore, I begin with the treatment of the rational structures of perception, of consciousness, expanding the discourse on thought and on language to arrive at the notion of conscious behavior. In synthesis, this is the groundwork for construing an intentional, rational theory of action and behavior in art.

2) The New Theoretical Structures of Artistic Behavior. It is understood that, generally, in the human mind, there must be a well-constructed, logical purposive thought before passing into action, and that is true because, before attempting any action and likewise any art, we must have a clear idea and an intentionality of meaning and purpose in the mind. I amply and plausibly demonstrate that no action and no art are ever without intention, even at the unconscious level. In other words, unintentional art is not possible at any level. Art without thought is nonsense because the mind is never an empty container and cannot be programmed without ideas. Though, it is a fact that either reason or prejudice abide in the mind—often prejudice from false myths, distorted cultural traditions, child reminiscences, dreams, etc., often constituting the sources of senseless production of works of art. At the same time, all things in life and in the universe have meaning and purpose for us, and so has art. Theory is a natural condition and a process of thought that defines the intention and the reasons as to why we make art. Therefore, it makes no sense to think of art without a projective structure of thought, as it would make no sense of the construction of a building without an architectural plan that defines method of construction and final ends. We arrive at the realization of logical judgments of reality, quality, and values in life only by the act of rational reflection. Any thought present in the history of art contrary to this argument is an absurdity. It is a fact that there must be thought in the mind before passing into action—action that transforms matter and produces meaningful changes in nature. Theory and thought form our beliefs, justify our feelings, and move our body into purposive action. Art does not elude this natural movement; art cannot be deprived of this rational necessity by some historicity or by subjective criticism, for it defeats the notion of anthropology as a whole. Therefore, this second part deals with the problems of theory, of *praxis* of method, and of judgment, in order to provide the theoretical and structural means for the implementation of art ideas as purposive thought of action and behavior—purposive to humanity—as well as for arriving at a workable theoretical model of art history and art criticism.

3) The Anthropological Reasons for the Existence of Art and Conclusion. In order to reconstruct the logical perceptual, historical, cultural, and social significance of art, we must obtain a true sense of its potential, objective humanistic validity—i.e., perceive art for what it is and can do in the anthropological sense. Culture, both in generality and particularity, is the macro-contextual ground that determines existential validity and anthropological developments, but it must be redefined and rendered clear in its significance at the *micro* and *macro* level of individual existence. Today we have scientific proofs from microbiology and genetic sciences that “acculturation” translates with genetic complexity and therefore that the art experience enriches human intelligence. This ascertains that culture can be intended not only as emancipation, but as genetic enrichment of the species, sensibilization of human nature, and much more. Art is therefore a necessary ingredient for the future of humanity. All and nothing can be culture if there is no understanding of this anthropological end. As a result, art is intellectual emancipation primarily because it plays a substantial anthropological role in human life. It expands both the human’s mental faculties and the actual biological intelligence. Therefore, this third part is an analytical discourse about the anthropological effects of culture, art, and aesthetic implemented both in individual and social existence. The structure of the consciousness and intentionality of every single individual determines the development of an entire society of individuals when endowed with this realization. Following the Husserlian-Heideggerian model of authentic existence in time, this part arrives at the definition of the artist’s existence as an important active social participation. The study concludes with recommendations for the practical actualization of a rational model for a new, authentic, responsible artistic behavior and with an outlook of the expected results from this new positive approach to productive study and research.

Introduction

1. General Introduction.

I began writing this book in the early 1970s, when the need to operate a *deconstruction* was the full-fledged topic of literature and linguistic philosophy. The desire to write this book was certainly stimulated by realization of the contrasting notions appearing in art books, art journals and magazine influencing in negative and confusing manner the public opinion and the new generation of artists about art. My decision was thus consequential, after the many reflections of many thinkers on the controversial and contradictory notions of the history and criticism of the entire literature of art. The book is timely now after the hermeneutical connotation of deconstruction has been established and has become a part of the arts' vocabulary. Since the early 1980s I have had time to research and reflect upon all aspects of art's production, historicization and politicization — enough to produce the first interdisciplinary comprehensive study ever done.

In retrospect, deconstruction has done nothing to advance or even address new theories, or new hypothesis on the true validity of art in society. Almost 30 years later, art is still under the Duchampian spell where artists act upon matter to produce a distortion of reality and to destroy humanistic values under the idea of *deconstruction*. Art history and art criticism are two accomplices in this destructive action because they fail to appropriate the knowledge needed to reconcile form and content and open a linguistic debate upon the problems facing the arts and humanity as a whole. Deconstruction for the sake of deconstruction made no sense then and makes no sense now because to all forms of deconstruction must follow a reconstruction, not only of language, but of human values as well. For long time even philosophers like Jacques Derrida believed that the idea of art has an end onto itself, which was discarded so that dealing with “art for the sake of humanity” is an anachronism, as if freedom of thought had a limit or if “pure freedom” in art would be a form of decadence. We must remind ourselves that art is made by humans for humans. Therefore, it must pursue existential values. Thus, after deconstruction, the following reconstruction is now due:

- a) Art, philosophically speaking is a human concept-not a God-given concept, whose perception helps expand the notion of reality, and enrich and fulfill our mental faculties and our spiritual lives.
- b) The latest scientific research in neuroscience, molecular biology, and genetics proves that complex perceptual and cognitive experiences enrich cellular intelligence and expand the mental faculties of reason, intuition and imagination, which contribute to human evolution. Art offers such complex perceptual and cognitive experiences and no one has the right to interdict the

creative process of the mind by reducing art to mere production and consumption of commodities.

- c) Contemporaneously to the latest developments in science there has been considerable advancements in the philosophies of mind, the most notable of which is phenomenology, as a method of thought and determination of truth, which has gone a long way, since Hegel's publication of the *Phenomenology of Mind* in the late 1800s exploring the idea and the dynamic of perception from which the communication of the qualities and values of art depend.
- d) The phenomenology of perception gave rise to further developments in the philosophies of truth, such as linguistic hermeneutics, since Aristotle defined it as the science of interpretation. Art is language in all its forms and media and the hermeneutics of art developed in the present study, which helps further the concept of art from the cultural and sociological standpoints, and place art at the center of human activities and contribute schools and universities to form better and more socially conscious artists.
- e) Ultimately, the book was written under the firm belief that expanded perception and better understanding of art, will help to make it more creative, more productive, more just society and more intelligent human beings, anthropologically speaking.

Speaking from such an interdisciplinary standpoint, can anyone tell me whether in the future of the world there will ever be artists with the intelligence and talent of Michelangelo (1475-1564), Leonardo Da Vinci(1452-1512), or even Paolo Uccello (1397-1475), to represent what art is or show us the ultimate vision of humanity? Artists have stopped searching for answers to these questions and identifying the nature of art for more than four hundred years. After four hundred years of artistic development, we cannot settle for a concept of art as "sensationalism" and the object of art merely employed to decorate a wall, fill an empty space, or satisfy the lowest human inclinations

Conscious of what perception is, more than forty years ago, I realized the need to study art from a larger perspective, larger than anyone has ever done in the history of art. There is ample evidence that mankind has undergone substantial cognitive-anthropological changes during the last few millennia, and that art proved to be a significant instrument in such changes. In short, the concept and the perception of art encompass all that human beings are, in their universality of substantial spirit, in their knowledge, and their potentiality for being. As I explain in the book, art should be considered a primary potential instrument of anthropological changes, because of its contribution to the qualities and complexities of genetic intelligence. This notion is greatly substantiated by recent studies in genetics and confirmed in the recently decoded DNA structures.

Interpreted from Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804) idea of *Universal History*,

anthropology is not only a passage of time, a cyclical movement of causes and effects that change and transform human nature, but a process of mind and spirit—namely, the forming of a universal consciousness that makes a mark in the changing reality of the world and at any point in time shows itself as a true being (what we are as humans), and produces everlasting transformation of human substance. Ultimately, there is some historical truth in all historical narratives, but there is only one true history, which can be called “universal,” which, in Kant’s view, is the highest development and manifestation of spirit and intelligence in human nature, which we call anthropology. So why shouldn’t art incorporate the substantive thought of anthropology, embrace the thematic of nature, and be a contributor to humanity?

This, I believe, is an enlightening view that should be reflected upon and embodied in all human expressions—in writing, in art, in poetry, in music, imbedded in school curricula, implemented in social programs, etc. Human substance embodies all the conceptualized values that human thought has ever been able to produce in time. It represents what we are today as humans. Thought is ultimately the conveyor of meaning, feelings, perceptions, and ideas that must be expressed in words. Humans are involved in a perennial process of refinement of thought and the values it purports. Thought is made of words, and ultimately, we judge our feelings, our ideas and edify our consciousness with its product of words. The written word is the ultimate tangible reassurance of what we have mentally accomplished and who we are as humans. One should not wonder why an artist like Michelangelo or Da Vinci began to write. To this effect, there is so much to be said in this book about the necessity to express and to build a bridge of ideas among people.

Writing, in Jacques Derrida’s (1930-2004) conception, is the most significant expression of human thought—and, I add, significant in terms of cognitive and genetic enrichment as anthropological embodiment of knowledge. Levi-Strauss proved that language is more than a reflection of anthropology, as it was thought produced by former empirical scholars. The dynamic of thought is therefore unstoppable. Whether expressed in a metaphorical, fictional, or non-fictional form, writing, the expression of it, is always an interpretation of the ways the writer understands life and feels about the facts and events that affect his or her existence. By all means, writing is the referential gage that defines the profundity and the development of human substance. Those writers whose minds are set in the past and who write from the perspective of the past about the present and about the future contribute nothing to the transformation of human substance, those writers whose minds are set in the present and write from the perspective of the present about the past and the future contribute in some ways to such transformation, and finally, those writers whose minds are set in the future and who write from such

perspective about the present, the past contribute the most because they produce a synthesis of substance in time. Also, these writers, who acquire synthetic knowledge can pass it on to others and show the way to practical developments, which opens the way to evolution. Possessing synthetic knowledge is the same as embarking upon the most comprehensive, critical analysis to arrive at its most advanced resolution. I believe I have done all I can to belong to the last category.

Therefore, I say: in view of this last thought, before anyone can write significantly about art, he or she should have set his or her mind on its future, have produced a synthesis and a vision of anthropological developments, and, thus, have a truly significant and valid basis from which to formulate ideas. Those who do not operate a synthesis on mankind's natural history obviously oppose all others. But little do they know that their work will be judged and proved to be meaningless because it is short-sighted and inapplicable as time goes by.¹ Simply said, a holistic comprehensive knowledge confers them a capacity to analyze a larger causal spectrum of events, identify ideal conditions of reason, and determine greater application of the fundamental principles of nature, of life, and of art.

A student of art is such insofar he or she is also a student of life in this comprehensive way. He or she must take on extremely advanced theories of reason, of nature, and of life, applying them to the concept of art, but doing such a thing beyond anyone's expectations can be dangerous because it may challenge conservative, incredulous, and pessimistic art groups whose ideas stagnate in time and are set too far behind a holistic understanding, which makes them not open to changes and even fight arduously for their false convictions. Some art groups, as exhibited in the history of art, met changes with fierce opposition and even hostility. Those who resist ideas retard human development as a whole, but, also, changes should not occur solely for change's sake. We all recall the case of Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) in 1610 when opposition was built even before he could prove apodictic certainty of his theories. However, I believe that an artist whose convictions rest on historical and scientific truth must have the courage to be and to act in conformity with his or her ideas.

So why have I spent more than forty years of my life to write this monumental work? This is the reason: I have tried to encompass in my discourse a large spectrum of knowledge and to examine reality from a future perspective

¹ Expanding on what I just said, those who operate such synthesis, taking the past from the prospect of the present, may be somehow accurate for having treated the past as antecedent but contribute little because they fail to have engaged dialectically with the temporal continuity of time. Generally stated, in order to express accurate reality, one must be comprehensive and incorporate the entire knowledge and the potentialities of the world. In other words, one must be "holistic," as to the signification of ideas in terms of time and space because limited knowledge will only produce limited and inaccurate changes. Those who write about the future are at times called "luminaries." Only the luminaries can produce holistic changes in terms of substantial advancements, structure, re-conceptualization and re-contextualization of thought.

before proving my points. The reader will be able judge the logical applicability and validity of my thoughts, whether I have succeeded in providing autonomy and finitude to each of my statements. I believe that when one formulates thought, he or she must consider himself or herself to live in a continuous causal, phenomenal world. In order to activate changes in a revolving world, one must have visions and operate on the causal dynamics of things. Phenomena are the only true expressions of a changing reality.²

All phenomena participate theoretically in a logical and rational discourse and the action that follows. The natural dynamic of Aristotle's *organon* is therefore explained. The laws of nature revolve as a phenomenological carousel, which moves the course of events. And, how does one make a synthesis from a future perspective? By advancing and following the logical dynamic necessity of phenomena. The reason of existing things is called "causality," defines the sequential movement of causes and effects. A book, a work of art, or a scientific discovery may be made a part of the causal process that changes the world. A writer knows when he or she has reached sufficient knowledge and understanding of potential phenomena to produce changes in the world. This thought alone should make anyone reach the conclusion that art is a powerful tool to be used wisely and effectively toward humanistic developments. But art, this human activity, is in need of a new perceptual approach, a new philosophical, sociological, and scientifically accurate synthesis of the existing knowledge in order to produce humanistic developments. The expansion of human understanding and the realization of human potential in the world is the vision moving the mind toward new frontiers. We all must make sure that art be perceived under this new light in order to assign the highest human purpose to it. At this point in history, I believe that to provide the perception of art within this new perspective is not only a historical necessity, but above all, an ethical obligation for all of us artists – for art must always be the driving force of human behavior.

Why is this thought representing an ethical necessity? Because the idea of art has the greatest potential of communicating the highest human values human thought may devise. The potential of human becoming, (the driving force of human behavior), may be better understood in the context of art that in any other discipline. In other words, the vision of a new becoming must always exist in the mind of the artist and materialize or, according to Kant, he or she fails to belong to

² When one considers whether something is true, he or she must examine the phenomena that express it. An example of this phenomenology is the following: I am now here at my desk, writing. This is not an illusion. My desk is made of wood; it exists whether I want it to or not. The phenomenological sequence of such phenomena can prove that this desk, which was once a tree, a seed, which came from another tree, which in turn was wood and a seed, and so forth and so on, has existed before me, and like anything in the world, it is part of my natural history.

the “intelligible” world (Kant). The question of what art is or what it should be, even in an era such as ours of scientific revolution and super technological advancements, remains unanswered. Once I state all my projections, it will become clear to anyone that the “intelligentsia” of art owes a great contribution to the history of humanity and to the creative minds that led human thought to the higher spheres of humanistic endeavors. Now, we better know now what art is from a “futurible” perspective in order to do the best of our creative energies; for we must move forward with candid visions and logical thinking to produce a synthesis of who we are with a sense of ethical responsibility. This statement is not at all inaccurate when we seek to know all that there is to know about human nature, about human life on this earth. We certainly cannot credit Modern Art with helping us in this effort. A reform in the way we think about art must take place because the problems of art are central to the constitution and development of our very genetic intelligence. (This topic is well researched in the book, especially in Chapter VI). Central to the values and the pursuit of happiness rests human intelligence—insofar as we need to determine art’s intellectual and sociological role in projecting, improving, and advancing human existence.

When we ask ourselves “what is matter?” or “what is water or iron?” we can today produce scientific answers that are specific and incontrovertible, and thus we can respond with matters of fact rather than with esoteric answers. Matter is a structure of molecules reducible to smaller parts, such as electrons, neutrons, positrons, etc. Water is a compound of hydrogen and oxygen, H₂O; Iron is identified as No. 29 among the minerals. It is a ductile, malleable mineral with an atomic weight 55.85, etc., but when we ask “What is art?” or “What is the kind of freedom, ethics, or aesthetics applying to art?” We are in a bind because we cannot resort to science to provide specific answers. In fact, science can do nothing to answer these questions directly because these are human concepts for which we must find rational, philosophical, historical, sociological reasons—reasons that fit logically and sensibly together like a science. It is we humans, in this day and age, who decide what art is in conformity with our understanding and development of reason. An explanation of the concept of art cannot be found in the Bible or in the Book of the Dead, but must be logical and coherent with our nature. Therefore, it can be determined only by copulative analysis and synthesis and an interdisciplinary study such as this.

This study, by implementing the most advanced findings in all disciplines of knowledge, should give the reader a complete analysis, synthesis, and assessment of a possible idea of art at this time in history and a realistic projection of its potential realizations. What art can do for you and what you can do for art can be discovered right here in this work. I can advance such ideas on which I have reflected on and mature for 5 decades. For the sake of this introductory argument, I

can say that art is and must remain an open concept that can help change human nature for the better, and we all can help in this endeavor. Some people may not want art to become more emancipated and more austere in spite of the potentialities of human nature, for it would not produce higher market prices, but we all agree that this is a treacherous and insidious motive. Art can be understood in the future not as illusion, as a decoration, or as image-making activity, but as a discipline devoted to a general cognitive and experiential assessment of nature and culture of the world in which we live. To substantiate this contention, which is an ethical one, we need only to ask this preliminary question: Aren't all disciplines of human knowledge anything other than efforts to understand and optimize human knowledge? The discipline of art is no exclusion to this rule, and for the same reasons, art is not a category of its own.

We all must understand the necessity of an underlying ethical discourse in all the things we do, or we are displaced from the practical, integral, and determining conditions of nature and its laws. An ethical discourse prescribes art to reflect the substance of those who make it so as to embody the essential existential human knowledge of anthropology. Under this aegis, anyone can understand that ephemeral attitudes about art impinge upon and reject human intellectual development altogether -- all to the detriment of humanity as a whole. Looking at ephemeral attitudes of life brings about ethical questions of human energy, which are not to be discounted, because they do not follow the natural logic of what I call "positive anthropology." Therefore, by failing to assign a proper asset to art as well as to all other human activities, we fail to organize human intelligence in the most efficient way, and thus waste precious human energy that could help make this world a much better place in which to live and prosper.

Positive anthropology, in my view, is organization of human knowledge, a project undertaken by many philosophers. Art, I believe, should be placed within the context of positive human knowledge in order to advance anthropology. The most contemporary philosopher possessing this expanding thought was Michel Foucault (1926-1984). He did do a great job in placing art in its proper, legitimate, necessary philosophical, sociological, and ethical relationship with the essential notion of human life. Somehow, some philosophers go along with critical and historical generalities and identify art solely with the external notions of "styles." Styles, trends, and fashions contribute very little to essential human values. I feel I can contribute to this aim, and this is why I have undertaken the enormous task of reorganizing the knowledge of art and provide it with a new philosophical structure I call phenomenology based on phenomenal, scientific truth, and at the same time, comply with the ethical principles of human nature. With this work, I believe I honor Michel Foucault's notion of "the order of things," which advocates

organization of knowledge, and compels a sense of duty to maintain it. Art is not exonerated from this ethical principle because it provides human nature with the proper tool to actualize the due potential of growth and development.

As I said, art does not arise from biblical or supernatural givens. Art is strictly a human invention that has not kept up with the progress of human thought since the seventeenth century. Their current status, above and beyond their historical misconceptions, can be universally accepted now as signifying the lack of reflection necessary for special actions that affect our anthropology and all things that are meant to advance human life, as well as, conceptually contribute to the constant renewal of thought as meaningful humanistic achievement.

This treatise proves that our views about cultural judgments and about the quality of human life much depend upon our perceptions and upon what we mean by art. After I prove what it means to perceive, it will be clear to the reader that art demands a constant expansion and refinement of its fundamental thought. Expansion means that the notion and the perception of art is fundamental to the understanding of life, nature, and ourselves as humans, thus the basis to form a substantial organization of knowledge. One cannot make good and significant art by means of vagarious thought, by playing with images, colors, words, symbols, myths, etc. It is my belief, as it is a law of nature that there must be an end for every art project. Art must identify with the very advancement of human values we rarely find in books of mass consumption. This is because a work of art represents everything but the aesthetic object under phenomenological coordinates defining the special meaning toward the advancement of those human values from which our anthropology depends. So let us start now to think about a positive and dynamic anthropology in the highest sense. By “central values,” I intend the exemplary refinement of our senses; the development of our mental faculties; and, in general, the entire conception of life here on earth. The consciousnesses of the artist must be able to embody all this in his or her mind in order to make art the medium that communicates the higher aesthetic values, which by Kant’s notion, are synonymous with ethical values.

Aesthetic values cannot but extend to ethical values simply because both categories belong to the higher spheres of human quality. Such conceptual advancement was once envisioned by the most significant thinkers of the Age of Enlightenment, who contributed to the ethical discourse of human life in general, the same which gave birth to the principles of human rights. It is because of the Age of Enlightenment that the word *aesthetic* now embodies an ethical component, essential to future humanistic developments of art and life itself. What we have learnt from the Age of Enlightenment is that from the advancement of knowledge depends the legitimate and rightful fulfillment of both body and mind.

From this fundamental ethical ground came the necessity to coin my term *Arteology*, as study of art in a new phenomenological context, in order to prospect what is legitimately and rightfully implied in an expanding concept of time and history. And, since art is a human concept, by advancing the notion and the perception of art, I believe I bring its concept to the level of logical scientific notion of life itself. Here, the term *scientific* precisely stands as advancement of the fundamental natural necessity from which human development depends. The logic and the concept of art should stand on this superior knowing of human life. I know now, more than ever that there can be a science of art, which in this case relates directly to an aesthetic and ethical quest from an ample phenomenological and hermeneutic perspective projected in time. By that, I mean a pure interpretation of phenomena that determines the correct application of existential principles and values of human life.

The root meaning of the word *art* actualizes a potential to expand the human intellect at all times in history. The new term *Arteology* says it. The ending - *logy*, we know, stands for study, science, or, at least, a scientific approach that defines newer conceptual structures. That which has aesthetic and ethical value—that which constitutes phenomenological research of the truth of being—should be considered under a new definition of science. However, the qualities of phenomena and of what Aristotle referred to as *apophantic*—that which ultimately shows itself as being a logical, causal, and historical product of pure knowledge and that constitutes this new philosophy of art. Looking at the world aesthetically means to bring all aspects of life under a perceptual balance. The study of *Arteology* shows that aesthetic is refinement of thought belonging to the very dynamic of an ethical perception of the true meaning of human life.

Thus, *Arteology* also stands as a movement toward the reawakening of substantial thought as fundamental ground for the idea of art, as well as for uncovering the fundamental values that expand and refine the perception of art, which is the very goal of this treatise. In my fifty years of thinking about art, I have found no reason why art should not be a transcending force in human existence. This idea is supported by any philosophy of life and nature and can be substantiated by any individual existence in the world. The truth is that all beings, all ideas, all concepts must have a reason for being in the world, and all beings exist for as much as we are able to perceive them.

Perception, therefore, is what guides human behavior and, in particular what defines the kind the artist's participation in the world. This is why the notion of perception is central in this book. It is studied in its particularity and generality nearly to exhaustion and updated to conform to the latest findings in molecular biology and brain physiology. A perception, understood as dynamism of experiential knowledge, provides the capacity to apprehend the object in detail to

invite new and greater perceptions. A new perception of things means new knowledge being formed and entering the mind as enlarged multidimensional apprehension of the qualities and values of the object, etc. But new knowledge and new concepts require new and adequate linguistic expressions. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) proved that there are ordinary linguistic dynamics that are often illogical and alter our perception of reality. Any form of language must follow perceptual structures to have any behavioral effect. Often, linguistic usages follow psychological trends and customs that frequently reverse the course of human knowledge so as to bury life's essential meaning forever, which is always a tragedy. This, we may say, is what has happened to the perception of art.

The language of art should be holistic, systematic, synthetic, necessary, and continuous so as to move along with the dynamic, logical necessity of culture and anthropology. It should never be dispersed because the dispersion of language represents dispersion of *reference* and what the sign or symbol stand as perceptual substance and as the body of communication. Indeed, the primacy of language expresses what and who we are, what we know, and defines in a progressive and synthetic way our existence and our culture. That is why Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) called it "the house of being."

This entire study may be looked at as a philosophical and linguistic exercise: propaedeutic and application of a newer phenomenological thought leading to the discovery of a terminology that carries the legitimate substantial thought of life and art. Maintaining a holistic and analytical approach to language is this writer's main precept, so that we do not lose our history and our heritage and maintain a true sense of who we are. I have discovered that phenomenology is the only advanced philosophy able to help us in this effort, for it gets us closer to the truth of things and to the thinkers who came before us. I believe that phenomenology is the ultimate philosophy that can provide art with a foundation of truth. Once truth is arrived at, what more philosophy do we need? We must realize that truth is not an isolated abstract word since it is the foundation that erects our perceptual consciousness. Abstract words do not offer objective truth by themselves. Truth is determination of existence independent from our will and action, but when applied to language it is like a timeless temple of magnificence. According to Heidegger, we have the ultimate philosophy called *ontology* which components of language and truth determine our anthropological foundation. The term *ontological truth* must, therefore, occupy the correct contextual space in the perception of art. To gain the true perception of phenomenological language means to embody factual existence and an expanded perception of truth as *ontology*. This idea reinforces the conviction that art as language can express the highest potentiality of being of both the performed object and performing subject. In other words, the work of art must indeed the true representation of the artist' substance.

By probing the thought of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Martin Heidegger for more than thirty years, I came to realize the potentiality of phenomenological thought as an asset toward the study of art. As I proved, phenomenological thought offers a plausible window into the mental dynamics of the perception and consciousness of art in ways that activate changes in the world. This is not a utopian statement because art is truth, not illusion.

Husserl, the master of phenomenological thought, showed that essential phenomena are bound in the language that governs our perceptions, our beliefs and our actions. He developed the analytical tool for seeking the linguistic, *eidos*, i.e., the essence determining the meaning of life. He showed that truth can be found in the intrinsic phenomena that constitute reality and in the forces generated by the will. This concept is universal and applies in life as well as in art. Phenomenological truth is the closest we can come to “apodictic” reality as opposed to empirical or virtual reality. This fact is as tangible and believable as the reasons we exist in this world. We do not have to dwell on this point since the Cartesian *ergo cogito sum* established it in the 16th century. Artists must therefore rest firm in the belief of reality rather than dreams as stronghold of security and fortitude.

Illusions and the quest for empirical truth have been problematic for both Eastern and Western philosophers. Scientific determination of truth offers security “above and beyond” the hypothetical character of appearance, which is the proper basis for arguments. In other words, we cannot build solid philosophical structures on empirical manifestation of reality. Analytic philosophers in particular, who found inspiration in Aristotle’s thought, still believe that empirical truths can be found in the margins of analytical language. Empirical truths, like the existence of the image of God, remain abstractions because they do not manifest intrinsic causality. This statement is correct in principle because the image of God remains impossible even to imagine because it is abstract reality yet empirical due to its indeterminable causality.

Language is all we have to identify truth, but the lack of adequacy of language allows more ambiguity circumventing necessity, so that philosophy has become an exercise of research of analytical fallacies. We must keep in mind that truth exists for itself and in itself. The logical, existential necessity of language is needed for the communication of truths, but first we must satisfy language’s amplitude of meaning manifested as *arke*, namely the forgotten language manifesting the essential being. In fact, the wealth and continuity of human knowledge depends on language’s adequacy to express it.³

³. Heidegger said that language is the “house of being,” therefore a rethinking of everything embodied in language should allow true meaning to emerge and free us from the contingencies of life.

At this point, the purpose of any philosophy of life and art is to unearth what has been buried for millennia by forgetfulness and bring about new perceptual meaning into the open. When the true meaning and values of things become less vivid and less plausible in our mind, we know we are in need of returning to the *arke* to regain the original meaning. In other words, we need our perceptual horizon to continue to expand and reach the holistic ideas of our civilization and embody their substance by logical causal necessity, for we do not want to make the same errors of leaving truth aside or bring the logical dynamics of thought to a halt. Human expressions, art included, must bridge the natural and the aesthetic world, and be synthetic and comprehensive of humans' natural history. What is endemic in human substance must be preserved and advanced. We cannot forget our past and who we are in relation to nature and to the world.

Immanuel Kant bridged ethic and aesthetic philosophy to prove the infinite potential substance of human nature. The "Enlightenment" established that ethic and aesthetic are bound by a single analytical truth that determines the right of humans to materialize within the possibilities of nature. The anthropological weight of this statement is enormous because it brings about the purposes of the sciences and the arts in the forefront as torches of light to show the way of a rewarding human life.

Kant believed that aesthetics is about the highest combination of ethical values applicable to life and art. It is actually a constant inquiry into natural truths that embody the finest human knowledge; while ethics is implementation of such truths, which guarantees potential human development. In other words, aesthetics cannot exist without its ethical counterpart because once truths are discovered, we have the duty to implement and live them. In practice, an individual is ethical and moral if he or she reflects the truth of aesthetic nature in personal, social, scientific, political, and artistic life. The artist is bearer and herald of such aesthetic truths. He or she must be truthful and faithful to his or her nature. This commitment must be regarded as inviolable philosophical creed of self-expression. Art and language thus bear this ethic-aesthetic necessity, which grants special seal of quality of expression. One cannot commit to be truthful to a belief that cannot be proved or that cannot be embodied in a positive consciousness.

Language is the "house of being," said Heidegger, but it is also a metaphor of being because it is a medium of conveyance of the truths of being. As a medium, it can be analytical when it cannot be separated from truth by deficient adequacy. Adequacy is achieved in direct proportion to metaphor. Analyticity, according to Aristotle, is an acceptable level of linguistic adequacy. There are two kinds of metaphors to be distinguished here: one that approximates truth and one that

abstracts it, but none of the two may reach a good level of adequacy. Ideally, truth requires a direct necessity between the internal and external world of being thus one that maintains the genealogy of meaning in linguistic expressions, i.e., the expression of itself, and the *in-itself*. A thing in itself is true when it is recognized as being by necessity what it is. That is why art must assert itself as such and retain the causal necessity between the inner and the outer nature that brings it to the fore. True art is truth insofar it is recognized a free and unhindered expression of nature and nature's distinctive essence and existence designated by natural necessity.

Necessarily, the notion of art compels the search for truths as natural existence. The artist is necessarily a researcher of truth by choice and commitment. We all must be truthful to ourselves insofar as we are conscious to exist as entities in a natural world. Our natural existence has validity *per se* if it possesses its own reason for being, even if it is not fully understood. Like Descartes, we know we can prove our existence since we know that outside the natural world there is no other existence for us to mingle with. Like Descartes, we can prove our existence by another form of true existence. We move forward in this discourse only if we can prove a necessity of tangible existence and closest adequacy of language. That is why a constitutive consciousness embodying true knowledge and the truth of art makes a superior consciousness. Why constitutive? Because, as we shall see in Chapter Two of the book, human consciousness starts as a concept of reality at the pure theoretical level only to realize itself as an instrument of the truth of being and to produce results by incorporating and constituting the perceptions of reality in a logical order. Only true knowledge can determine a secure and actionable perceptual consciousness.⁴ In other words, a non-constitutive knowledge—that is, empirical, one that merely recognizes external differences—equals to a displaced consciousness that cannot find its place in the world or become instrumental in the making of it.

The great historical token of human development is one that satisfies the idea of art by conscious necessity. We all realize the importance of knowledge of the world by causal necessity. The law of causation must be invoked in everything we do, since all actions must be ascertained by cause and effect, but we often neglect the necessity that proves the motives of action, and that is why, we fail to move forward in art and in life. Causal necessity is determined by conscious analysis and synthesis. Toward this end, Kant invited us to exert synthetic a priori judgments as the production of truth and to place them before all other analytical judgments for proper assessments of values. Since we now have defined and entered in possession of the instruments to establish the truth of art by a priori

⁴ We shall learn in the course of this treatise the ramifications of the important correlations of thought, reason, and behavior.

judgment, by not attending to it, we violate the ethical rule of “duty”—duty to fulfill the potentiality of our nature and achieve the scope of an extensive positive anthropology.⁵ Art needs truth to accomplish its anthropological function for there are no more adequate disciplines to lead to such actionable *praxis*.

Being the ethics and aesthetics of art synonymous, the necessity of one applies to the other. The today’s world characterized by chaotic historic conditions, the major necessity for art is to have a special purpose and higher levels of sensibility in order to interact with intelligence. To this end Something more beyond “creativity” will be required to associate the superior values with this word and distinguish the particularity of the work of art, which belongs to the universality of culture destined to make human nature all-so great as to define a greater degree of “intelligibility” than what Kant has already done. For this project of changing the world, as we will come to discover, it is obvious that we must learn how to arrive at the phenomenological analysis and synthesis of reality and affect the final judgment of what is there as reality of being. The goal is to possess greater knowledge to advance perceptual sensibility. My phenomenological theories will do just that referring to the special thought that refines the artist’s faculties.

It can be understood that this treatise, during the making, has developed into a new approach a new phenomenological method applicable to just about any human endeavor. My theory of phenomenology, in my view represents a new approach to the understanding and the perception of art resting on the realization of an absolute natural necessity that compels causal necessity thus beyond traditional descriptive phenomenological discourse. It goes deeper into the logic and the dynamics of phenomena to discover their inner causality that will apply to all aspects of life. This new approach is substantiated by the fact that any thought passing through our mind can be explained causally. In this sense, a causal phenomenology is a more suitable research tool than a descriptive one. For this reason, there can be no confusion as to the congenial means and the ends of art. My theory cuts through the superfluous and unnecessary linguistic contingencies of metaphor to arrive at the essential value of things and anything that performs ethical functions.⁶ Causal phenomenology allows us to look at history in general and provide due criticism, not before I attend to the criticism of current art trends that occur in Chapter Seven and Eight. The critical discourse begins to acquire

⁵ It is like denying a heart transplant to a patient when there is one available in the refrigerator.

⁶ I must, therefore, forward my apologies for making what may seem a direct attack on the philosophical and artistic communities, when I say that ontology, as a product of phenomenology, is the *ultimate philosophy* and Heidegger, the most important philosopher of Western thought. The philosophical novelty being offered here is thus a causal phenomenology as a tool for determining the nature and the future of art. This statement will acquire proper countenance after I use this tool to probe into the notion of the history of art and make precise phenomenological historical assessments.

substance in the following Chapters and come to a final conclusion in Chapter Eleven and Twelve with the support of Husserl and Heidegger.

As I move through the application of a causal phenomenology in a variety of ways, that is, as I proceed to its application with the interpretation and criticism of the prevailing theories of art. Since the beginning I believe that good developments always emerge from correct methodologies, especially if I correctly interpreted Nietzsche, who asserted that method is the core of art and science. Therefore, I believed that the idea of art must be shaped by the criticism and redefinition of phenomenology, or the latter form – known as “descriptive” will have no effect or jurisdiction over art or life.

In Chapter one, we learn from G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) that from an accurate consciousness of the object, consequential developments of contextual self-consciousness occur. Vice versa, the entire perceptual process is inversed as the subject becomes the object of perception and the process begins again with new perception of the object. This statement alone defines the correct movement and the relation of artist and the work of art. The analysis of this process constitutes the essence of both the object and subject providing as well the correct consciousness of art -- a necessary ingredient for the contemporary artist. This is so because consciousness is always consciousness of something and of itself. The perceiving subject after the initial stage, inevitably perceives himself or herself while perceiving the object. This thought obviously requires much reflection, especially when we say we possess the consciousness of art. My causal method prescribes that a true perceptual consciousness is to identify the essential phenomenal components that determine the existence of both subject and object, as in René Descartes' (1596-1650) meditations of the *cogito ergo sum*, where I realize that I exist, insofar as another causal existence is before me.⁷

From the causal phenomenological analysis developed in Chapter Seven, we learn that the current definition of the history of Modern Art has little to do with anthropology, but more to do with playful modes of existence that change the image of the artist shaped by the Renaissance. We also learn that mere narrative lacks methodology and scientificity especially from the standpoint of my new approach, which requires causal reasons of existence. In other words, from my perspective, Modern Art does not pass the causal phenomenological analytical test because it lacks analytical necessity.

In the same chapter, the reader envisions beforehand what I mean by the term *causal history*? It means that, through phenomenology, the truth of the

⁷ If things are so, why do we look at art as a sacrosanct and untouchable symbol, while it has been dealt with as a product of mere narrative, lacking the very causal purposive reasons of existence?_

history of art can be brought to the essential level of factual phenomena—that is, reduced to and synthesized from the notion of literary narrative to bare essential and anthropological facts. The arising question the reader will address is the following: in what substantial manner did the history of art contributed to culture and anthropology when it has forgotten all humanistic values? My criticism also alleges that, although narrative makes reading more enjoyable and entertaining, it brings about enough ambiguous and ephemeral notions that disperse the causal reasons establishing anthropological meaning and values. To cure the historical narrative, my phenomenology prescribes reduction, precisely Husserl's *epoche*, which I treat and practice throughout the entire book. This same approach reduces things to their essence and substance and reiterates the demand for a tantamount distinction between history and *historicity*, that which has been drawn in existential phenomenology beginning with Martin Heidegger.

The other side of the coin of the unwritten history of art is merely a collection of subjective stories of artists that do not recognize the universal process of the central anthropological idea in time. Between what is written and what remains unwritten, there is a whole universe of meaning relating to “ontology” as Heidegger mentioned, and to anthropology. Therefore, we owe it to ourselves to endow the history of art with legitimate meaning and fundamental values. It is up to us to decide the meaning we want art to carry, and not to fall into contradiction with nature or life itself, as in the work of Charles Baudelaire (1821-1867).

Let us begin with the idea that all things of this creation should harmonize with the movement of nature; and that human existence rests on a dynamic set of ideas expressing such natural values, which can be determined and proved by philosophical legitimate reasons of necessity. It is a fact that after millennia of civilization, natural values are incarnated in our bodies and inscribed in our DNA, which contains the information of our past and future by causal reasons. I believe that we must be conscious of our potential future or we never will be able to achieve the natural potential resting in our genetic make-up. The new concept of human substance therefore arises from the embodiment of all lived experiences encoded in our molecular structures. This book embodies this particular interdisciplinary spirit of research, for the meaning of humankind must be found in the logic and order of things to which all disciplines must participate in order to arrive at a final anthropological assessment.

The reader must agree with me that that which activates the harmonious development of art must be made of the same substance that moves anthropology. Art makes us better humans when it incorporates the values of human nature and

nature itself. Under these premises, it is hard for me to associate the term *art* with anything else.⁸

Baudelaire's tradition is set on the belief of art as an exogenous exercise has no ethical or aesthetic rules of conduct, having nothing to do with natural values. Indeed, we have a choice whether to make art more intrinsic, more logical, and more necessary to human nature, constitute a likewise consciousness, or keep it as a mere object of decoration and trade. My realization in this book is that treating art as mere cultural phenomenon produces unworthy artists, historians, and critics who decontextualize its values and dispossess it from its tradition. All things in life and in the universe fall under the same causal power of the natural law therefore all things are necessary and interdependent. Human behavior and artistic behavior are not excluded from the phenomenal world and from the effects of the natural laws. We need not wonder why historians do not entertain art's universal argument or why no one seems to search for greater and more meaningful reasons that can justify art's existence as a natural form of human behavior and potential transcendence of human life.

Everyone seems instead content with the little enjoyment provided by art objects as decoration and by the depiction of subjective remembrances and illusions and forget its great tradition. Such arguments and considerations would eventually determine that art has nothing else to offer than to fill the ephemeral and illusory demands of an intellectually limited and ignorant market. To deny the artist the authenticity of being and the consciousness to interpret reality in its own right equals to denying the existence of art's causal necessity to exist and to recognize altogether its current illogical and ephemeral status. There cannot be a true history of art if we do not recognize its true existence or if we deny art's full potential to exist and express its fullest potential. If we accept the current pluralistic conception and modes of expression of beliefs, we do no more than minimize evolutionary anthropology.

One must not detach him or herself from a problematic that does not implicate anthropological issues, especially those, which pertains to formal and informal representations. Contemporary thoughtless formalism constitutes no tradition in a causal phenomenological aesthetic. Every perception must have an antecedent and consequent causation in order to justify existential truth. Some people make distinctions between abstract and representational art and produce an apparent qualitative judgment based upon external, stylistic distinctions, but that is not sufficient to justify all that art may mean to the history of humanity. Others think that the more art is stylistically indefinable, the greater are its manifestations

⁸ . This point is what promotes the critical spirit, the finality, and the intentionality of this book._

that leave qualitative judgments suspended, ambivalent, and ambiguous for historians to fantasize upon. I should not consider, nor should I make distinctions between appearances if I want to perceive art at its essential universal conceptual value.

In this treatise, I assume that all artists possess some level of conscious substance and a constitutive perceptual consciousness form by whatever culture they belong and in need of development and that anyone has the right of self-expression accorded by common natural rights. The problem is to establish exactly what constitute real freedom of expression “art” aside from market demands and cultural restraining conditions. Given that human life has logical and fundamental natural structures, we must be able to define art as an harmonious natural human concept. Any other discourse outside the articulation of logical existence does not deserve philosophical legitimacy. However, art’s legitimate nature and role in human life should emerge clearly and unmistakably in accordance to logical, causal discourse.

How can anyone prove to me that what I say does not reflect the essential universal value of the unwritten, but causal reasoning reflecting the intrinsic notion of natural history? How can anyone prove to me the illegitimacy of the type of art that supports its philosophical tradition? In all truth, the inexplicable questions, namely, those supporting “deconstruction” of values and traditions in art must indeed still waiting for proper historical justification. Or, otherwise, how can anyone demonstrate alternative the cultural values of art outside the support of its great traditions. These questions must be answered by those critics and historians that support the nonsense of pluralistic productions. Ultimately, how can anyone devise a theory of art without a philosophically correct notion of culture or produce convincing arguments of anthropological enrichment without a correct scientific definition of anthropology?

Anthropology is driven by a silent, deterministic “endless potential finality” of human development. This concept poses a demand to the thoughtless critics to simply show that the concept of art cannot satisfy human potential and that no reasons to exist to demand more cultural responsibility from contemporary artists. In all truth, what we take as true “history of art” is an array of indefinite and contradictory narratives that do not dare entertain the thought of anthropology. What is needed is to reiterate the basic principles of truth that constitute the production of art works and reconstitute their full human significance. By continuing to omit such important concerns, we may have already retarded or jeopardized the project of anthropology forever. Therefore, we must begin to wonder about the danger arising from the lack of a defined arguments and of purpose in terms of the universal values that make anthropology a human project more than a human destiny.

The anthropological discourse is actualized when the arts and the sciences embody and implement the ultimate human knowledge and the ultimate values. These are the same values that influence to the minor arts and the day-to-day living of ordinary people. Good art eventually will influence the crafts, the industries, the trends, the fashions, and the political and the social life as a whole, and this is the way essential values and cultural values come together to change the culture and the world for the better.

This discourse reflects the universal principles of *telos*—that is, the application of art's substantial purpose and function in human life. Art must perform a positive function in society and in human life as a whole. All things in nature have a purpose, and, on the basis of this universal truth, we must define our hierarchy of values. As a result, the unwritten causal history is by all means an omission of anthropological values. All beings of the world have the power to evolve or to decline relentlessly. Our reflections, our perceptions, and our knowledge of the world allow us to actively advance our consciousness or to merely exist.

A missing knowledge signifies a deprived existence and a deficient anthropology. True knowledge does not rely on appearances to be a substantive part of human nature. For this reason, I believe, the narrative of art has exhausted all the styles and the “isms,” and has yet to center itself on true human values. It must be understood that when I speak of “historicity,” I mean a narrative that equates with description of external phenomena and omit essential anthropological values. The difference rest between omission and manifestation of values. Art that shows no philosophical or logical reasons to be shown in public should be burned in a public place to exemplify the such art has no use to humanity.

The art critic Harold Rosenberg's (1906-1978) famous dictum “Art of the New,” simply characterized such ephemeral qualities that kept American art of the 1950s and 1960s out of the international exhibitions. What Baudelaire called *le culte des images*, and André Malraux (1901-1976) *Le Musée imaginaire*, were two modes to describe art as child's play and a whole production of images that fosters the exaltation of fantasies and perpetuation of illusions. But at the end, these two critics sold their soul to the devilish market turned ephemeral behavior into fictitious aesthetic theories, they did no more than misdirect future cultural and artistic trends that kept artists from producing significant work and pursuing human substance. If art is to emerge from the essential meaning of human nature and to benefit individuals who live on earth, its principles need to be centered on those governing human existence. A principle must be abided by like “dogma” when resting on logical, inalienable truths endemic to the necessity and advancement of human nature. This is to say that, by all means, art can only be

articulated on the principles of nature, which are the basis of philosophical ethical thought.

So, it is to be hoped that until the exploration and play of images and every possible combination of forms and color has been transferred onto the canvas, the new century and the new millennium, will be recognized as one of higher principles on which to rest the concept of art – and an era of new ideas moving toward a higher order of values. The choice is clear: artists can keep entertaining the dreams that lead the mind to a world of unreality or use art's causal power toward humanistic developments to change the world for the better. Let us imagine a rational world order in which art occupies a teleological space and assess its action toward achieving the highest purpose of humanity. The ethical dogma of art is constituted by its principles of duty, which are superior to all the aesthetic theories expounded so far by modern and postmodern philosophers.

My ultimate realization, after the advent of my theory of phenomenology, is that art cannot defy the laws of human existence, because we are natural beings. The laws of nature in this planet are equal for all humans and artists as well. Art must do its intellectual function in the world, which is far superior than entertaining and pleasing the senses. This is why we are to pay more attention to form the intellect of new generations of artists and instill in their mind the ethical role of art established by the single common sense of the natural laws. Less attention should be placed to external imagery that only evokes mere sensuous experiences.

Here is what the philosopher Francis Bacon (1561-1621) said:

The evil, however, has been wonderfully increased by an opinion, or inveterate conceit, which is both vainglorious and prejudicial, namely, that the Dignity of the human Mind is lowered by long and frequent intercourse with experiments and particulars, which are the objects of sense and confined to matter. (1893, p. 48)

Bacon expressed here an ethical condition that has enormous ramifications. He explained why mere apprehension of imagery simply resting on sense-experience find no place in true and important art, which is a primary ethical problem of society, so unconsciously reductivist. For him, ethics was to fully satisfy the necessity of reason and the quest for natural existence. Ethics or aesthetics do not abide by cultural rules. Their significance must be ultimately related to the natural laws.

To this effect, I like to quote from St. Thomas Aquinas' (1225-1274) *Summa Theologica* (1947, I-I-100-1): "All human acts depend on their relation to reason"

rest on a single but fourfold argument fundamental for enacting the ethical principles that govern the notion of anthropology and art:

1) All beings in the world, animate and inanimate, owe their existence to the purposive reasons of nature which aim at the greater good and assure their development. Purposive philosophical reason defines all the ground principles of basic, natural existence as well as the universal ethic applicable to all men. We only have to study and observe the natural laws in order to abide by the ethics of nature. The very fact that nature is a logical, intrinsic, and necessary dynamic, which embodies the necessity that moves all beings to greater complexity and to the greater good, constitutes the only reliable ethical model for us humans to follow. By the same logical discourse, any human concept of art or science that does not reflect the intrinsic principles of purposive reason and the greater good of nature surely brings into existence contingent, causal necessities that negatively affect both short- and long-term human developments.

2) In society, we regard art to be a concept about man's superior intelligence, ingenuity, and creativity, yet art, in actuality, is and remains a human concept with limited application of intelligence because no effort is made to improve the artist's intellectual qualities. Often exerted by mediocre men, art is nevertheless frequently elevated to the status of a religion. This is to show that art cannot be credited with anything substantial and be applied as an absolute value. In order to do that, we must determine its necessity and existential ethical validity. A concept of art should be conceived to reflect the purposive and transcendental reasons of human's existential nature, and this means that such concept should improve the meaning of human actions and behavior and aim at the greatest human good. Humans have arrived at it by means of philosophical thought, and by the same means, it should be revised in order to be advanced.

3) Art is not a private, but always a public matter when it applies the principles of purposive reason and of the greater good (*telos*). These are universal ethical and moral principles governing collective political behavior in general. Therefore, all art expressions, if presented or exhibited in public spaces, belong to the public domain of the universal *telos* and, therefore, should be judged according to these general principles. I shall see that these principles are incorporated in my notion of the new humanism, which I establish resting upon Heidegger's theory of ontology and anthropology.

4) Consequently, in the face of anthropology, an ethic of art is needed for determining the basic contextual ground of attainable truths and values of nature, as *logos*, as realization of the most fundamental principles of human existence. The highest principles of human nature are those which secure

art's ontological and anthropological transcendence and expand the notion of humanity. This rather plausibly explains the principle of the greater good expressed by Aristotle, which, although it exists only in theory, I hold to be true. Anthropology must, therefore, be understood as a human project of mental development under the firm belief that what can be thought by humans can be actualized. In principle, what is necessarily demonstrable in the mind can be universally valid and may constitute human advancement, and to this end, causal phenomenology satisfies the meaning of anthropology and overcomes the old empirical criteria used to define it by empirical conformity, resemblance, and utility of nature.

In the chapters that follow, I will return again and again to the subject of phenomenology and how it provides the scientific approach to the perception of both life and art, and I will expand upon the way it demonstrates phenomenal interrelatedness. We understand the natural world as a world of science, that which studies and defines the natural laws and the causal phenomena that link and bind our notion of reality to our existence. Advanced notions of science constitute the bases of advanced notions of art. By this token, at the end of this study, we will have reached the conviction that only that which can be demonstrated phenomenologically can become a part of the notion of art; only that which is a part of our existence can be brought forth as the conscious body of art.

If our structure of reality can be given only by the causal necessity, production, and succession of phenomena, the “things-in-themselves” as Husserl used to define them, the same that remain fundamental to the establishment of the of art as well as forms of the existential world. A work of art always shows its phenomenological structure by which it is possible to re-ascend its process all the way to the artist's intention. I must be persuaded by the object's phenomenal causal structure in order to accept its meaning and values. In Aristotle's *Rhetorics* (Book I, Ch. 1, p. 1355a), we find this idea implied in the concept of persuasion. “Persuasion is clearly a sort of demonstration since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated.”

This treatise began as a Ph.D. dissertation on a postmodern, holistic aesthetic idea of art, but soon I was persuaded of its political import, in terms of conviction of social necessity beyond the empirical, didactical conception of aesthetics. Indeed, the study of phenomenology was one way of overcoming old empirical views imparted during my art education and life experience in the market place. I then began to believe that here is a phenomenology of spirit and one of matter in life and art. In a holistic sense, all phenomena—both physical and psychic—are directly and indirectly connected and affect one another. Under this concept, it was logical for me to envision a new holistic aesthetic exemplifying the highest

achievement of the truths of human nature and, likewise, defining an ethical discipline of art. The statement that aesthetics and ethics are ultimately synonymous may seem too idealistic to the reader, but it reiterates what I say in the text: phenomenological thought is merely reproducing the truth resting on the natural logic of nature. Phenomena of human nature and art are fused together as events of nature, and we cannot interfere with this fact. Our job as artists and scholars is to perceive and understand complex phenomena of art and life correctly. However, for the sake of this existential idealism, metaphorically speaking, the sailor does not have to grab the North Star, but use it for good directions. It is sufficient for the sailor without compass to know the north point to reach his destination.

The idea of a holistic aesthetic bound to all the other phenomena of life is sufficient discourse to point our thinking and our lives in the right direction, to direct the problematic of art to legitimate aims, and to initiate research about its true humanistic possibilities. Aesthetics in art should only signify perception of the finest qualities of an existent reality. This capacity is available only to those who develop intellectually. This discourse is not here intended as mere rhetoric, but to point out the logical reason that builds bridges of understanding and perceptual structures between art and life. Thought provides the connections between these two existential conditions. The artist, like the boat that keeps the sailor afloat and sets the course of the voyage, must face the treacherous conditions of the world ready to overcome the hidden complexities of contingent social phenomena. Art, like life, is in constant need of rational thought to justify actions and assign proper validity to make correct choices. How is all this possible without thought? That is why the discourse on art should embody the fundamental logic of nature, like a science.

There is no law that prevents art to aspire to the highest realization of human reason. All artists can attain such high degree of reason when dealing with matters that concern the essential nature of mankind. It is by the same discourse that I can prove further that everything that is aesthetic is necessarily rational and ethical, for it produces the highest logic of nature. Joseph Bueys (1921-1986), superstar German artist, once said that “everybody is an artist.” This is true in some respect, only if he or she is a producer of the highest good. The artist can equal Plato’s “philosopher king,” as administrator of his or her knowledge determining the intellectual capacity of mankind. To aim for the highest degree of knowledge is a wise proposition. Although not for the same reason, Andy Warhol (1928-1987) too granted all members of society 15 minutes of recognition and fame. Pop Art obviously was not a holistic concept; not a theory of reason either, but a simplistic approach to demonstrate that there can be art in everything we do, but not necessarily excel in the idea of its humanistic purpose. Nevertheless, Warhol, in

his limited philosophical knowledge, maintained that art was the highest form of mental activity, though he never applied his creativity to the best cause of humanity. I, too, believe that there is an expressive capacity in all human beings, but not all human beings are capable to exercise it in their full potential and bring it to the highest realization of reason.

Obviously, those artists who can bring art to its highest realization distinguish themselves for such achievement and set themselves apart from all others with works that withstand the test of time. That is why we are to recognize artists by their intellectual achievement, by the profundity of their thoughts, not by the originality of their imagery. Images produced for the sake of originality alone are like Kant's definition of empty ideas that have a very short life and do no good to humanity. We do have in history some examples of realization of the highest human achievements such as that exhibited by Leonardo Da Vinci, Michelangelo, Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), Petrarca (1304-1374), et al., who approached human knowledge in a holistic manner, thus unifying art, poetry, and science and proving that there is a direct synergy between analytical and "creative" thinking. In reflection, their example disproves the entire historicity of art, namely, that logical and creative thinking are dichotomous. As I expand upon this subject in the main text, I can prove that there is nothing wrong with embracing a holistic approach to knowledge and to engage both sides of the brain equally, working together so as to obtain unity and uniformity of thought, of meaning, and of language in all disciplines, art, poetry, the sciences, etc.

Phenomenology as a method of analysis proves that art and nature are interdependent ideas, no matter whether they emerge from within or from without. It proves that the mind is an instrument of realization of the order of things in nature, of which it is a part. It allows the mind to become conscious of itself and its human elements. The inner and the outer values and necessities are therefore confronted with its sensuous reality. Hegel was first to realize that the sensuous reality comes into prominence by way of thinking, which opens the way to greater possibilities. The mind's task is to realize the meaning of what he called "sense certainty," to perceive itself as real and produce other analytical projections. This is how science developed in the human mind. The object of reality offers the needed instrument of contrast for the mind to perceive itself as being, part of the same reality, but distinguished from it. The perceptual process thus moves within itself and beyond itself. The natural dynamics of perception depends on the organization of what the mind is able to realize as intrinsic thought. It does so naturally, for the dynamics of thought respond to the logical necessity of the brain replicating physiological structures. Hegel's "sense certainty" is what initial perception may represent and what may constitute the basis of progressive

apprehensions, when it moves to cognitions and intuitions, which emerge consequentially from it as transcending moments.

Thus, the perceptual dynamism stands as renewed, integral movement of thought referred to often as “substance” and to the meaning to be incorporated into the conscious whole; it means that new determinations of existence can bring about progressive syntheses to renew perceptual consciousness. This concept can easily be applied in art and produce meaning both in the making and the interpretation of it. Human thought has been said to be infinite, and that is why it is also incomplete, which goes with the limitations of human nature, but it can recombine itself anew into higher aesthetic forms and to explore the higher meaning of reality in any moment to ascertain the true nature of things.

These generalities identify with the new notion of art proposed in this study as the most expressive forms of humanity. We owe to ourselves to know and experience the best of ourselves. We are natural beings and to a certain extent possess the powers to change our own nature. In sum, the powers of art as higher form of thought can move beyond formal aesthetics toward self-realization of the greatest potentialities of the reality of human nature, which is all to be discovered. The new science of microbiology and genetics seem to prove this belief, namely, that such higher and limitless forms of reality are accessible to human understanding.

This thought exemplifies that existence of higher forms of aesthetic reality compel a totally new theory of art I call Arteology, one that re-contextualizes the meaning of perception, of language, of history, aesthetic and sociology, which is precisely what I have attempted in this book. From the study of Kant’s “Practical Reason” we learn that that the order of things establishes the ethical principles of reason and nature. The meaning of “ethics” is thus not only realization, but respect for the natural laws that govern our existence. Ethical reason thus makes it improper and dangerous to violate the laws of nature therefore artists must incorporate this fine sense of ethical behavior in their art in order to be open to the higher forms of aesthetic reality.⁹

The realization of the order of things as ethical structures, as Michel Foucault’s interpretation demands, should define human behavior, which in many ways is in conflict with the history of art and being anti-Baudelaire for excellence may contribute to my theory of art that everything possess its place in the world and everything has a purpose in it, art included. Baudelaire prided himself for

⁹ This notion will also provide a new definition of the word “aesthetic“. And since I see no distinction between art and life, this much shows how an ethical theory of art is established and maintained as a aesthetic discipline.

opposing the nature of being as if self-creation was a fact. He thought of himself to be a prophet who took an antithetical position against nature, and that is why criticized J. Rousseau's philosophy. The term "Arteology," I proudly devised, was intended to be the study of art and to expand its discourse as a university of knowledge of the higher form, which has been abandoned since Kant's third critique – almost 4 Centuries ago. Since Kant, there has been no significant advancement in the definition of art or aesthetics itself, nor an effort to assign the place of art among the order of things. To this end, beginning from Aristotle wrote about a theory of "teleology," comprehensive of all forms of existence in the world.

The reader will recognize that a redefinition of art and aesthetics in light of synthetic knowledge of science and philosophy is a good thing because it will project theoretical continuity and transcendence of the idea of art until it finds its place again within human excellence. The more recent scientific discoveries and phenomenological theories make this evolutionary necessity of the brain possible. Einstein, for instance, declared that humans use only 10% of the cortex capacity. Arteology, as an open study, simply brings back the essential and comprehensive necessity for interdisciplinary knowledge of how things in the world are interconnected by the natural law, which has not been dealt with in aesthetic philosophy for almost four centuries and produce the qualitative synthesis that collects the necessary values that needs to be incorporated to move the arts forward. This kind of revolution stands on the realization that the idea of art is self-evident, self-formative, and self-affirmative of the higher values of human existence and must be a part of the artistic concern to aid the natural history of mankind. With this, I want to demonstrate that art is not all spiritual, but truly cognitive-biological existence and to substantiate by scientific research that we engage in intellectual pursuit that will yield better art – because art, as proved in Chapter Six, makes more intelligent individuals in terms of biological substance and cellular development. In addition, there can be no question as to what defines the validity of art as Arteology for it overcomes what Theodore Adorno (1903-1969) typified as the "Aesthetics of Illusion."

As I mentioned at the beginning, by opening up the entire field of human knowledge, one opens the way to the logical development of genetic intelligence. This fact may be deemed ethical and should be institutionalized thus introduced in schools, universities and foundations because it has anthropological value. To determine whether cognition is the product of perception or vice versa, is for now irrelevant. The goal is to produce achievable ethical and purposive ends while unfolding the existential problematic of art. In this sense, this study is intended also as a linguistic exercise as it sustains the belief that meaningful art works emerge from embodying the true philosophical knowledge of life in the language of art. Indeed, a reflection of such positive criticism could have been ripe during

the times of Rousseau and Kant, but the futurity of art could not be anticipated due to minimal scientific research in fact of biology and genetics. Hegel opened the field of the phenomenology of perception, but the ideology of art simply continued to abide in a terrain of ambiguities. Such ambiguities continue to exist today as matter of common belief and common applications in schools and universities.

We can register much confusion in the history of thought and consequentially in that of art, which moved from aestheticism, to materialism and to psychologism destroying its historical heritage and therefore its identity. Linguistically speaking, developing the important philosophical discourse between sense and reference equals to enriching the vocabulary of art, as well as expanding the meaning and values that determine its *raison d'être*. It is to be said that the truth of all beings remains substantial in terms of conceptual thought; thus, at the essence and the center of language is the meaning and the history of human existence. My study revolves around a notion of language that encompasses the problems of life and art. We must now consider the study of the linguistic problematic necessary to the development of a holistic existential aesthetic of art. Language must emerge as a necessity for self-realization. The way we bring our existence to aesthetic countenance and to an ethic-aesthetic authentic level, is precisely by satisfying the pure necessity to express our reason for being, which proves to be much higher than our ordinary day-to-day concern.

Arteology is an epic rethinking of the entire epistemology of art and the abatement of the old and new myths and oracles that dominate and suppress the thought of art and the search that determines its necessity and validity. Phenomenology is precisely the right instrument to produce new realizations and operate such changes. One does not have to make art because he or she belongs to the profession or because someone requires it. There must be a necessity researched as a desire and a commitment to historical change, to new realizations of value and disvalue, illusions, exaltation and assessment of reality, etc. My Arteology, as a study of reality, offers the justification for and the method by which art should be studied and interpreted in the future. This is a synthetic and projective position that has never been taken by formal aesthetic. At best it is a general revision and a holistic discourse aimed at reconstructing the perception and the consciousness of art.

Said in other words, and in a broader historical sense, the main objective of Arteology is to produce a synthesis and an interdisciplinary thought that embodies the entire human knowledge by which we can support the existence of art. This is what Hegel himself aspired, but could not produce in his aesthetic theory.¹⁰ This

¹⁰ . Indeed, he understood phenomenology as a natural philosophy and not as a method. That is why he could never unify the aesthetic of art and life, and remained stuck to Platonic dialectical formalisms and failed to construct comprehensive historical synthesis. Synthesis should be precisely the work of any philosopher at any given time.

study shows that the consciousness of art, must be sought with the Heideggerian method of *ontology* as embodiment and synthesis of universal knowledge and as human substance.

According to the Old Testament, humans have been placed in this world and given a body and a mind to figure out reality. They therefore have the freedom to erect or discard ideas. Abrahams, as far as we know, was the only man to hear the voice of God.¹¹ The word *consciousness*, obviously, is always in need of new synthesis, new and holistic definition. There cannot be a consciousness of the world different from a consciousness of art, or one that fails to encompass the totality of human knowledge. In this sense, the meaning of the term *consciousness* also establishes the thematic conditions for the perception of the world. What opens the research and satisfies art's anthropological necessity is a consciousness establishing a positive dynamic movement of experiential and existential knowledge. With this in mind, Arteology can easily answer the following questions: Why is the consciousness of art necessary? And why should an idea deserve moral or material support? The answers to these question rest on pre-Socratic philosophy and all the words that have been forgotten.

The words, precisely imply the need for a historical consciousness that reinterprets the original idea of art embodying the best qualities of humankind. As an entity capable of reconstituting itself as potential human existence, art engages the best mental qualities that distinguish humans from animals. What makes art necessary to the world is its project of research aiming at the intellectual advancement of humankind. Surely, this idea has been missing in the mind of artists since the Renaissance's time. Renaissance artists were concerned with continuity and heritage, therefore did not hesitate to embrace and carry forward the Greek tradition. In this narrative there is a very significant belief in "causal history": that ideas have capacity to expand and shape humanity.¹² Indeed, the correct understanding of art is necessarily bound to human nature's infinite capacity to bring new kinds of changes in human behavior and in anthropology as a whole.

This exceeds the common oracles of spiritual "creation," which accompanied the artist's profession since Baroque times. It means that the artist's potential understanding of human nature is more than a gift. It is an instrument of the will, which can be aimed at structuring positive and constructive intellectual developments.¹³

¹¹ Martin Luther (1483-1546) rebelled against the church that was selling indulgences as God's commodities. M. Luther realized that to speak of spirituality was insufficient as long as mankind was not able to construct a just and suitable world on which to expand one's consciousness

¹² Plato, for instance, attributed greater ingenuity to the cabinet-maker than to the painter precisely because the painter was not aware of the enormous potential of the language of art as a medium of change.

¹³ Very pragmatically, I can show the opposite side of the coin: that is, that market demands are now built on

Many believe that the introduction of a new discipline of values would certainly cause a derangement of the market demand and upset the system. The fact of it is that external appearances, fashions, and trends are prejudicial subjective forms of power with no anthropological value, which act negatively upon the intelligence and sensibility of artists. It is a historical fact that the powers of prejudice now determines the status of art, which does no more than delay or annihilate art's intellectual development, as well as destroy the legitimacy of the historical and ontological values of art as a whole. Therefore, we must learn where the legitimacy of art lies and decide whether we implement the best values or the worst disvalue to represent ourselves to posterity. It becomes clearer, as my discourse reaches completion, that, in order to generate a genuine demand and support for the arts, the dismantling of the empirical, formal, Platonic evaluative scaffolding and the overcoming of the prejudicial historical and political advocacy of "art for art" sake are required. As I prove in Chapter Seven, without substantial expanded humanistic merits, art narrative produces intellectual displacement and false values because historians are not initiated in philosophy or ethics. This is not a matter of formal versus informal representations, not a matter of representational versus abstract configurations of art.¹⁴

Eventually, all trends, no matter how different and informal they may be, tend to seek conformity and be accepted by the general consensus. In today's art, this common state of affairs is counterproductive because it displaces human substance, prevents innovation of ideas, and retards human evolution. By this, I mean that formality or informality cannot be a criteria for evaluating works of art because it prevents the positive, holistic, synthetic course of the history of art from being structured and established as rational premise for substantial value, as well as preventing any other valid critical method from being developed. Under these conditions, the entire legitimacy of art itself is compromised, retarding the structuring of a rational society and ethical humanity.

The sad realization is that artists can operate at the lowest perceptual level and still be elevated to greatness by a group of pretentious *demiurges* who have obtained political powers. Artists may employ childish and uncultivated intelligence or exercise the mind at the lowest level to attain what Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) called *petites perceptions*, which produce no cognitive development and do nothing to improve the quality of life. Indeed, art is

artificial values, and artists, as Frederick Nietzsche (1844-1900) said in *The Birth of Tragedy* (1967). Artists feel they have an obligation to deceive and to abide by the system that feeds them. This is because there is not in place any defined system of support resting on true values, any type of taxonomy or a higher model defining what is valuable and what needs to be sought in art.

¹⁴ When I say *formal*, I like to refer to the social phenomena that support the formation of meaningless and insubstantial trends, styles, and fashions as art whenever something new or particular is introduced independently. "Formalism" is supported by no ethical discipline and therefore has no authority over human substance.

the market of the *petites perceptions* manufactured as commodities and idolized as the highest production of the human spirit for the sake of consumerism. This condition identifies with a general failure to bring into the social context of art the holistic synthesis of human knowledge. The system is such that, if one chooses to exercise critical faculties, he or she is sharply cut out of the circle and confined to anonymity. We may refer to some courageous individuals, like the writer, who prefer to maintain “high standards” rather than compromise their high ideals. We are to realize that no high art can be produced, either in theory or in practice, precisely for mere reasons of consumption.

Many philosophers and artists have alluded to, and accepted as given, the death of art, precisely because the high ideal concept of art has been forgotten. The perception and the idea of art itself have disintegrated to the point that they cannot be reconstructed without prompting a holistic philosophical and historical synthesis. I feel that those who have achieved a certain understanding of philosophy and history have the obligation at one point or another to stand up to the task of reconstruction.

If art is dead, can it be resuscitated? Hegel first, then Nietzsche, Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), Heidegger, and even Picasso later, thought it was dead because it had lost its fundamental values. Pablo Picasso (1881-1973) went so far as to say that art has become the industry of the lies. What would then be an appropriate linguistic term for what can be defined as the highest activity of mankind? *Techne* and *aletheia* were appropriate terms at the time of the Greeks to denote the highly generative activity of the mind. Today, we have specific words that define intuition and imagination, which are known to activate the “creative” human faculties. If we were to change the name to art and call it something else, we should find a name that preserves the congenial, ontological potentialities and identifies with the continuous materialization of a positive anthropology.

I mentioned earlier that I felt the urge to undertake this difficult interdisciplinary task of writing about art especially after studying M. Heidegger’s *Being and Time*—after learning that there are many “authentic” potentialities in the human mind that directly apply to art. At this point, the concept of art appeared to me no longer as a specialized, formal activity of the artist, but as a spontaneous and authentic expression of the highest humanistic capacity of all individuals. Under this precept, I thought, art can be understood first as a conscious cognitive, perceptual transcendence, and then as the ultimate expression of human values. During my studies I found it obvious that one cannot achieve the former without the latter. And paraphrasing Kant: if ideas are empty, concepts of art are also empty. If nothing goes to nourish the brain, nothing comes out of it. Likewise, this study is intended to achieve the completion of the idea of art endowed with cognitive substance, along with all that improves the image of the artist in the same

vein. This means that the artist may aspire to an expanded consciousness of the world and move beyond the boundaries of media experimentation and techniques so as to bring both art and human existence to higher standards.

Obviously, this expanded consciousness of humanity automatically brings about a new category of artists and art works that can be defined by universal values rather than by cultural trends. I envision the critic, the historian, the operators of private and public institutions, and the art public at large, to enter into the contextual space of art and become conscious participants of this exciting, projective and expanded idea of art. At that point, there will be no more doubts as to what art is. The term will be self-explanatory to characterize its meaning automatically, which will denote what is implied and expressed in an idea belonging to humanity as a whole. The term will then be used only as a substantive and constitute a world into itself. This may be an *ad hominem* vision, which nevertheless proves that the principles of art and life are bound together governed by the same laws, since the understanding of one originates from the understanding of the other. Most importantly, only in this way can art be understood as a universal project of anthropology, made by humans, for humans and inseparable from life.

A vision that assigns to art the function of equalizer of the meaning of human life, i.e., of ethical and spiritual values, can only produce a comprehensive (holistic) existential thought. I can imagine how much rewarding life would be if human were dwelling aesthetically in this world. The new notion of aesthetics advanced in this work announces that we have arrived at a point in history where a rational, structural theory of aesthetics equals to what is of real value to us. There is no doubt that what I propose stands opposed to any modernist theory. However, my theories stand opposed to any form of shallow “creativity” and overshadows aesthetic and ethical behavior. Modernism has proven contradictory to humanity because it does not obey this rational logic. I am sure that if my philosophy would be considered if construed during the Renaissance, or the Enlightenment. I say so because it is my belief that this holistic concept of art can bring some special qualities to humanity and to anthropology as a whole.

Anthropology can only be conceived resting on sound philosophical principles that preserve and advance true humanistic values. This principle should guide the artistic intent in the planning stage of a work of art. Away from humanistic ends, we should understand the word “art” as a means to escape the humanistic ends of art as pointing the interest in the material, sensualistic perception of the physical input and execution of the work of art. in the way Theophile Gautier intended in his *Manifesto 1857*. The total shift of art toward “materialistic sensualism” and sublimation of reality began with the works of Charles Baudelaire, T. Gautier Gustave Flaubert and Oscar Wild, followed by John

Ruskin who turned all the previous theories into the concept of *l'art pour l'art* away from the humanism of the Renaissance and the mythologism of the Baroque era.

The word “humanism” has disappeared in art vocabulary indeed because this word demands artistic conscience and confers artistic dignity to any work of art. Modernism has forgotten the word and assumed the falsifying “dandyism” or romantic mysticism introduced by Baudelaire, namely, an artificial condition in which the artist operates under the illusion of making historical marks just by being different and by destroying humanistic traditions. A concrete philosophy of reconstruction is therefore needed at this time in history—one that by its own maxims exhorts artists to pursue true humanistic values because by the notions of Kant’s ethical teachings, we can deduce that choosing the evocation of imagistic illusions over the essence of phenomenal reality, the chaos of the psyche over the suggestive revelations of the forces of nature, is not true artistic freedom, but a jubilation over something artificial, rather than dependence on the wisdom of nature.

The substance of this message is that art should be contextual and conforming to the existential objective world as part of the rationally organized system of life expanding the ontological and anthropological thematic. Anthropology can only be seen as a substantive, cumulative development in time—as distillation of human experience over millions of years. Art is very much a part of this process; so, why should it not be studied in this context? Some say, well, art should not be bound by any rule or discipline in order to be free. In other words, it should be a play without confines, action without conformity, blasphemy without guilt, etc. There is in these affirmations a very shallow meaning that may sustain subjective modes of expression but cannot glorify the principles of human freedom.¹⁵ The true freedom is to choose what is right over what is wrong.

If the notion of human freedom could rest only on the subjectivity of the artist, human life would be by abstractions, just like a painting of Jackson Pollock. You see, Picasso was right asserting that “art is the industry of lies.” The notion of an extensive positive anthropology precludes the claim that everything has no purpose in life, for everything positive must meet a specific need in the *telos* of the universal necessity of nature. Between theory and practice, from intention to action, the passage from thought to action must therefore be consequential and necessary. Therefore, in order to give anthropological sense to the work of art, logical ground and practical conditions must be laid down before the mind of the artist so that the latter may not be led by the belief that art serves no purpose except that of the bourgeoisie or that good art comes from nowhere. History should

¹⁵ The notion of human freedom as it applies in art is a recurring topic throughout this entire study and the reader will be able to define and apply its principles as the reading of the book progresses.

provide the teachings, the values, the discourse, the language, the motivation, the inspiration, and the purpose for art to be. There are no other sources stored away and ready-made to accomplish the aims of anthropology; there are no other ways to establish continuity and humanistic purpose in art.

The history of art, however written, must produce the cornerstones of knowledge at any time, that which sustains and advances the true values of human life. The failure of traditional aesthetics to produce the propelling existential values of art has caused the latter to indulge in a metaphysic of illusions. Traditional aesthetic still wears the abstract Aristotelian metaphysical vestiges which alienated art from existential reality.¹⁶

Indeed, the art experience has been revolutionized with the help of the notion of ontology, which has opened possibilities to move from passive contemplation and sublimation of reality to actual reality, which alone has the potential of changing the history of art. Modernism ignores entirely the real history of the philosophy of life behind artistic behavior. It instead moves along the ethereal plane of Baudelaire, who could not harmonize the functions of the poet with those of the artist and the critic, as he was too insecure about himself and therefore sought refuge in horrific fantasy and mysticism in order to avoid reality of a non-theoretical and unscientific notion of art requiring corrections and a true sense of human values at all times.

Baudelaire had not read German philosophy which was struggling to move beyond British empirical dialecticism to find scientific certainty and rationalism to justify its own existence. The phenomenology of Kant, Hegel, and Husserl was at the time ignored because of the uncertainties caused by the new wave of post-impressionism. That was a time of insecurity to which he contributed to be an anti-nature. That is why he suffered from the irrational supremacy and prejudice of the political events first and the Nazi regime later. It remains the fact that, although the advent of phenomenology and of Modernism occurred almost simultaneously, they remained entirely dissociated from each other. Yet, as I have tried to demonstrate, they belong to each other as a matter of causality, temporality and phenomenal *praxis*. In the 1930s, the work of Husserl revolutionized the notion of perception with his phenomenological method while Modernism, totally disconnected from philosophy, was seeking its *raison d'être* in a philosophy of

¹⁶ Paraphrasing Heidegger in *What is Metaphysics?* (1929), metaphysics failed to reveal the truth of being and to provide the individual with his place in the history of humanity. Hegel, Franz Brentano (1838-1917), Ludwig Langrebe (b. 1902), Husserl, Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), and the school of Vienna, especially Adorno, Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), et al., have been also instrumental in grounding aesthetic onto a philosophy of existence. Heidegger believed that a philosophy of existence provides the basic condition for ontology and anthropology to take their natural course. He represents the return to the science of man — *onto* from which *ontology* derived by a *raison d'être* that finds its foundations in human existence. Many phenomenologists from the stem of Husserl-Heidegger, such as Maurice Natanson (1924-1996), Roman Ingarden (1893-1970), Richard Palmer (b. 1933), et al., advocated the same need for art to be ontological and true to itself

illusions. A philosophy of illusion obviously brings about iconoclastic theories that cannot be grounded on reality simply because devoid of natural necessity, like the abstract theory of *l'art pur l'art* or the illusionary theory enunciated by Eugene Formentin, which recognizes the infinity of the language of colors, and therefore cannot be sustained indefinitely because those theories do not possess the structural phenomenal necessity as the foundation for further developments. Plurality of colors and of means are ruled by contingent necessity regulated by the mathematical combination of chances.

Mere iconoclasm is always heralded by empty minds proudly distancing themselves from prominent philosophical reason to fulfill a notion of freedom that does not exist. Disinterest for and apathy toward the world is thus a typical trait of iconoclasm. Existential phenomenology was regarded by many as possessing the same negative qualities, but when interpreted correctly, we realize that this philosophy has the potential to secure the correct notion of freedom and autonomy that applies in art.

This affirmation ascertains throughout the main text the correct perceptual scientific structures of the mind. Modernism ignored phenomenology as a method for determining the *raison d'être*. Phenomenology, the science of phenomena of that which “shows itself,” described by the “things-in-themselves,” as Heidegger and Husserl defined the phenomena implemented in a perceptual event; and revealed itself as the most centered thought since Logical Positivism. The latter was also of great significance especially when scientific philosophy was at its infancy, before the Industrial Revolution and after its impact upon the environment. Scientific reality is needed in order to accept a credible constitution of values. Its main asset was, therefore, the determination of the perceptual boundaries that establishes factual reality. Existential phenomenology establishes what mankind can and cannot do in terms of existential freedom, which cannot come from metaphysics or from empirical observations. Similarly, art's *raison d'être* cannot originate from something lacking logical explanation.

It is a fact that modern artists do not think and do not write, and necessarily must be told by critics and historians what to do. This was the case at the time of Clement Greenberg (1909-1994) who wrote scripts for artist on the stage of representation. His “historical criticism” was a theatre of historical heresies because they established no phenomenological nexuses or continuity. Greenberg's historical criticism was a system of artificial modes and metaphors designed to supplant true historical consciousness. When one is starving of information about art, he or she will take fable as true. This is precisely what occurred during the 30 years or so he was actively involved in American Art. Under Greenberg, artists, although experiencing easy and immediate material revenues, were oppressed by

his demands and felt like they had no part to play on the stage of the world's political affairs.

It is easy to delve into or to take private dreams and fantasies to produce works of art that do not require commitment, logical rigor, and mental discipline. For this reason, metaphysics, whether Western or Eastern, can be identified as a common source; and a philosophy of illusion and diminution of existential values at the same time. Transcendental meditation offered a mere escapism of the mind that rides on “mantras” as if they are flying horses, though it is not an instrument to achieve real freedom. Real freedom is only possible in an ethical world.¹⁷ Modern Art critics and historians challenged and discounted rational thought under the belief that a “supernatural” connection between the soul and the intellect was at reaching distance. Certain human faculties used out of context, like the imagination at times, could abstract reality and establish a metaphysic of illusion, like a Jackson Pollock (1912-1956) painting, which could never be more than a theory of chances and material displacement. The Abstract Expressionist critics attempted to prove that the alteration and the destruction of recognizable imagery could have historical significance, but failed to construct a valid argument because of the lack of substantive thought. Moreover, to compromise spiritual freedom to allow the material to find its way by gravity or acceleration of force brought many artists to the edge of despair.¹⁸ The fact is that what metaphysics failed to accomplish with words, Modern Art failed to accomplish with visual images.

Indeed, it is easier to make art into a cult or a ritual and bring the whole to an abstraction of mental complexity so as to invite esoteric speculations rather than to explore the logical substance of mankind, which requires rationally organized thought and diligent analytical work. It is a fact that the philosophy of *tout va bien* (“anything goes”) always yields good material returns for artists because it plays on people's ignorance. “Art,” said Picasso, “is the lie itself” precisely because he understood that he was merely a clown.

One would think that the de-idealization of beauty and forms of Romanticism would eventually call for experimentation of reality. Instead, the transition from art's ecstatic contemplation of the Romantic period was simply a transfer from logical speculations to a quandary of abstract beliefs, to contradiction and ambiguity as diversity of modes, which turned into social attitudes, pretensions, fashions, and even cults with physical masochistic sacrifices. Under these complex and contradictory social phenomena, the meaning of art had no choice but to be

¹⁷ The mere repetition of mantras—namely, words of a few syllables that numb the mind like a drug—is not an intellectual pursuit. It is easy to condition the mind rather than to expand it to greater horizons of knowledge. An idea emerging from an abstract notion only produces more abstractions of the same.

¹⁸ Mark Rothko (1903-1970) comes immediately to mind, since he was driven to despair and committed suicide in the process of painting 3,000 abstract pictures which were commissioned by Marlboro Gallery of New York.

reduced to a triviality that inverted the roles of the signifier and the signified and reduced language to the lower forms of expression, such as the diversifications of stylistic modes, media-driven fashions and trends, etc. This means that formalism was never overcome, not even after Postmodernity, and that more of it was to be added to the existing ones that controlled all forms of naturalism. In other words, illogical changes reinforced the same fallacies that Modern Art was said to have overcome.

It means also that important historical events had to be undertaken by the two diverse functions of the brain's hemispheres: the sensory (the left cortex) and the cognitive (the right cortex). Psychological phenomenology supported, not just the separation of functions, but interrelationships of the two hemispheres. It was during the 1930s that artists, critics, and historians with their narrow circumspection lost the chance to make a new connection with human reality and with humanity as a whole. Thus, left without adequate, objective vehicles of thought and without the philosophical legitimacy of reason, the concept and the idea of art, art history, and art criticism fell into an isolationism that compromised the significance of art in society. The attempts to reattach the meaning of art to the old naturalist discourse and the relentless Platonism grew more and more subjective, thoughtless, and insecure during Clement Greenberg's dominance. Art history and criticism, the "intelligentsia" of art, still does not feel the need to reconstruct the perception of art, to seek logical thought as the practical way of constituting essential reality in the mind. Without an adequate body of interpretive thought, no critical or evaluative assessment can be made, while repetitive language, namely, the socially acceptable metaphors, the same that Nietzsche condemned, brings more intellectual stagnation. Contradiction is also the interplay of such metaphors. Confusion of images heralds or excites the so-called "creativity" with its endless and meaningless combinations, but it nevertheless becomes socially legitimated by those in power who expect no more than to continue the trend of entertainment and of the superficiality of art.

I reiterate that phenomenology helps us in the identification of key phenomena, good or bad, for it is a philosophy of logical truths established by the absence of existential contradiction of phenomena. For this reason, the phenomenological existential movement was and is a *tour de force* in both philosophy and art, but I now understand why it left art critics and historians totally indifferent: they thought it would force them to search for the truth of things and deprive them of their subjective freedom to interpret and entertain the thrill of contradictions and ambiguities.

The need for a revolving change of imagery satisfies all of the above just for short moments and is treated as self-correction of that superficiality that has been accepted as desires impossible to fulfill and a constant thirst for novelty, so well

described by Harold Rosenberg and substantiated by Adorno in *Negative Dialectics* (1973).

It is my belief that art can now be best interpreted and assessed with the tools of phenomenology, especially if we make it our goal to identify the perceptual body that identifies its humanistic qualities. Yet, if we look at art literature, we realize that its method of inquiry is other than thematic, phenomenological and humanistic. The incessant search for something different and for new experiences cannot be described or imagined. It seems to be an obsession for contemporary critics and historians who seek the ultimate end in itself; but their ultimate vision in art is an illusion of the endlessly inconclusive and despotic mind that limits existential dialectic and reduces the context of art to image-making

Image-making has nothing to do with humanism, but more to do instead with exploitation of public naïveté and philosophical ignorance--nothing to do with existential values and with the existential concreteness of human life, but rather much to do with displacing the human mind or placing it in a state of ambiguity and confusion. The latter seems to be good for the market and for entrepreneurs, who acquire the explicative power of charlatans. One may wonder how it was possible for Modern Art to lose the sense of things, the righteousness of thought, the humanistic excellence and continuity of a tradition and turn art into a mechanical production of imagery. The meanings of the terms *continuity* and *tradition* seem to have played no role in the history of Modern Art or to have changed its connotations. Heidegger explains the notion of tradition as maintaining and advancing that which is of value to humanity. Common sense tells us that what has real value should not be changed, but advanced as an ongoing tradition.

Once the image-making for the sake of the same had begun, the breaking down of a tradition followed. Artists, under the spirit of competition, sought to move toward the complete desecration of the principles of value and reduce art to mere abstraction as a thematic exercise of instinctive stimuli and responses. This is what made Modern Art the avant-garde an art of reaction that stretched beyond Postimpressionism and Dadaism. It was a non-cognitive movement that distorted the perception of art and made it dichotomous to its nature as to disperse its meaning. Rejection of all criteria, renunciation of all values and all traditions was the rule, which can be understood by anyone as a self-defeating enterprise and as a factor upsetting the entire logical functioning of the mind. To produce a work of art relying on improvisation and invention unsubstantiated by fundamental cognitive knowledge is against the very etymological principle of expression and judgment.

To be an artist today does not require the same degree of intelligence, thought, preparation, and commitment as during the Renaissance. Yet the meaning of that tradition was something limited in the mind of DaDa artists who nevertheless felt the need to be referred by Greenberg as the inheritors and continuators of the past. They were instead the pioneers of a squalid future who developed an art of protest and rejection as if a new world of revelations was going to emerge out of their work. Indeed it did. It was a material world that idolized objects of mass production and monetary value. Yes, because, as I will explain later, ambiguity produces an existential mystery that easily connotes with a false spirituality and erects the pedestal of art that “creates” more idolatry.

On the one hand, the rejection of naturalism and academism and their mechanical approach to nature, merely from external and empirical modes, had already occurred; on the other, no valid alternative thought emerged during the latter three decades of the 1800s. It was the time of Freud’s influence, its psychology and psychoanalysis that revolutionized the idea of art and introduced the theory of dreams and mythologism as well. Now that a whole set of naturalistic ideas and techniques had been rejected, another universe of imagery in art was being empirically organized into styles, schools, and periods by critics and historians; and, once that such work had been done, no one could dare dispute their validity, especially if they became historical icons. However, in retrospect, if we can approach the art of that period with an expanded consciousness, it will not be difficult to detect that this new organization of imagery lacked the fundamental principles of a new historical tradition. It was Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) who proposed a psychology of history opposed to the predominant naturalistic Freudian psychology. The reason was evident: psychology is not limited to phenomenal explanation of the body; it does not understand cognition based on the logical and theoretical structures of knowing as pre-judgment of the perceptual act. Psychology, not intended this way, reduces psychic phenomena to mere depersonalization of being. Historical relevance in art, as we shall find in the text, requires a substantial discourse on the fundamental cognitive values of history as a reservoir and constitution of real knowledge. The absence of it not only annihilates traditions, but confines the entire discourse to psychology or, we may say, to that external objective psychology of art that E. H. Gombrich (1909-2001) seemed to have relied upon for his book *Art and Illusion*. Thus, we know it to be true that, with the aggrandizement of the self, the advent of Modernity, the history of art came to an end, while the psychology and depersonalization of art stated a new course.

There is no art without its intrinsic epistemology and its humanity. Speaking about a work of art and not about its humanity is the same as de-contextualizing the work and making the artist a subject of social pathology. Such is the history of

art: a mere production of imagery, a trading industry, a senseless enterprise that generates artificial wealth and fame. I have tried to give ample reason as to why the true history of art is still to be written as a true assessment of humanistic events, as progress of humanity, and as a scholarly discipline showing the social and philosophical causes that led to its demise and certainly led to the disintegration of the humanistic idea of art.

The birth of the industry of art finds its origins in those movements of art that abandoned subject matter to explore new modes of representation. This switch represented a major derangement of the artist's concern for substance. From Postimpressionism, to Fauvism, Cubism, DaDa, Surrealism, Futurism, Orphism, etc., the concern to make the representational image unrecognizable also contributed in stripping away its epistemological status so as to become itself the signified, while for historians and critics, it was history in the making. So, art lost its humanity to acquire likeness and congeniality. The pretension and haughtiness of art historians did the rest in erasing any humanistic concern from the artist's mind. To erect a false symbolism out of abstract images requires imagination on the part of the critic and historian, but also a good amount of narrative fiction, which they all seemed to have enough of them to compete with the artists themselves. But this is all said from the perspective of the unwritten history. Above all, this new attitude marked the rejection of rational thought and of the search for the ideal values -- practices found during the Renaissance.

What drove the intention of the artist astray from tradition, preventing the self to be truthful to itself and to the history of art, is precisely the making of a false historical narrative. In sum, the narrative of Modern Art has generated false geniuses and false heroes simply by manipulation and sublimation of subjective values. There is a certain similarity of events as history repeats itself as carbon copy of ideologies tending to distort its fundamental principles. The Roman belief of *cancellatio memoriam* applies to the history of Modern Art for having undertaken a false idea and having betrayed a tradition of acceptable values. *Cancellation memoriam* was based on the idea that anything not conducive to the glory of history of Rome should be deleted to conjure the danger of repetition, but as we know the opposite happened and significant virtues came to pass, which caused the decadence of Roman culture. Historians of art caused the same to occur, which explains the actual decadence of art.

The humanistic disintegration of art, as I said, left ample space for subjective behavior and for justification of the ephemeral, playful, nonsensical art production. No one wants to take away the artists' rights to dream and fantasize, but subjectivity and personal idiosyncrasies should not be adopted as general rule in

public art because it demeanor or the humanistic tradition.¹⁹ Psychological theories of criticism aiming at interpreting pretentious and outrageous works of art such as those against the catholic religion that have taken center stage in our historical time.

Art is like a white dove which everybody uses until it and to dies by the hands of predators. Now, even psychoanalysis has attempted to prove its validity by telling us what art is. Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) believed that art emerges from the darkest and most complex unconscious areas of the brain. The artist retraces conflicting childhood remembrances and externalizes them as art simply because he or she has no other concerns or interests in the world. The belief that art must serve self-psychoanalytic catharses or biographical idiosyncratic exercises also displaces its values and its reason for being but, most of all annihilates the possibility of erecting the universal idea of Kant's intelligibility, which aims at special sensibility in every human being by cognitive input.

Psychoanalysis introduced the criterion of mystery in art because mysterious is the unconscious, but the unconscious is not the abode or the cradle of art, which as we know from the great masters is the product of a higher rational structure of thought. This is what Kant intended as "intelligible." No critic was ever able to demonstrate, *vis a vis* the works of the great masters of the Renaissance that dreams are valid vehicles of intelligence and greatness in art, or that representation, which reached its highest in "naturalistic painting," was to be understood as the greatest form of art of all time. Duchamp, Picasso and Jackson Pollock, for instance, had mental problems that both Jungian and Freudian psychology could not explain. Psychoanalysis claims that art is a-causal -- when we learn from Kant that "nothing comes from nothing," which means that nothing is a-causal in the universe. The mystery of art brings us back to the antipodes of civilization because lacks rational, conscious thought or a pre-constituted structure of interpretation. The lack of such a priori structure is what forms strange beliefs and induces irrational behavior. Artists no longer believe, like Da Vinci, Paolo Uccello, Alberti, Botticelli Caravaggio et.al. in the disciplines that guide rational actions at all levels of intelligence. Without embodying all that cultural anthropology represents-- human knowledge, the sciences and philosophy— artists cannot operate with excellence on any perceptual level of experience. I will show in the study that a

¹⁹ This is precisely what happened. From Baudelaire to Marcel Duchamp (1887-1968) to Sam Faton, or to Chris Ofili, who desecrated the images that cognize art's most prestigious traditions in painting. I will not be surprised if one day Duchamp's painting of Mona Lisa with mustaches would appear next to the real one in the Louvre Museum, or if the painting of the Virgin Mary adorned with images of genitals would appear next to Raphael's in the Uffizi Gallery.

constituted rational intentionality presupposes the employment of rational intelligence as an anthropological end. For example, one should not begin an art work with nothing in mind. Through these ideas, the artist can provide a reason for being and the purposive existence of art as human endeavor. After all the nonsense has faded away, the center issue of the artist's intention in art, like all other human actions, demands necessarily a philosophical explanation as to what it means and what has been accomplished in the art experience. Whatever is done here in this world must make sense to humans, not to cats and dogs.

Logical thought repeatedly forces us to ask ourselves "What is art?" Only in order to seek an answer that would redirect our thoughts toward something rational. Without the logical and humanistic thought behind art, we are forced to ask other questions, like "What kind of person is the artist?" and "What good must we seek in a work of art?" and "Is there a universal concept of art valid in the entire world?" We would like to assume that artists know why they exist and why they decided to join the profession, but they don't. The knowledge of a rational consciousness of their being would probably answer our questions, but no one can possess such consciousness until someone reconstructs it. To become an artist is a decision determined by an immanent consciousness that expresses its values with direction and purpose. Intention means directing one's mind toward an end with determination and certainty. The Husserlian analysis of intention starts with a desire or an interest in self-consciousness as Hegel advocated – something already known or advancing to be known. The design of self-consciousness must precede actualization and the subject's interest must be geared toward something reason can realize through analysis and synthesis, which Husserl referred to the Greek word of *noesis*.

Heidegger, in *History of the Concept of Time* (1985, p. 45), speaks of the unity of the *intentio* and the *intentionum* as that which realizes the act of perception. Intention contains the distinctive, conscious power of the mind overcoming and organizing psychic phenomena. Now, is this contrary to an ideal theory of art? And who says that analysis and synthesis cannot be allowed in art? If art and the artist are deprived of an intentional consciousness, any assumption of value and greatness falls apart. Consequentially, any work stored in galleries and museums is thus deprived of significance without a structural reason justifying value.

The work of art must constitute the immanence of the artist's consciousness of what E. Husserl called the essence of lived experiences as the immanent field and value of art. Art must never become obsolete and must always remain active in the renewal process of the intellect. This is the purpose of renewing the historical synthesis. There is certain immanence in the dynamics of human intelligence that must be recognizable as it approaches substantial synthesis, especially in the work of art. The synthesis for the historian and the critic must be

aimed at the collective spirit and the renewal of humanistic values and traditions. The artist arrives at this immanence by way of reduction—that is, by eliminating from the experience all that is external, foreign, or prejudicial to the inner field of immanent experience and by acquiring a sense of belonging in the collective project of anthropology. Artistic consciousness is that positive field of experiential values that makes the work of art significant to humanity. That is why a work of art should be judged by its immanent values rather than by its external typicality. The history of art has yet to bring about the perceptual process that leads to such values.

What if I can prove that the destruction of the beautiful and the sublime as empirical ends in art was no act of consciousness, but unconscious denials of anything that is logical, structural, and rational? It really sounds like an act of “terrorism” toward the natural history of art, which is yet to be written. The malady of culture is precisely imbued by the belief that rational thought is contrary to “creativity” and that a logical approach to a perceptual consciousness is a sin. In medical practices, if a patient has fever, one does not throw away the thermometer and pretend that the fever has gone away, but this is precisely what occurred at the turn of the 19th century. Reason is the thermometer of all life experiences, art included. Without reason art moved far beyond the limits of human understanding, wondered in the metaphysical space and failed to propound a theory of existential values, which means that the artistic consciousness suffered total rational destruction.

Human existence rests essentially on the reality of being, which is dependent in all species for the survival of the species. The question to consider is the same structural genetic necessity to advance like in the flora and fauna of the world. There is nothing abstract about our existence because there is reliance on genetic intelligence. Everything and every human action must follow the same laws of material necessity. Therefore, no outcome of arbitrary human freedom can contribute to positive anthropology. The space of human freedom must not exceed fantasy, dreams, and the mysteries of the unconscious, all of which are antithetical and dichotomous to the anthropological end. Abstract art was to break down the image and bring about the disintegration of the idea of the subject-object relation by the pretension of overcoming its “subject matter” as traditional intent to bring about the truth of being, but it generated in its place a whole set of artificial ideas aimed at substantiating what cannot be substantiated as art, namely chaos and confusion.

Artists represented chaos and confusion as art and set their work before critics and historians, who followed up trying to substantiate the work with senseless theories. This is the quintessential ground of “historicity” and *tous va bien* as impossible narrative of Modern Art. In this way, critics, historians, and

artists together failed to advance the true concept of art and to maintain the expanding continuity of human substance. The lack of philosophical legitimacy always brings the discourse of art further away from humanity

This study shows that lack of signification in the language of art contributed in retarding the growth of the endemic intellectual capacity of the brain. In practice, this condition generated a void of meaning that invited more ambiguities, more misconceptions, and a state of confusion as to what constitutes the true values of art. And it did not stop there; multiple empty representations are no food for thought, but brought the automatic signification of what became the state of “pluralism” -- indeed another quick fix to justify lack of meaning. The freedom to be nonsensical is not denial of logical thinking, but a new way to be unique and particular, or to avoid the important existential issues of art. As a result, in the absence of a central idea of value, ambiguities became requirements to make the art work problematic, intriguing, and thus mysterious to justify the criterion of the *tous va bien* philosophy.

Art writers pass as psychologists in their attempts to decipher abstract images, identify signs, and pride themselves to be masters in building more ambiguities over ambiguities. They establish their personal semiotic theories, like Clement Greenberg, who produced sharp controversies while assuming that the artist, like the common man of the streets, do not have enough brains to make sense of things. Most critics attempt not to formulate a philosophy of life, but to produce non-sustainable subjective, often childish remembrances that instead of explaining the work of art reveal more idiosyncrasies. Art becomes an act of pretense when animated by such convictions and false values rather than by knowledge, because it distorts the causal notion of language, which is to signify and direct appearances toward substantial meaning. For this reason, I do maintain that, where there is no philosophy of life and no order of things, no constitution of true values, no freedom, no individuality exists, no matter whether we speak of art or life. When one takes away the logical principles and the laws that rule natural linguistic necessity, whether physical or psychical, the mind has nothing to reflect upon. When there are no logical structures in a piece of critical work, only scattered and irrational freedom that disperse the mind: idiosyncrasies of a childhood, instead of analysis and reflection; we have chaos and from chaos, more contingent forms of art can emerge. Under this type of complexity, which Gombrich could not deal with, theoretical chaos in art reaches a superlative level of complexity. Gombrich was left with an apparent need to search for reasons to legitimize artists’ abstract thoughts, but the results produced more rhetoric and more confusion.²⁰

²⁰ The need to legitimize language is an epistemological issue rather than a psychoanalytic one, which brings to memory the term *subject matter* used by British critics of the past century denoted in its times, an empirical

Empirical assessments of art would stand as flaws if a general history of the philosophy of art was in place. So historians and critics limit themselves to refer to the plurality of imagery and styles. I must reiterate that, in order to preserve the truth of art, we must preserve the artist's original intention and estimate the logical, rational and necessary import of the same. Reversing this process signifies destroying the natural intellectual processes of reflection and analysis behind the brain and the entire history of art, which exists in principle, but, as I said earlier, has never been written. In other words, the surrogates of culture, linguistically speaking, reverse the function of the signifiers and bring about the annihilation of art and of the human faculties altogether. Jean Paulhan asserted that this condition forces the construction of an artificial rhetoric of styles in place of content and communication as well as a history of manipulation of appearances. In addition, styles force a rhetoric that cannot evolve as all-inclusive discourse, resting instead on the description of mere psychological and idiosyncratic cultural phenomena.

Down to this essential analysis, Modern art is no "creation," but illusion adopted to supplant a history and a tradition of true structural values for the sake of entertainment. If we re-ascend the artist's original experiences and ideas after the work has been performed and compare them with the defunct original idea, we realize that not only we have lost continuity, but that we also lack the tools to establish any value toward human transcendence. Now, it is hard to believe that in order to support the idiosyncrasies of Modern art our culture has erased (*cancellatio memoriam*) the entire set of values established during the Renaissance. However, Clement Greenberg found some justifications that served the economic survival of Modern Art. He thought he could re-establish a liaison with old values. He believed that the artist can start fresh with a blank canvas and the blindest mind, without formative consciousness, and still be a part of the same tradition. The result was obviously a distorted interpretation of the cultural values, which are supposed to exist in the subconscious or unconscious mind of the artist, not a new structural interpretation of what was established during the Renaissance.

A reliance on chances and combination of images, for the sake of image-making is not what Renaissance artists practiced. Any conscious interpretation of the idea of art must have a universal approach and aim at the truth of things or it cannot be brought to posterity as an ideal value. A new tradition cannot be established over a confusing one without damaging the intellectual process of humanity, and this is precisely what happened.

intention of both the artist and the critic to carry meaning in the body of the work of art. Jean Paulhan, reported by Robert Klein in *Writings on the Renaissance and Modern Art* (1979, p. 185), claimed that subject matter is no longer acceptable, but he did not explain why. This is obviously an impingement on the freedom of expression that vilifies the artistic intention which grows in time and should historically move along with the knowledge afforded by the culture of the time. One should explain to me why an artist should not have the freedom to incorporate whatever knowledge and whatever feelings he or she possesses?

In this regard, it seems to me that all philosophical approaches to the interpretation of art have been forfeited for more than a century to give way to abstract theories based either on the unconscious or on the laws of chances, like those justifying the work of Jackson Pollock. Acceptance and adaptation to market conditions rest on the fact that there may be meaning buried in the unconscious, which should be considered therefore the underlying justification to cancel out a valuable historical process may apply. That is why over the years art has lost any concreteness. It is a fact that now the multiple ideas of art have gone so much out of hand that mediocrity is erected as a monument in the name of human “creativity.” In other words, let the artist scramble some images while critics and historians figure out ways to provide some meaning and justifications. We shall see later in the treatise that the employment of the phenomenological method brings truth to this matter. It brings back the essential and congenial grounds for the truthful interpretation of art. There seems to be no other way to justify the meaning of art other than to pay the just tribute to the substance that constitutes human consciousness as historical tradition.

The question is, how can anyone agree to endure values when no one has reflected on the meaning of history? History is supposed to sustain, substantiate, and preserve for posterity what is of value to humanity. The thought, which produced the birth, the continuity, and the developments of the artistic tradition, is what we no longer possess. We are now left with nothing to substantiate, justify, or inspire the works of contemporary trends. The end of a tradition, in other words, brings about no logical historical explanation except antithetical events or contradictions. What some scholars have identified as change from the traditional paradigm is instead forgetfulness of the language that carries the tradition and substantive idea of art. We cannot continue to call art what we cannot substantiate as art. No philosophical theory can be found to support the opposite of this statement. Anything that does not support the continuous, positive, anthropological course has no reason to exist. The philosophy of *laissez-faire*, whereby thoughtless artists can play with materials or rely on productions based on manipulation of images cannot be elevated to metaphysical status.

Phenomenologically speaking, that which is done in art is what the work shows and nothing more. A-casual, accidental production of imagery must be identified as such by accurate, veritable analyses and be judged for its true characteristic modalities, in order not to distort art’s original idea and true function in the world. If a piece of art has been generated by accident, by chance or by numbers, it should be narrated or described in like manner. Therefore, we must abandon the so-called “creative” critical and historical writings that build layers of fantasy and subjectivities.

Any form of writing must serve the communication of meaning and must be set forth consciously, rationally, and intentionally in order to move minds toward the right direction. This rule is valid in poetry, literature, art, music, or any other human accomplishment where higher forms of language are needed. Reliance on accidental linguistic conditions only advances pretentious and absurd presuppositions. The history of Modern and Postmodern Art is full of these presuppositions. However may be the case, when an artist sets him or herself up for an accidental event to occur, the result is an accidental occurrence, not a revelation from the highest. There exists in place an entire semiotic of signs and symbols that fall in this category being accidentally formed, but that now co-exist with a silent history of art.²¹

In the study, we learn that our existence is at all times governed by some level of consciousness, but we must get used to the idea that no artist can make art under an unconscious state. I can prove that what critics and historians have written about Jackson Pollock cannot be supported by a theory of psychological automatism either. The consequential enormous body of literary material written in support of this kind of art should then be reviewed and corrected. A new approach to the contextual ground of art criticism and art history should bring about instead the true phenomenological values of this action in ways that either support or discredit the notion of the existing belief in the art process in general and Abstract Expressionism in particular. This study wants to set higher standards for determining the values of art from a critical and historical standpoint so that a realistic ontological development in art can be undertaken

Any form of criticism of both life and art should support the “ontology” of human nature and human substance as true emancipation of the species. A

²¹ Contrary to what has been established to justify “Action Painting” by critics and historians is actually reliance on accidental natural phenomena, which unfold under determined stimulus and physical laws, as to produce physical phenomena, of gravity and inertia. As a result, from a phenomenological standpoint, this is all that exists as value in the works of Jackson Pollock. It is wrong to call his art “composition” as it is wrong to call it unconscious, as I explain later in the book. Indeed, Mr. Jackson planned each event that produced the bulk of his work with meticulous precision. The credit for what we marvel in Pollock’s works of art goes to his simple knowledge to produce accidental phenomena and certainly a low level of consciousness of the natural laws and to the natural sciences as well, but not to his unconscious. Pollock, who, in addition to placing the canvas on the floor, made the conscious choice of selecting the colors and pouring the paint in a more or less coordinated fashion, relied on a typical and methodical motion of his body, his arms, etc. He did no more than control specific movements and intentions. At this point, it becomes clear that we ought to judge artistic intentions as to why he made such works and called paintings, more than to marvel at his techniques of execution and refrain from ascribing meaning and values that are not there.

philosophy of accidents and chances cannot be sustained either, because it would only carry meaning of contingent phenomena being purported by the act itself. Mere visual manifestations are of no value to the mind because they do not support the rational intentionality and the ontological process of the artist, which is a universal process.

This writer believes in the universality of art because there is a universal will, a will of nature and of reason, in all human acts--art included. The aesthetic experience, according to Kant, refines and defines our intentions only in relation to the universal intention of nature, which is also Husserl's idea of the true perception of the world. In other words, aesthetic achievement is a higher perceptual state of apprehending natural values.

Once a degree of mind enrichment and understanding has been reached in art, all that came before us and that does not respond to truth must be discarded (*cancellatio memoriam*). In this case, to perpetrate and repeat the errors of historicity does not conform with any anthropological theory; the past must be looked at as bearing significant value only for what existed or failed to exist. We must credit Heidegger with this teaching. A consciousness is a synthesis of perceptual experiences as well as a correction of and renewed predisposition to our perceptual field, all of which allows the subject to carry on what is of better value toward the future. Devoid of this consciousness, art criticism, and art history cannot move ahead with the universal intention of nature. In Husserl's mind, consciousness is a body of phenomenological thought of positive and negative phenomena that enriches critics and historians with the knowledge and the wisdom of nature so that the multitude of perceptual fallacies may be corrected.

Applied phenomenology can reveal the truth of the artist's true intentions, simply because it can retrace causally the sequential motivational phenomena—the same can lead to true judgments because there can be no conjectures and no contingencies in phenomenal necessity. The field of perceptual immanence that constitutes the a priori of the consciousness of art reveals its true existence under any circumstances. Phenomena are indelible causal events that settle in memory like fossils and change our genetic memory. If every human action begins at a level of conscious intention, the end of the action can only signify fulfillment or, at least, advancement of that action. So criticism's logical function is to trace and define the validity of the genuine artistic intention that precedes the action. Art can only identify with the artist's original intention. The quality and integrity of the original intention is determinant for the evaluation of works of art. It must be understood that prejudicial, ready-made thoughts cannot constitute the original rational intentions because they offer no advance to the problematic of art unless validated by a structural method. Untested ready-made thoughts simply disperse human energy and displace true consciousness. The loss of art's original meaning

and of its rational intention explains how the discourse of Modernist art became ambivalent, confused, and esoteric, so as to preclude any substantial developments for the future.²²

We can now demonstrate that historians must possess the right tools to assess Modern Art outside historicity's concern for preservation of illusion, fantasy, and decoration as justifiable components that bring no intellectual development. Until they embrace all disciplines of knowledge and make correct assessments of human values, there will be no history of art. We can demonstrate that the concern for true value excludes any belief in mysticism rooted in the human imagination and its attempts to delve in abstract and metaphysical questions. What establishes metaphysics in art must be the same secular fear for the unknown that also played a large role through the history of mankind and provided fertile terrain for all sorts of religions rather than for productive intentions.²³ Benedetto Croce (1866-1952) maintained the position that fantasy and illusions do not exalt the capacity and the role of productive imagination. That is why the given notions of Modern art are still rooted in the inadequacies of ancient story-telling. The history of art is in reality the "Story of Art," which has no bearing on true existential discourses. Conversely, Croce, like many other scholars, saw in the rational role of the imagination a faculty capable of great achievements only on the basis of a substantial ground. Imagination does not differ from fantasy and dream if it does not carry the weight of substantial ideas.

This is to say that imagination can carry valid and sustainable hypothesis and it is not a scattered faculty or exclusive patrimony of the artist. In other words, this faculty can be substantially capable of advancing human conditions under the guidance of a wise consciousness. This discourse is sufficient to debase the artist's indulgence in illusionary imagination, more than ever, the scattered, subjective and ephemeral fantasy that many artists find easy to indulge upon. The artist can well fill the empty canvas with an empty imagination, but also with a meaningful and substantial message. The canvas that cannot endure the test of time is the one that lacks rational conceptual and universal substance.

In practice, Art's historical tradition is like the Einstein's light ray, being bent by external forces, rather than the force producing the action, which tells us that we cannot call art anything outside the reality of being. In other words, art

²² We ought to be able to envision the world as rationally organized whole in order to act on it in a correct and moral way. Recognition of the natural law is fundamental for the recognition of the values that must be maintained and those that must be suppressed in human life.

²³ For instance, Albert Einstein (1879-1955) imagined, or rather hypothesized, that gravity would bend light rays and was able to prove the hypothesis because the idea emerged from a structural basis from which the imagination emerged.

must be the force, not the object upon which the force is applied. More than ever, the artist of today is faced with the challenge of a changing world that has infinite dimensions of reality and possibilities of expansion. Such world must be correctly perceived and, dealt with the knowledge thereof, to give causal force to the instruments of art capable of changing it. A conscious artist cannot stand aside and allow world developments to pass by without interaction and applying the art he or she possesses.

The task of art is to capture the present and anticipate the future by synthesis, which equates to enriching and enlightening the mind of humanity as a whole. We feel more human when we understand art as an integral part of our existence, when the only true thing that reflects the true possibilities of human nature is within our powers. The questions of being find true answers only in the context of an advanced phenomenological knowledge called ontology. In this context, art becomes the sole force in the world capable of re-conceptualizing and redefining the notion of human existence in time.

The goals that I have set forth in this study are to open the field of interdisciplinary phenomenological research and thus expand the understanding of the existential potentialities of art through an appropriate analysis and synthesis of values to be drawn from advanced philosophies of life for the art of the future. Art can achieve the kind of autonomy and freedom to apply the imagination on this anthropological perspective. This statement shows not only the meaning of a true understanding of human freedom, but that all artists can act upon the real potentialities of art and oppose the critical and historical vagaries so frequent in art literature that dispossess human values and distort human freedom.²⁴ Because subjectivity rests on the difference between cognitive and sensuous perceptions, it is typical of the untamed body, while what is objective from the perspective of intellectual inquires remains objective in its physical conditions. Objectivity, as I said, is cohesive thought formation from the beginning to the end, formed by the law of supreme order of things that only a striving intellect can grasp; contrarily, subjectivity is that raw physical or psychological impression on brain matter in search of recognition with no logical explanations. Art is an ideal force only if it recognizes this difference between these two presuppositions; and only if it can activate changes in the world's system of values.

Hegel in his *Philosophy of Right* and his *Philosophy of History* spoke about a world order as a progress of the objectivity of human consciousness. The subjective sublimation advocated by many immature scholars does not offer a valid condition for the future of art or the future of the world. Vis-à-vis the subjectivism

²⁴ Subjectivity paraphrased in M. Heidegger's *History of the Conception of Time* (1985, p. 105) is the actual temporal region that can only be recognized by an objectivity, which dwells outside the body — the same body of a conscious spirit that changes itself in the image of a rational nature.

embalmed in the historical narrative and the criticism of art, I now question all the myths and the false beliefs that have brought about the conviction that illusionary freedom is the sole condition for art to establish its role in the world. Illusionary freedom is not true freedom even when intended as the liberty to act as one pleases. It is instead the failure to act on the rational logic and feasibility of correct ideas and the lack of logical reason inducing insecurity and unfreedom. To make it more succinct, according to Kant, reason and reason alone can determine the positive qualities of freedom.

Realistically speaking, pure objectivity may be just as unreachable as pure subjectivity, but it is altogether absurd to believe that we can substitute even in a marginal fashion objectivity with subjectivity, reason with the dogmas of religion, history with myths, reality with fantasy and illusions, and continue to call art the products of human aberrations and idiosyncrasies. It seems to me that this new scientific era represents a valid invitation for art and artists to reflect synthetically upon the past, the present, and the future, as well as upon possibilities and impossibilities to advance the consciousness of the world. We all know that life can be lived with or without art, but in order to decide on this issue, we need a clear and contemporary notion of what art is and what it does for humanity so that intelligent choices can be made, i.e., whether we decide to enrich people's life or indulge in intellectual lethargy.

In order to produce constructive intellectual conditions in art, we need a discipline of thought to guide "lived experiences" according to Husserl. Starting with Hegelian philosophy, this study retraces the history of consciousness of being. Based on that knowledge, it reformulates the consciousness of art. Art and life are bound by the same ideal mode of objective, rational existence. At the end of this study, the reader will determine for him or herself whether art should continue to exist in the realms of fantasy or become an active part of the real world; whether to allow the ongoing Platonic formalism to endure or reinforce the idea of art as conscious concreteness; whether to allow mental apathy, confusion, and indifference to persist, or operate on a structural thought to expand the perception of art; and lastly, whether to encourage artists that remain unconcerned about the problems of humanity, that possess limited visions of reality and regional confines, or produce artists that look at the world as a whole and aim at the edification of a universal consciousness of art.

The project of the art of the future can be reduced to a single aim: that of art for the sake of better humanity. This project requires the consciousness of art to be removed from its present state of self-induced nihilism, from the type of critical and historical empiricism that reduces it to subjectivity and prejudice. We shall see that, although these opposite states of mind are consequential, they impose separate conditions that undermine quite different courses of the history of art, as the due

destiny of being, as Heidegger mentioned. All disciplines of thought are equally important to secure the destiny of art as long as they are effective means to carry forward the project of humanity in the world. As a discipline of humanity, the concept of art must be renewed and undergo extensive phenomenological hermeneutic self-analysis and readjustment, which is what this writer is doing; it must be re-aligned, or, better said, integrated as a matter of dignity, interests and concerns with the universal notion of human substance.

Humanity is in itself an existential body of values that should fall at the center of any established knowledge. This concern, as I will explain in Chapter Five, induces the subject to attain a commensurate degree of knowledge to act and to exist in a world of reality (*Weltanschauung*) as an existential goal. Art has the capacity to redefine itself anew against the current *world-view* concept that brings about new philosophical and anthropological perspectives, and establishes new priorities. Rediscovering humanism in art means to find the courage to act and to be in accordance with a unity of being that formulates the ultimate human values of its heritage, not according to Freud's purported mythology.

It must be recognized that from its inception and throughout the history of the Middle Ages, art has taken several roles — roles always founded in the communication of basic forms of knowledge beyond the techniques of tool making, agricultural practices, alchemy, hunting, which have evolved as instruments for the development of the species. If we take a single glance at anthropology, as we understand it today, we realize that art has greatly contributed to the development of the intellectual faculties and of the species simply by developing means of communication of what is of value to humanity. I refer obviously to qualitative substantial aesthetic judgments beyond Kant's subjectivism of taste, which is reflected in the works of Middle Ages' artists, like Cimabue, Giotto, Duccio di Buoninsegna or even Piero della Francesca.

The importance of this era rests not on the stylistic mode, but on the simplicity of the elements of representation and communication, as I explain in Chapter Eight. Cultural development translates with biological development. Art found its intellectual apogee of excellence of representation during the Renaissance, now excellence rests on their intellectual engagement and spirit of humanity. A return to the notion of "New Humanism" is thus demanded as spiritual endeavor. The middle ages produced new knowledge and many men of political power were also poets, writers and astronomers. Plato called these eloquent men the "philosopher Kings." A rebirth of the same spirit that produced the Renaissance of intellects is not impossible now that the world possesses the phenomenological tools to evolve substantially and at a faster rate.

From simple ingenuity, art has evolved to higher forms of linguistic expression, by looking at the world and looking at itself. Now after 30,000 years

from the frescoes of Altamira artists are yet to find their role in the world. Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) confirmed that the human species can be defined by the movement of its substance alone, as opposed to substance in a state of absolute rest or being forgotten. The grottos of Altamira and the Egyptian Obelisks are not only monuments to early human ingenuity, but pivotal intellectual signs of this anthropological movement. Saying it succinctly, an artifact is human intelligence maturing under the vestiges of genetic intelligence, which may come to a halt, but is never in remission. However, it needs to be rediscovered and revived over and over. What archeology uncovers today are not the simple rests of customs and traditions, but the referential causal signs animating anthropological movements as movements of the mind. Art can only be understood as part of this legitimate claim to human substance. Artists should take notice of what preserves and advances the human species and reformulate their behavior to produce examples of positive anthropological development.

For this reason alone, art is a precious commodity because it can set concerns above material existence to fulfill the causes of humanity. The concept of human substance was the preoccupation of philosophers from Aristotle to Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger. Heidegger recognized the potential capacity of thought as *ontological* substance, the intellectual substance, which was later proved in biological science to govern and refine cellular intelligence. Our faculties of reason, perception, intuition, imagination, understanding, judgment, depend on thought etc., which produces the movement of cellular complexity and genetic refinement. The reader will find this evolutionary topic of biology in Chapter Six along with a good amount of research to substantiate it. In addition, to further substantiate this point, Heidegger traced this evolutionary notion of humans as far back as to Parmenides. He thought that what precisely stands for human substance and existence is ontology of nature embodied in what is called *Prima Philosophia*, which goes back to the *pre-Socratics*. This notion, always by following Heidegger's philosophy, implied a rejection of the metaphysics and a reformulation of the existential constitution of being in our historical time, rather than what carries the mind beyond its existential boundaries and to a *reductio ad absurdum*.

The mind formulates thought and the biology of the brain that biologically preserves it in memory. Kant made the distinction of *noumenon* and *phenomenon* advancing genetic science by three centuries. This signifies the power of human thought. This consideration makes us think how many artistic potential artists have simply given away when they stopped integrating philosophical thought in their art, showing that there is no development when human thought is not present in the process of art. The mind and the body are not dichotomous, as Kant believed, but continuous, converting cognitive knowledge into cellular memory. The brain's

physical substance is animated by the multiple synthetic layers of cognitive and perceptual knowledge. The phenomenon is generated by the *noumenon*, which weaves a fabric of causal interdependency. The act of knowing and perceiving become inseparable, once the fabric and the many layers of substantial thought is in place. That fabric is our consciousness. The mind builds substantial channels and bridges as infrastructure of consciousness following the laws of causal necessity until perception reaches its completion and a new intuition sprouts like a new seed of life.

The body senses or apprehends the object of perception at first; the mind recognizes it and determines its objectivity later upon reflection, according to Hegel. Hegel was very clear about this phenomenon. It is the mind to arrive at the determination of the substance of things, not the senses, which are merely the receptors of the physical stimulus. More than a century before Kant, Descartes reflected upon mind-body relations only to establish the boundaries of human consciousness. Much later, Hegel and Husserl brought light upon the intricacies and complexities of such consciousness, which clearly ended that which appear to give rise to an irreconcilable conflict between subjectivity and objectivity.²⁵

As treated in this study, ontology reflects the Husserlian-Heideggerian notion of perception brought to its existential necessity and application. In their view, perception becomes synonymous with ontology because it encompasses the possibility of a totality of knowledge emerging from reality's initial cognitive understanding implemented in its multiple conditions of actual existence. All phases of perception can be explained by phenomenological means as determined by the work produced in concert by all intellectual faculties under the auxiliary, coordinating implementation of consciousness.

Cognition prepares the senses toward new apprehensions by providing the initial meaning, the proper attention, says Husserl of what can become an endless circularity that produces what Leibniz referred to as "truth of fact," which is never complete. The circularity of perception is, therefore, just a movement of materialized knowledge that makes the subject conscious of what gave the object existence to a new independent being. Hegel saw this movement as an intercourse that comports both an active and reflective cognition of the object (self-consciousness); in other words, we have a pre-given notion of the object in most

²⁵ Husserl understood that the subjective side of consciousness is in no conflict with its objective counterpart, because one leads to the other. Subjectivity is the unlearned side of being waiting to be educated. Much water has passed under the bridge since Hegel's dialectic found the two sides of being irreconcilable. It was Husserl who noted that if we release the mind from the rigor of reason, we inevitably fall into a subjective state. However, Husserl left phenomenology of perception incomplete as far as its existential application. This meant that the Aristotelian division of physics and Metaphysics was still prominent among the philosophers of the time. In *What is Metaphysics*, Heidegger proved that the Aristotelian notion of Metaphysics was a postulation of speculative ideas far removed from reality, contributing nothing to the idea of perception and to the unification of human consciousness. He saw the need to bring Metaphysics back to the realm of ontological existence.

cases. The subject admits the object in consciousness as a special order of ideas and this admittance changes the existential conditions of said consciousness.

Self-consciousness is the culmination of Hegel's treatment of perception in a circular and transcendental motion. Thus, what is beyond reality cannot be causally a part of the circle of perception. Reality can be imagined outside the circle of perception, but cannot be taken as being or a-priorily given. As a result, perception must always come to reason with itself. The passage from Kant's metaphysics to Hegel's phenomenology is characterized precisely by this conscious motion toward concreteness of reality and self-realization. A similar example may be drawn also from Descartes' *ego cogito*: I am here, now, before the object, and I can perceive it in so far as I perceive myself perceiving it and vice versa.

Descartes' *ego cogito* was the most important reflection ever made since Aristotle. It demonstrated that a certain amount of subjectivity is needed to establish true and objective existence. This thought possesses an immense meaning in art and indicates that there cannot be subjectivity without objectivity and vice versa. We may say that the empirical conception of perception and experience exerted by British empiricists and positivists was moved historically to fruition by Edmund Husserl's meditations. Husserl made it crystal clear that the mind and the body are not separate and that perception cannot take place if we separate their actions. Descartes' wax example supports this contention brilliantly.

Perception is thus established by a phenomenological circularity of interdependence that establishes the unity and continuity of the intentional body of knowledge to be applied. Husserl made the Cartesian consciousness more plausible by establishing the circularity of perception and turned into a productive unity of positive activities of the mind. Consciousness is that overall dynamic movement that prompts the intentional thought that produces the right language and renders explicit the sensuous apprehensions of experiences.

Conceptual thought is also a production of consciousness, Husserl points out in *Experience and Judgment*. Meaning can be predicated as to determine the qualities and values expressed in any linguistic medium, he believed as to produce incarnated substance, which defines and justifies human existence. What drives consciousness forward is precisely its substance producing specific intentional force. Thus the force exercised in art does not emerge by itself but with the aid of some special thought. The subject must want to perceive the object and identify his or her art with this conscious effort. What penetrates the object's layers of meaning is a phenomenological analytical effort, step by step, aimed at arriving at a logical and determinative judgment. Subjectivity, the undefined and insecure part of us, is necessarily always in search for concreteness to transform itself into objectivity by the acquisition of substance. If this thought appears a bit confused the reader's mind will understand more and more as he or she moves along the

treatise of the book, which all too often brings back the problem of subjectivity and objectivity – the most thought of in the history of philosophy.

Substance is the prize of a search for logical and objective possibilities of existence, but without an intentional analytical consciousness there can be no judgment leading to a finality of meaning. Phenomenology furnishes the ground for objectivity of being because it offers justification for the causal movement of perception. From subjectivity to objectivity the constitution of the rational structure of consciousness becomes reality. Through phenomenology, consciousness becomes the governing body that investigates and apprehends reality, the world, and itself. By looking at this process from a theoretical point of view, consciousness learns to assess its own subjectivity, to overcome it, or to accept its misgivings.

Husserl's phenomenology of perception is important to the assessment of the new existential idea of art because it brings into the open the essential meaning of what it means to perceive. It is true that I am my own perceptions, which constitutes my art, but it is also true that once I embody the perception of reality, I am not the same person. Once the idea of the art object is cemented inside my consciousness, it acquires real qualities that advance my art toward reality. This movement can be delineated in the genealogy of the art object vis a vis my reality of being even when I produce spontaneously that which is my being. Therefore, consciousness in general can be objective and extensive, imaginative and generative (creative) on the basis of its own generated substance.

The empiricists' fallacies of perception still exist in the common idea. Art has value as long as it is understood as a search for truth. Truth can only be found in nature. Perception therefore must be understood as a window that accesses the nature of things of the world, namely, the logical and extended view of natural reality. This idea comes from Husserl, who isolated the fallacies of perception by insisting on the "natural attitude." He distinguished between what indeed exists before the eyes from what exist in the mind, unlike the empiricists, who were not aware of any phenomenological method.

This writer went indeed much further when he established the causal necessity and continuity, (beyond descriptive phenomenology) which determines the perceptual movement of human substance. If the idea of substance is accepted as value of art, we ought to be able to establish it with certainty through the causal phenomenological method. True perceptions enrich our consciousness so as to become an extended universal body of substance constituting the basis for the spontaneous expressions of art. This point clears all the obscure notions in the field of psychology that claims a ground of illusions and fantasy to be the seat of art expressions, while art is no more than the capacity of consciousness to express

what is perceived in the way it is perceived. The same process of externalization also de-materializes the concept of *l'art pour l'art*.

If we assume Kant's belief that "nothing comes from nothing," what comes out of a consciousness directly relates to what goes into a consciousness, and, as a result, we should be witnessing significant historical developments with the revival of humanistic thought. Kant taught us that consciousness is real because it recognizes the boundaries, which delimit the contextual existential ground of reality. The world is the sole ground of the very applicability of all concepts and ideas that constitute true possibility of anthropological developments because it is ratified by scientific certainty.

We understand anthropology because we understand causal phenomenology, which when applied in art can anticipate real changes in human nature and in the world. Anthropology is a realization of what we are as perceptual beings. Descartes's *cogito ergo sum* taught us that we realize what we are through the object of perception. The perceptual passage from noumenon to phenomenon, i.e., from cognition to perception, establishes the real necessity that links us to the object.²⁶

The structure of the consciousness of art cannot be dissimilar formation from the natural structure of the mind. With this, I mean to say that the perceptual process repeats the design of natural structures and reproduces likewise impressions in the brain. Art, being a product of human nature, cannot establish anything opposite to the natural structures of the world – it cannot change scientific experiences, like that of Descartes' wax melting by the application of heat. Critics and historians formulate abstract theories when they take for granted that art can be set above nature. On the contrary, it can be said that art can develop a greater contextual field of experience only by probing the substantial grounds of nature, which provides art's *raison d'être* and a concept that rests on the capacity of the human faculties to cognize, perceive, imagine, and synthesize the knowledge of the world. It is a fact that metaphysical introjections in the discourse of art cause more confusion than psychological pathologies.

Those who associate the term "creation" beyond, which no phenomenology exists, precludes the real understanding of the word creation, which is over used and charged with too much meaning. The human mind is the product of a complex physical entity that can process only what is fed to it. Because of this Kantian belief, we can say with certainty that no mysticism can prove that humans are not dependent on material existence and bound to the physicality of the world.

²⁶ We perceive a glass in its material content, shape, and form because we are capable of tracing its origins, such that it was once sand melted into liquid and shaped into its actual form. This indivisible cognition makes perception real and actual as causal realization in our minds. We can, therefore, perceive insofar we understand life processes in nature. This maxim applies in art as well.

Heidegger proved that metaphysical presuppositions of any kind could not aspire to be the ground for the development of an idea of ontology. The term *onto* stands for real human existence thus, the soul or the spirit that animates the flesh stands oppose to any constructions of the mind.²⁷ This is how we define perceptual aesthetic refinement of existence, which represents the highest objective knowledge. As a human concept, art remains subordinate to what can be determined as fine and subtle qualities of nature in universal terms. This statement obviously calls for reexamining the entire history of aesthetic ideas and beliefs as to what constitutes aesthetic value and what is needed to evaluate and assess works of art.²⁸

Since, by natural necessity, every form of existence requires a *raison d'être*, we could not fulfill the tasks of art in society without knowing the necessity that binds it to human reality. Moreover, since the time of Aristotle, philosophy has represented to the world that everything in life exists in function of something else, i.e., a *telos*, a purpose, and an ultimate end. Therefore, a necessity of existence must represent the grounding principle of everything we believe. For this reason, the idea of art cannot be extended *ad infinitum*. It can only apply to life itself as operating on the same universal plane. Immanuel Kant's categories confirmed this belief.

Mankind is the artificer of its own destiny, the designer of its own concepts of life, and it believes it can do that with art. Concepts are ready-made syntheses of knowledge, said Kant, applying current levels of understanding. The apprehension of meaning, the sense of things as to their internal logic, and, thus, our actions cannot be embodied in a concept that does not reflect the logic of nature. Under this train of thought, a concept cannot be proved wrong unless by conducting the same analysis and synthesis that produced it in the first place. Art history narrates that art was born in the cradle of philosophy, which shaped its meaning and functions in life through centuries and millennia. The growing spirit of research, which together allows the expansion of the true perception of the living world and arrives at its accurate judgments, can only be animated by the human desire for intellectual art developments.

Philosophy was first to formulate a concept of art that would harmonize with those of science, of history, of ethic, of freedom, of politic, and of society. These

²⁷ It is nobody's fault if human knowledge is limited to the physical world. Consciousness is such strictly because it can establish the boundaries of its own reality. We humans can only abide faithfully to what we can establish existentially in the mind or we subject our being to the contingent powers of space and time, to the world's primordial chances.

²⁸ In synthesis, let a new, logical, holistic aesthetic be the ground that defines and establishes the universal validity of art free from ignorance, subjectivism, material interest, or political power, which take over its consciousness.

concepts, whose meaning is supposed to expand with the expansion of our faculty of reason, serve humanity to fulfill its existence. Art can be of no exception to this rule, but its history shows that it rejected any form of objective thinking that could not develop a philosophy of its own. When a concept loses the causal reasons that justify its existence, antithetical prejudice establishes itself in the place of reason and the human will loses the grip on the reality of the world, which constitutes a serious issue for contemporary art.

In all of the above we find embodied Kant's categories. The *Critique of Pure Reason* (1919) remains a colossal work of logical reason. The advancement of human reason is dependent upon the necessity that binds all things in a larger universal whole, which confers holistic knowledge and yields the capacity to pass sound apodictical judgments, as well as advancing the existential possibilities of our being in the world. Often, in academic studies, the holistic sense of things is reduced to empirical concepts and reductive judgments. Scientism and technologism presented with emphatic rhetoric reduce and transpose space and time in human learning, producing the great disappointments of our culture. Consequently, any art and life concepts lose their real significance, to become false perceptual pretexts. This occurs as a result of human presumptions, false convictions, subjectivity, and illusions, all of which render contingent the causal course of phenomena and the necessary projection of events. The existential principles of action and behavior must be understood as purposive and attainable ends. *Reductive* conditions limit the perception and the understanding of natural phenomena and render rational behavior unattainable. Take global warming and the destruction of the environment as examples of reductive understanding of the natural laws—often caused by man's limited perception of natural phenomena—and we will not be in error in predicting dreadful developments in art when devoid of thought. When causality is not sought, reality cannot be envisioned. This means that man's presumptions, false convictions, illusions, and myths, are being pursued or maintained as errors, which consolidates and obscures future reality itself.²⁹

²⁹ All knowledge in every discipline should undergo phenomenological test of significance and determination of reality. The knowledge of the causal dynamic of phenomena is necessary because it helps mankind to act with accuracy and intelligence upon nature and human nature as well. In order to exercise their maximum validity and their particular value, human knowledge must relate to the higher universal necessity of nature. That alone establishes accuracy, unity, and the continuity of existence. Concepts and judgments, unless supported by this holistic causal reason, are inevitably reduced to a limited milieu that may suffice immediate cultural ends, but not long-term substantial ones. We see, then, that the violation of this principle obfuscates natural reality, reducing science to the technicization of nature, such as has happened in our era, which has yielded alien results. The human mind's tendency to judge by appearances, to take things for granted, to elevate them to the status of first principles, and to by-pass analysis and synthesis are notorious practices. Husserl, in his critique of *The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1970), made a point to address the maladies of empiricism. We need not look further than our history, which makes phenomenology a holistic corrective necessity, even though applying it beyond physical phenomena seem a heresy.

Empirical psychology deserves its share of criticism for falsely claiming to have found all the answers to the origin of art. It invokes a-rational behavior to be inborn in the artist without establishing causes. What does not establish causality cannot be assumed as constructive theory. On the contrary, what connotes with reductivism inevitably limits the view of reality, leading to pathological conditions. All this is contrary to the ethical reasons that prescribe substantial concreteness, especially when humanity is in need of enlightenment to overcome prejudicial, mythical, and cultural beliefs. Here, in this study, the reader inevitably arrives at the conclusion that the principles of science and of art must rest on interactive substantial universal knowledge, to detach oneself from lower cultural concerns. This is why this book calls for a causal historical phenomenological inquiry to bring to the fore the basic substance of human reality. According to Edmund Husserl, to obtain true knowledge of reality is to allow the mind to follow the causal stream and the succession of phenomena. The question is: Are we to follow this maxim in a global manner to get a hold on our existence and avoid the calamities of the world?

This study is entirely supported by this type of phenomenological causality. A general rule is that the truths of reason must be grounded on the natural laws. Once this has been understood, action can be directed toward congenial ends for humanity, which says that human reason exists as long as there are ends to be pursued. Kant's dictum, "the reason for the existence of human reason is reason itself" that justifies satisfactorily causal phenomenological research as substantiation of art's existential reasons. It remains for the reader to establish the supreme ends of art.

Art's *telos* sets itself before the entire spectrum of humanity and, in doing so, operates toward its own perfection so as to fulfill the universal purpose and validity of reason. This means that the conception of art, science, history, and all the other specialized disciplines as particulars before the universal principle of knowledge are to be governed and shaped in the same Kantian approach to universal reason. In other words, art, science, and philosophy are explorations into the universal reason of existence and only as such can they enhance human existence. Thus, the practical ancient method to establish validity as *prima philosophia*, of relating the particular to the universal still applies throughout the determination of reality and toward the teleological significance of art in the world.

Teleology, from the Greek *telos*, describes this universal concept of interdependent ends transformed by the belief in the higher reason of nature. The pre-Socratics and, before them, the Egyptians and the Sufi understood the concept of natural ends. The Tibetan Book of the Dead speaks about natural ends as well, which means that humanity has been looking at its future for 10,000 years.

Much time has passed, yet this concept is not fully applied to endeavors of science, technology and art. In spite of their advancements, the individual remains an entity in a large magnitude of consciousnesses by virtue of the potential universal knowledge. We all belong together and what we acquire by setting our mind above world's cultures is a general sense of common interaction. Through thought, language, and reflection, consciousness appropriates the universal substance that produces existential completion. The universality of thought offers a large field for art's exploration of reality and represents the meaning of art and life combined—life that by fully existing communicates itself as real nature, and art as a progressing enlightenment. Art is meaningful for us all if we are to achieve conscious completion and a teleological understanding of the world as expanded particularity and universal validity of meaning applicable to both the subject (the artist) and the objects of art as instruments of a human reality all to be advanced through continuous perceptual syntheses.

Consciousness of art is both a critical and self-critical process, thus constantly rectifying its judgments and beliefs and realigning itself to the universal values which it recognizes as ends. In sum, this Aristotelian notion of *telos* applies to consciousness, to all human concepts, and to art in particular. An open contextual field of inquiry of both subject and object in the physical and mental sense allows what Kant calls, *apperception* and what Hegel calls *self-consciousness*, because it transcends the internal dialectic of subjective and objective desires. Through this rational concept of art, the artist can acquire consciousness and self-consciousness of art as 'being in the world.' If the latter is consequential to the former, there can be not one without the other. This is because one signifies the other without exceptions; but in addition, this is how we learn that the perception of art is more than empirical learning, more than incorporating and relating external qualities of objects.

By understanding the nature and the genesis of consciousness, we come to understand art as the presence and existence of the essential meaning of life and of the world. And while we learn this important lesson, we entrust the word *art* with a special meaning to be transposed into the consciousnesses of others. For this reason, art, by definition, must be a transcendental activity. To learn about the dynamic nature of art is to allow more of its congeniality into the basic concept of human nature and vice versa.

A consciousness of art is the project of this study, though it is to be assumed a-priorily that consciousness is a dynamic ontological and anthropological entity for its essential, existential embodiment of meaning and values. This is so by virtue of its analytical and synthetic capacity to operate changes toward edifying its own existential presence in the natural world. It is a fact that the world of nature

and the world of culture have grown dichotomous precisely because of the lack of these particular reflections.

Forgetfulness is what makes ignorance a separate entity. An expanded notion of the necessity between nature and culture must be established and maintained at all times, for only by the way mankind perceives itself in the cultural and in the natural world can it determine the positivity of its existence.

The notions of *culture* and *nature* need scrutiny and new definitions, for they must be understood as distinct and entirely interdependent notions fundamental to the definition of aesthetic. The natural history of human existence goes beyond the bare Darwinian notion of evolution and survival of the species. Human natural history is intertwined with the ontological accomplishments of the intellectual faculties. The mind dictates the body's behavior and that alone equates with whatever level of aesthetic existence, which is reason elevated to a higher plane. The subject thinks and dwells aesthetically when his or her understanding has reached certain perceptual levels of refinement and has satisfied the potentiality of the ontological being. That is why aesthetics can be seen as high culture and altitude of thought, but essentially an ideal existential design of human nature. The correlation between culture and human nature is first established in the mind and the aesthetic object reveals it. The true potentialities of the aesthetic being can be obtained by implementing the finest existential design of human nature, if available to the mind through education and information, as to promote and project the human faculties toward cultural and natural, biological (genetic) developments.

In the study, I speak about the implementation of such a design as a holistic aesthetic and a high form of existence. This theory does not indulge in metaphysical thinking, nor does it prove or disprove metaphysical truths. It is a pure phenomenological and logical realization proved by simple DNA enrichment. Beyond human perception and the comprehension of nature there lie metaphysical truths all to be regarded as unreachable ends, but taken for what they are, namely, realities out of the grasp of human perception. Metaphysical a-priority is not discounted or taken for granted in the study, but only treated in the same way metaphysicians have understood it.³⁰

Socrates, in exerting his famous dictum "know thyself," precisely advocated that total existential knowledge of the subject is possible. He believed that there

³⁰ Examples: the *chronos*, the infiniteness of time, of space; the omnipresence and tangibility of the spirit of life, etc. What is out of the grasp of human perception cannot be theorized nor discounted. This belief makes my vision of aesthetic an existential rather than a metaphysical pursuit, while I point out that Heidegger's statements about the end of metaphysics is real because of our incapacity to theorize about it and contextualize it is also real.

are fundamental human values to be discovered and advanced in human nature—such are the infinite capacities of the intellectual faculties that needed to be expanded as much as possible. Kant's transcendental aesthetic in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1919) substantiates the direct connection between the “sensible and the intelligible,” which means that the perceptual acts within ourselves can produce the finest intellects because they are continuous, self-enriching, self-transforming, self-transcending, and their ends may be unlimited. Perception allows the intellect to become aware of the potentialities of nature and of the world. Does this relate with or explain the meaning of art? I believe it does, for “creativity” must be intended primarily as self-growth followed by self-realization and self-awareness. And who can predict what human intellectual development will be in 10,000 years from now?

So far, no one has ever been able to predict human destiny, not even Nostradamus. The infinity of time and space does not signify limitation of thought. On the contrary, it represents extension of all human concepts, but such thought must not lose touch with human reality. This belief was basic for Kant's entire teleological aesthetic philosophy, as it was for Hegel's.

The concept of art must be based on the accepted reality that there are unlimited potentialities in the human intellect that need to materialize as conscious individual unities. A fundamental intellectual activity, such as art, should not rest on imaginary ideas. I draw this simple but open comparison from the principles legislating action and behavior in accordance with what we understand as consciousness and intentionality. Our intellectual potentialities are not realized through metaphysical mystifications. The intellect will never be free from the prejudice of petty cultural trends unless its thoughts are made to rest on the reality of the world. Similarly, the future of art depends on its capacity of synthesis to project visions of reality and the firm belief of substantial existential knowledge. Making art is dwelling aesthetically on the greatest truths and at the highest intellectual levels. The artist must think of his or herself as part of the process of transcending the human intellect. Thus, in order to help constitute this consciousness, this treatise must not only bring about the proper aesthetic discourse, as the essential core of the meaning of art, but also provide the perceptual space and the conditions for aesthetic realizations.

Hegel demonstrated in his writings that the understanding of the genesis and the internal dynamics of a perceptual consciousness is necessarily a critical and self-critical task. To this end, the tasks of intuition, understanding, reason, and reflection, as faculties of the mind, must be clearly understood in their dynamic and reciprocal action and interaction.

It has been a painstaking work to research and redefine the genesis of perception as a constitutive part of and as a vehicle for the expansion of human

consciousness. Major work was done also to establish how all human faculties process information during the act of perception, and establish that their particular causal dynamic always culminates in a greater and more profound attainment of reality. There is a complex push-pull of information going on during the act of perception. Ultimately, perception depends precisely on the subject's conscious intention to pursue reality, which must be established both a priori and a posteriori. This point is crucial for the understanding of art as a transcending aesthetic process. In other words, it is important to understand how the mind, through its faculties, gears itself toward apprehending and expressing meaning, as it accrues greater aesthetic sensibility. This is what makes art great.

Our faculties have developed during millions of years in a direct and close relationship with the existential world, not after models of some cultural hypothetical theories, or after extraterrestrial designs. We cannot derive a holistic concept of aesthetic and art without keeping in mind our existential conditions as humans, i.e., without seeing through an expanded anthropological significance of human life. Similarly, the correct concept and the perception of art must not follow, but rather antecede and advance our notion of culture and of the world in order to improve our existence. A perceptual order is maintained by the phenomenological method, and that order ultimately reflects the psychological expansion of consciousness by its physiological nature. We do not know where consciousness resides, but we know the receptors that process any perceptual realization. This is to say that a reality of nature and its potentialities must go hand in hand with intellectual developments, which define the culture of human existence and art.

In all instances, this is the rational thought of departure from metaphysical aesthetics and the aesthetic of illusions advocated by the empiricists. To move toward conscious aesthetic completion, requires the subject to make a clear distinction between subject and object, subjectivity and objectivity, particular value and universal value, etc. Thought is the instrument that moves our consciousness beyond the empirical understanding of a given notion—that is, beyond rhetorical and tautological language—toward a logical unity of knowledge. We cannot obtain perception of nature, or of that fine aspect of aesthetic reality, if we do not possess a general idea of how our faculties work, not singularly, but in unison.

There is a fine aesthetic reality beyond any apparent reality, which characterizes the meaning of the *eidos* of phenomena. What is, is often not what ought to be, the nourishing cognition that formulate possibilities can only be given by aesthetic necessity. From particular to universal perception, aesthetic knowledge is measured in consciousness by the degree of the substantial reality attained and processed that condition the entire field of perceptions. The genesis and the dynamics of perception are self-explanatory realities as natural possibilities

defining how the human mind really works. For this reasoning we must use both hemispheres of the brain, but allow cognition to advance the notions of perception. This study exposes the work required to open this large body of knowledge and to pave the way for the art of the future. From appearances to reality, from particular to universal perception, we learn that there is a reason behind every manifestation of nature, namely the teleology of purpose and of ends that bind space, time, and matter to a single causal necessity.

The causal dynamics of phenomena determine true existence, purpose, and potentiality of beings and events in life. All beings of the planet and of the universe are organized by their nature to behave and to interact in ways that determine their existential ends. Explained in Aristotelian terms, philosophy is the official discipline to help us understand the organization of parts and wholes and to recognize the structure of every being in the world. Aristotle organized his entire philosophy to formulate the dynamics of human understanding (eight books). Under his terms, all things belong to an organization of movement and necessity he called *organon* that allow the part and the whole to arrive at what he called the “end of ends.” In short, to have knowledge of something signifies possessing the understanding of its beginning and its end in a larger and extended context of purpose in the world. We can apply this concept to art and understand that we will not be able to arrive at this existential condition unless we organize its perceptual structures as valid and universally acceptable as an *organon* of humanity.

An *organon* of art must be seen also in a larger structural context of a rational society, both epistemologically and morally structured. This requires the application of logical objective thought and the understanding of the organization of parts from their origins to their fullest possibilities of being. Plato used the term *organon of sense* to explain that the perception of all things begins in our senses and ends with the apprehension of their structural forms. Hegel took on this teaching to build his *Phenomenology of Spirit* to explain the genealogy of perception that apprehends the infinite possibility of nature.

The world is a harmonious organization of parts, and the logic by which these parts come together is all to be discovered. Nevertheless, Hegel tells us that they exist in their own right and as a harmonious whole. Disharmony occurs in nature and in our mind when parts are displaced and disorganized. In that case, perception is either interrupted or distorted and no mental mediation or logical induction can correct the process or reestablish the organic tendencies to tender a structural order of thought. Can the body of the artist detach itself from its sensuous inclinations and allow reason to bring intellectual harmony of thought in the mind? The answers to these questions are determined precisely by an *organon* of instrumental necessity moving the faculties forward from the preliminary idea to the correct execution that guarantees the final product of art.

A wrong idea and a wrong belief can divert a whole process and degenerate into a catastrophe, just as a small headache can produce total dysfunction of the *organon* of the body. This, I suppose, signifies that both mind and body perform functions under a linear logic of nature. A positive thought is the product of harmony and logical coherence and never one of disharmony; a positive action can only be understood within the context of a positivity of nature. This tells us that we must prevent the access of unsubstantiated beliefs and the formation of ideas that do not reflect the logic and the organization of nature. The production of positive knowledge in art is, thus, the outcome of a synthesis that, by its own dynamic, moves toward essences, thus setting the conditions for advanced aesthetic behavior. This simply sets out more accurate premises for the definition of aesthetics as the highest achievement in art.

In other words, *organon*, in the full Aristotelian interpretation, means that the mind can never be saturated or distracted by illicit ideas when it is centered on natural logic. Einstein told us that we use only 10 percent of our brain capacity and that, therefore, much intellectual growth can come into being when the mind is in tune with the body and with itself. This means that we possess the potentialities of greater organization and production of thought, and that through thought the intellect can grow “creatively” and structurally so as to embody greater knowledge and greater understanding under its own structural and genetic make-up. Toward this end, the natural condition of the circle of perception can continue its motion of logical expansion in perpetuity.

Hegel alluded to an *organon of reason*, and to an organization of morality that moves the natural faculties of perception, understanding, intuition, and cognition toward the order of things: completion of capacity and performance. This has indeed occurred and can be proven by the genetic sciences. This unity of mental capacities may one day be better understood when higher possibilities for expansion are produced. Under the necessity of a perfect *organon*, the advancement of knowledge moves *pari passu* with the development of the human faculties. Knowledge is cognition and perception of the interdependent totality of parts. It is pure learning necessarily grounded by greater perceptual and intellectual achievements. The intellectual faculties possess a dynamic which is proper to their nature and physiologically and psychically governed by logical mathematical laws, whose function and interaction are at times spontaneous, reflective, and self-regulating, but still very obscure in the eye of science.

Some assert that brain functions can be measured as electrical charges and therefore can be simulated by artificial intelligence. When we speak about cognition and perception together, we also enter into the pure world of sense and sense feelings, a realm that produces the kind of intuition that binds art, science, and philosophy as the three major disciplines of knowledge into an *organon* that

cannot be dissolved. Artificial intelligence will never be able to possess an intuitive faculty, for instance. By Kantian terms, cognition is achieving conceptual unity and setting new landmarks for thought to prepare new grounds for perception and for intuition to emerge. The passage from an initial cognition to perception, the logical deduction of judgments, and the arising new intuitions that set the ground for new perceptions are one continuous circular conscious motion. This circularity is central to the development of the intellectual faculties.

In this study, much effort has been placed to research the ways the human faculties actually function both physiologically and psychically. My research has finally determined that cognition, for example, is *de-facto* realization, always present in the act of perception because readily available in memory, which submits predetermined data to perception, while the major productive assets of intuition emerges precisely after the act of perception from the inductive deductive capacities of reason. This circularity makes intuition spontaneous, automatic, productive, and conscious because, especially at a higher level of perception, it produces new combinations of data from previous perceptions or because a new element has been introduced that triggers new perceptual developments. The circularity of perception was anticipated by Hegel and by Husserl, but it has never been described in such minute details. In order to accomplish this, I have done no more than develop their ideas phenomenologically—which allowed to follow the dynamics of intellectual phenomena to their outcome.

I have determined also that the internal dynamic necessity and interrelationships of all the faculties follow one main impulse, which is the intention and interest in probing into the perceptual reality of the object, which automatically, as an exercise, purports their attunement and development. This is why those who do intellectual work have sharper minds. I hope that by this study, the reader will be inspired to inquire in the key knowledge pertaining to the nature and genealogy of brain physiological functions.³¹

From a physical standpoint, by what knowledge has been produced in microbiology, we learn that perceptual advancements are achieved by the mind's activation and development of new brain circuitries. The circularity of perception and the constant return to the object with renewed notions relate to new scientific criteria. Circularity is no more than reorganization of neural charges and thus the building of newer perceptual circuitry. I have tried to cover this fact with accuracy only to realize what a marvelous example of harmony and complexity the human intellect is. The reader shall bear in mind why it was necessary to probe the human intellect from various phenomenological and scientific standpoints in order to define the perception of art. To overcome the fallacies of empirical psychology is

³¹ I am saying so because I am firmly convinced, as Freud believed, that to any psychic function there exists a parallel physiological function.

an important step toward acquiring the understanding of art processes and toward distinguishing what represents perceptual advancement in art.

In the sum, it was my realization that there are no conceptual dissimilarities between the dynamic growth of the intellectual faculties and their natural, spontaneous cellular psychic disposition, organization, and development of new data. In fact, the mind is the command-control that organizes better cellular disposition, alignment, and reorganization of the same. Thus, from perception to intuition, the mind is an *organon* of parts and functions that establish relations between the *micro* and the *macro* causal efficiency and that allow analysis and synthesis of the supplied impressions received in the memory bank. This is evidenced by the way the mind passes from cognition to perception, to intuition, and how the latter emerges spontaneously as a logical mathematical interrelation and complex interactions which propel all the other faculties to greater performance and, in turn, provide enrichment of cognitive and perceptual knowledge. The complex circular interrelation during the perception of a work of art excites the faculties of cognition, memory, language, and reflection in the same way and triggers the emergence of productive imagination.

Major philosophers and some psychologists who are treated in the study have dwelled upon phenomenological psychology, but even at the time of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1907-1961), the precursor of this discipline, much of the knowledge in biogenetic and cellular biology was not available. This knowledge obviously makes the circle of perception more ascertainable. Unknown to Piaget, Merleau Ponty, or even to Husserl, for instance, was how intuition emerged as a spontaneous logical reworking and manipulation of thought and how it manifested itself as a synthetic or extensional determination. Intuitional spontaneity has often been treated as a mystery or as a product of supernatural powers. Now, we have proof that it can be more simply understood as a function establishing order and hierarchy of value in the mind. Kant defined it as a “pure synthesis of apperception” and even confused it with imagination. Husserl’s later definition as *associative synthesis* is certainly more appropriate because it reflects what I just mentioned above. But conversely, Husserl placed intuition under a manifold of impressions and sensations establishing it as a lower mental function. It is clear instead that there may be several forms of intuition. A pure logical synthesis emerging as a spontaneous production of thought is still intuition, nevertheless differentiating itself from imagination for the pre-given knowledge that sets itself before subsequent circular perceptual developments. This problematic is extremely important when it comes to understanding the faculties that best give the artist potential “creative” power.

When I say that intuition is emerging spontaneously from constituted perceptual structures, I mean that it does not emerge from empty thoughts—or

from chaos, as it is often assumed in art, especially when one refers to the obscure notion of “creativity.” What is missing in all empirical philosophic and psychological speculations about the mysteries of art is the element of the mind’s structural synthetic capacity to define itself in the perceptual process under the subconscious force of intentionality, which is not a mystery, but a self-conscious disposition for action. One does not have an intuition as an apparition of imagery or a remembrance of ideas. Behind it, there is the silent intention of the mind working under precise directional instructions coming from the subconscious regions of the brain—perhaps an amazing logical hidden power exerting new and advanced results. We may not know what comes out of intuition until it is brought to the fore, but we recognize how it has evolved in the mind, often as a fixed dilemma, as we trace the causes among the faculties of the intellect.

Intentionality is the constituted conscious ingredient, the reinforcing structure, the mover, and, therefore, a feasibly silent power that propels perceptual processes. As I said, the mind as a whole and the entire set of faculties—are being initiated into the perceptual process as a sequential natural order. This order is a key factor in the understanding of the perceptual process. Finally, intuition as a logical synthesis is what finalizes and satisfies the perceptual quest of the experience. Husserl brought this function to the sensuous level of apprehension, but he did not take into account that cognition and perception are forever inseparable. One cannot separate an object from its initial ground of references. All our perceptions are culturally structured and culturally bound to preform prejudicial references, (a book cannot be perceived aside from what the book announces). External stimuli always trigger extension of meaning but may not satisfy certain sensuous capacity. Husserl explained in his phenomenology that it is not excluded that intuition could emerge in some other way. However, the fallacy and the contradiction are here apparent because if they manifest their presence outside the causal phenomenal order, for there exist a phenomenology of internalization of data needed to be uncovered—more specifically, one of logical constitution in memory and one of expression to be understood in their relationship, which is necessary and consequential in the perceptual process.

This study covers both theoretical assumptions, which were in the mind of both Husserl and Kant throughout their work and their phenomenal revelation. The conclusion is that intuition cannot be interpreted as an apprehension, *eo ipso*, but rather as a spontaneous, structural, logical, internal development toward greater ideas. We may not be aware as to when intuition is in the working, but we may become exhilarated after it has arisen, moreover, after being challenged by that which is often a transcending possibility or a vision.

This makes intuition an expansive cognitive faculty, more realistic than what Kant surmised in the first critique because it constantly challenges the perceptual

continuum by setting before it new challenges for all other faculties and prospecting new possibilities of perceptual apprehensions. Afterwards, we search for causes because intuition requires testing, especially when it eludes conscious reflection. As a faculty, it speaks to the other faculties as in Descartes' *ego cogito sum*. As to its effects on the entire conscious apparatus, it is clear that it opens the way to more cognitive material, challenging all the conditions that stand in the way of an established system of beliefs and prejudice.

Intuitions are often confused also with presentiments, premonitions, foreboding, or sensations having to do with various emotional states, namely new ideas encountering certain emotional states. However, they are to be understood as logical projections. Some have reasons not to believe their own intuitions (so they say), precisely when they cannot formulate conscious logical geneses. Scientists and philosophers are notorious for wanting material proof of their intuitions through experimentations. We need only to think of the great thoughts and ideas of some thinkers and scientists that later became reality. We may reflect on some of the things that are now reality but were once considered science fiction and, thus, products of intuition or of the imagination. It has become quite evident in our time that science has made giant steps in its own ways toward establishing mankind's capacity to exploit and bend the natural laws—of course, not without consequences because of the incapacity to test the logical necessity of both intuitions and imaginative ideas.

From the industrial revolution to the new electronic age, much new ground has been uncovered as quantifiable data, but the remaining question is whether mere manipulation of data may lead to true meaningful knowledge of nature in the field of physics, genetics, microbiology, etc. What we call science, thus, hardly reflects pure, logical intuition, or the essential knowledge of perceptual processes, namely those which demonstrate physical necessities, i.e., at the level of causal existence or define the final ends of things.³²

A common application of these truths may be considered as common empirical beliefs of quantifiable data, often projected as tangible knowledge, which may be converted to qualitative ones by simple phenomenological analysis. Experimental sciences and technology are in need of adequate method for proper dimensions of value. Human knowledge may not necessarily be extended through exploration of space or genetic manipulation without a logical and morally acceptable projection. When I speak about morality or ethics, I always have in mind the natural law. Whatever conflicts with the latter is by logical consequence immoral or unethical. The cloning of animals and human beings, the alteration of

³² . For instance, that which is predestined, but not known, or that which is moved by the *summum bonum* (first mover), as Aristotle has bequeathed to us, needs more than the power of logical intuitions to be brought to light.

species in the embryonic stages, or the modification of an entire ecosystem, reflect inadequate intuitions and absence of consideration for the final end of things. Therefore, most of the new and even most astounding discoveries are based on myopic views of the causality of nature: art, and likewise science, do not possess intuitive vision at the moment. A constructive social future must be able to satisfy the entire spectrum of special necessities, like sparing the environment and the public health. Here is where the notion of the genealogy of intuition becomes precious. Manipulation of matter, by any means, does not increase man's power over nature and over the environment and does not produce substantial results. Some scientific discoveries may apparently satisfy physical needs, but do not guarantee the survival or the advancement of the human species.

In generality, we can entertain some doubt as to the validity of both art's and science's final ends especially when ideas are not the result of long-term rational projections. This study precisely outlines the concerns that in art as well as in science, the fallacy of ends is real because the enormous historical and political contradictions. Presently, no one can be sure about the true ends of art and science, though one can continue to sustain this criticism by applying the principles of human condition and its imperfect nature until the end of time.

Experimentation always gratifies the artist and the scientist who, instead of determining reality and rational causation, indulge in the experimental practices of trial and error when extending the time and the action beyond the natural laws. Pure knowledge, according to Husserl, starts from the essence of things, and moves causally from inner to outer space. No significant results will emerge from experimental manipulations of matter until human understanding acquires full certainty of what constitutes life itself. Often, science operates without cognition of time, purposes or final ends engaging in unnatural processes, namely upsetting the *organon* of nature. One would think that this reason alone should alert science to overcome its state of insecurity and caution it not to throw its darts without aiming.

Science's failure to preserve the magnificent qualities of nature and human nature as a whole is having tremendous repercussions already. Manipulation of matter inevitably leads to irreversible results. Irreversibility is the great danger science faces in spite of natural laws' ineluctable and implacable determinism. The course of nature is irreversible and can carry indefinitely all sorts of distortions to the end of times, which means that most often, once the mistake is made, it cannot be corrected. To bend the natural laws is a dangerous illusion; to distort the course of nature is all the more dangerous especially if our main concern is the pursuit of the utility principle. The lack of vision of the ultimate ends is lack of causal logic mentality — all too common in every human endeavor. It is above all an utterly reductive and dangerous prospect to think about. There is no science in

whatever nurtures illusion of replaces God. Acting as creator of human existence is enormously pretentious.

To be considered in science and in art are the relations of *micro-macro* validity of ends. An immediate advantage may not be a sustainable long-term end. A holistic knowledge before action seems the prudent solution to all problems of science and art. Happiness and immortality are not valid possibilities as long as we have to deal with imperfect beings and experiment with the unknown. We must accept that science will have limited powers as long as both the beginning and the end of time are incalculable and unforeseeable. Humans will always be bound by their physical and temporal limitations and this fact should make us weary of tampering with the natural laws.

Philosophers for centuries have contemplated doubt in their theories because they knew they could not possess full knowledge of the entire *organon* of nature until the advent of phenomenology, which shed some light on reality and projected possible developments. Heidegger pursued the knowledge of the finite individual and the environment because he identified the *lacuna* of empirical scientific community. Most importantly, he pursued the understanding of the essential fundamental necessity that binds living beings to their nature. What determines humankind's harmony of existence with animals and plants and what allows human nature to excel by virtue of its own internal necessities stands opposed to any alteration of the distorted system that has altered natural processes for hundreds of years.

Projective knowledge cannot be obtained simply by determining empirical differences or by categorization of ideas. We must do what Heidegger said: start with an ideal notion of being and pursue its realization by moving along phenomenological lines. Heidegger offered substantial material to correct the repercussions of the psychological illusions of our times. His ontological thought opened new outlooks of the potential constitution of scientific consciousness in relation to reality of existence. The search for reality in the world always constitutes greater challenges for science, art and philosophy. He believed that the advancement of human substance requires grounded knowledge of the phenomenological field of nature and human nature as well. Husserl, the father of phenomenology and his teacher, convincingly showed him the universal validity of "being in the world." Both at the practical and aesthetic level, it can be determined the truth of being by resting our judgments on the essential positivity of nature and, ultimately, by combining the meaning of natural phenomena and events with ontogenetic reality, i.e., individual existence in relation to the *micro/macro* relations of the world. This judgment is made good and self-evident by the application and the implementation of the natural laws confirming validity here on earth.

It is clear that the lack of these philosophical considerations makes all theories of both science and art insignificant. One does not counteract science and technology's irrationality with mere unprincipled, iconoclastic denial of everything that has been adopted as culture of reason, or with more irrationality. Primitivism, the adopted practice in both art and science, like manipulation of matter and living matter, is no cure for the relentless technological proliferation of ecological threats. Infantile search for the minute particle of sub-atomic matter does not stop the supremacy and the powers of nature over human existence.³³

Individual existence is not a self-sufficient, self-sustaining entity. Believing that it is, however, is like advocating more metaphysical aberrations.³⁴ The dichotomy of the *in-itself* versus the *for-itself*, namely metaphysics versus existential philosophy, still generates confusion and bewilderment in the art world. Does art serve human ends or only its own whims and desires? This confusion is responsible for erasing the true humanistic spirit and alienating art from the world. By this, I mean that a theory of art cannot be construed by resorting to instinctual, primal behavior alone as to benefit only itself or some ephemeral decorating purpose.

In retrospect, we can see that this defeats all universal laws of interdependence, of necessity, of unity in diversity, etc., which apply to all things in life. Neither philosophy nor psychology can justify the utopian concept of the *in-itself*. If the latter must be identified with the unconscious mind rather than with a rational self-evident entity, it should also be considered as a subjective unworthy condition of being. Moreover, the unconscious and the conscious mind are like water and oil. They do not mix, but the latter should be aware of the former. By analogy, the notion of the *in-itself*, much observed and revered in art and society like art's long shot of a dream for autonomy – truly an esoteric contention claiming primacy and non-objectivity in art without principles, which cannot be constitutive of any theoretical, social, or political discourse. It seems that, in the genealogy of life, the main discourse is to be constituted by the support of the natural law.

³³ Some have claimed that art could become man's highest pursuit simply by returning to primordial existence, an existence devoid of reason and wisdom. Nietzsche had predicted, in *Twilight of the Idols* (1968), a strange dichotomy that challenged metaphysics with an illusionist return to instinctual nature. Nietzsche tried to undo the Kantian-Hegelian rational philosophy of consciousness by producing a philosophy of the *in-itself*, which much excited Jean-Paul Sartre but proved to be unrealistic.

³⁴ Tantamount utopian abstraction found resonance and was supported by both J.-P. Sartre's and H. Marcuse's negative philosophy as followers of the skeptic Schopenhauerian tradition proliferated during the latest social revolutions of the 1960s. At the turn of the 20th century, both existential philosophy and metaphysics were convivial in the same dichotomous space, while art was still charged with a dose of preponderant material needs to conflict with all forms of naturalism. Later, naturalism in art turned into eclecticism, while phenomenology reinforced existential truths.

Molecular science failed to identify the infinitesimal subatomic particle of matter. As in science, philosophy failed to identify an *organon* of the essential substance of human nature. The theories of art failed to fulfill the congenial, objective, scientific, and philosophical reasons for being. All this opposes the Aristotelian organic, rational body of knowledge or the Leibnizian knowledge made of *monadic* components speak about interdependence of the various disciplines conducive to the advancement of the species. Under the existing conditions, we can speak of no workable theory to relate art to the world of reality and help move mankind from point A to point B, or even place it on the scale of universal validity. This is what I hope this study will plausibly explain.

The historical fallacy that there could be art for the sake of itself must be blamed on subjective and prejudicial critical historical introjections. What has been accomplished in the history of art, so far, is only an assumed and unsubstantiated autonomy, which produces isolationism and iconoclasm. What is alien from the world is also alien from its own nature, which further defeats the Nietzschean concept of the *in-itself*. Rational philosophy cannot envision a notion of conceited, self-centered individuality in place of a *teleology* of the individual. We have learnt from Hegel that individuality's plausibility consists of a unity of knowledge as part of a larger *monadology*.

Modernist art is a direct consequence of a state of false autonomy and social iconoclasm, which is denial of constituted cultural universal value. We saw the beginning of this phenomenon in Baudelaire's extravagance and philosophical aversion. Following on his footsteps, artists thought they could draw meaning, motivation, and energy from subjective experiences, (often reminiscences of childhood devoid of substance), or energize their *egos* by operating in the interface between the internal and external world, but they remained victims of their own illusions.³⁵

To possess a vision of the world does not signify relinquishing the entire human effort to produce a body of knowledge over thousands of years, repudiating

³⁵ Baudelaire's *anti-naturalist* stance during the 1850s was no congenial substitute for the naturalist formalistic approach to art, turning subject matter much in the same way into an ephemeral, psychological, and even pathological state of being—such as what is exhibited in his *Salons* of the 1800s. After Baudelaire, there is no more aesthetic thought being forgotten along with all traditional values Emile Zola (1840-1902) happened to be the sole voice that rejected Baudelaire's misconceptions of art and nature:

Every great artist who comes to the fore gives us a new and personal vision of Nature. Here 'reality' is the fixed element, and it is the differences in outlook of the artists which has given to works of art their individual characteristics. (1960, p. 30)

the true meaning of nature, as well as the responsibilities toward mankind. Knowledge is needed to formulate ideas and concepts at all levels of experience. Kant (1919) said, “Without concepts ideas are empty.” The search for extended concepts of nature and human nature requires the knowledge of both science and philosophy. A concept of nature, therefore, must antecede all concepts of culture and of art. In this way, a concept of art is fundamental in defining the true value of the artist’s nature and the effects of his/her art in society. A work of art may say, even in a peculiar way, what the artist understands about nature and about him or herself. Premised that all knowing is about nature, consciousness is the essential knowing about both nature and human nature. Since we can understand nature only through causal concepts, there can be no dichotomy between the concept of nature, human nature, and that of art because the former generates the latter. This goes against Baudelaire’s position that art is a-contextual to nature. An *anti-naturalist* concept of art is therefore unacceptable from any logical standpoint; a non-philosophical approach is also unacceptable after thousands of years devoted to the edification of human reason. Moreover, whatever knowledge is left out of art curricula is detrimental to the very intellectual development of the artist.

The reason of it is simple: the body of perceptual knowledge is what determines the individual’s conscious state of being as integral embodiment, and it is such enrichment that must attend to the production of art. If consciousness is to be considered the ultimate acquired integral nature of being, the expression of itself—namely, the art work—should be intended as spontaneous production of that perceptual conscious body.

In other words, endow the artist with a greater consciousness, and you will have greater art. This concept is what places art at the forefront of human knowledge and contributes to positive changes in the world. The Aristotelian notion of the *organon* and the Leibnizian principle of *teleology* are fully implemented in this idea of art, and by definition, the purpose and function of art acquire universal significance as instruments of human nature.

This idea is greatly reinforced when we look at the work of Renaissance artists. There is no logical argument in the history of mankind, that denies the artist the freedom to apprehend, to synthesize, and to embody all that he or she knows about nature into art, nor to relate his or her knowing to new scientific and philosophical knowledge and other major events of the world. Above all, no logical argument is available to oppose ethical standards with respect to the problems of nature, the environment, or the entire ecosystem. Any notion of art introduced against these principles would be contrary to human existence and cause the dichotomy of art and nature. My position in this is congenial with both the traditional and any advanced disciplines of knowledge—that is, with a

universal synthesis involving human and divine intelligence as referential constituents.

Since art is an intellectual activity and is made by humans for humans, the artist must be motivated by positive beliefs in nature's potential significance, as Zola advocated. Artists must possess an expanded universal knowledge necessary to prove what is valid in life, while refuting what proves to be false and needs to be overcome or discarded.³⁶

This study establishes altogether what Michel Foucault's "order of things." It totally diverges from any modernist line of thought and shows that art as a product of consciousness can be geared by the artist's intention toward the highest philosophical ideals of life, of nature, and of existence. Thus, a contextual change of subject matter establishing new goals for humanity is hereby suggested. No one can deny that a "philosophy of art," based on phenomenological truths is

³⁶ Some want Modernism to start with Impressionism, and others want postimpressionist Paul Cézanne (1839-1906) to be the father of it. The important point to be noticed here is that, from Cézanne on, the thematic of art shifted, and the history of art became the narrative of image manipulations rather than this kind of humanistic considerations. Cézanne himself was more in search of technical representational devices than redefining the purpose of painting. His repetitive painting of the Mt. Saint Victoire proves it. To be blamed for image manipulations as art was certainly an inadequate, established dilettantesque bourgeoisie conception of art, but also the misconception of the functions of critical and historical narrative. Paradoxically, Charles Baudelaire interpreted this change as the departure of art from its philosophical roots. He said:

By 'modernity' I mean the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art whose other half is the eternal and the immutable. (1964, p. 12.

Obviously, this is also an acceptance of the formalistic *status quo*, but what was most damaging was his misconception about *nature*. In Baudelaire's mind, nature was to emerge from his disdain of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) (here again subjectivism is instrumental to his negativity) after reading his *Emile*. Baudelaire became known for his countless contradictions about art, yet his influence has been determinant in displacing the entire thematic of Modern Art and heading it toward perdition. In the *Salon* of 1859 ("The Modern Public and Photography"), he cursed against naturalist painters, as if nature is the enemy of art.

For us, the natural painter, like the poet, is almost a monster. The exclusive taste for the True (so noble a thing when it is limited to its proper applications) oppresses and stifles the taste of the beautiful. (Cited in Frascina and Harrison, 1982b)

Baudelaire was also a candid conservative voice in his own right, who accused artists of bowing to the public's taste and using tricks. In this context, he denounced photography as art's mortal enemy. He, obviously, constrained by French formalism, could not place the new medium in any philosophical context and rejected any positive development coming from it.

unacceptable or irrelevant because he or she would repudiate the very philosophy of life we are allowed to pursue right here on earth.

The right philosophy of art has made itself known by establishing its right to exist against the aggressive market that established its sale technique on what Picasso calls “the lie.” When one deals with phenomenal reality rather than the hegemony of market demands, does no more than bringing the notion of art back to the human dimension. It becomes obvious that, when one studies the true nature of things and centers human concerns and human perception upon the true potentiality of being, he or she will produce a new existential philosophy. This is certainly the case of this broad and extensive study of art. Reflection, analysis, synthesis, cognition, intuition, and imagination of an expanded reality come together when the artist arrives at a unified projection and embodiment of the knowledge of nature. These faculties cannot but be interpreted without their interrelation as means to advance both the perception of art and life as well. Reason and logical deduction are not monopolies of science and philosophy, but also in many ways represent perceptual means for qualitative behavioral judgments. This is how an artist can continue to grow and prosper in his and her career. Art arises out of special aesthetic judgments reduced to common sense behavior as language and displays it before his or her audience to be judged. This type of endeavor is in all effect rational and aesthetic distinction, which cannot be separated from the rest of logical and rational reasoning or be disconnected from society’s interest. I said earlier that reason is fundamental of what makes imagination *directive* as opposed to just scattered and purposeless wondering of ideas. This point makes contemporary artists reevaluate their intellectual asset and define the existing theories that reinforce the dream-like approach and the fantasies arising from mere appearances.

Mindless artists, historians, and critics have struggled to render autonomous or liberate art from formal prejudice for years, but inevitably restricted it to mere means of physical productions and stripped it of its cultural values. Thus, did historians and art writers know what they were doing? Even Adorno failed to be sufficiently plausible when he was invoking art’s autonomy, which in my opinion signified demanding the freedom to exist under a state of ignorance.

Amorphous non-contextual, (non-objective) representation and the motto: “anything goes” was the result of ideas and concepts devoid of thought. Placing emphasis on modes and empty formalisms (the establishing of “styles” as value) – yes, because after acceptance of a novelty, that too becomes formal in itself, which carries a large dose of prejudice because those artists who are able to establish their own style, acquire social notoriety, which means fame and money. This state of affairs discards real freedom of expression as defined philosophically in this study and establishes arbitrary freedom.

Image-production for the purpose of consumption does not purport ethical or philosophical value; it is not genuine freedom, nor is it a form of expression, as I explain in this study. Human expression must be understood as a manifestation of thought and communication of meaning. I believe I have been able to prove in the main text that this is the reason why art cannot be stripped of its humanistic values and reduced to a mere visual activity.

The artist's intellect grows when all the intellectual faculties are at work in unison, and not when just one hemisphere of the brain (supposedly the right one) is involved in the art process, as many have sustained. We know there is a constituted consciousness at work when an artist expresses his or her own being and participates in the fulfillment of the human causes.

My argument is that consciousness as the basis for expressions of art involves both hemispheres of the brain and develops superior intelligence. I have satisfactorily addressed this controversy issue in the study. The so-called "creative" faculties, such as intuition and imagination, can expand in a distinctive manner from the same consciousness because of its multiple interactive functions. No faculty of the brain may develop disjunctively and from one hemisphere of the brain. With this statement, I believe, I have corrected one major fallacy of Modern Art.³⁷

An artist can attend the tasks of analysis, of logical projection of meaning as he chooses, and may do so by applying various methods, since there are no laws or authorities that can restrict an artist to use his or her mind in this realm of thought and experience, which some critics may dare saying that it works against the "creative" process. Supposedly, "creativity" equals to invention—that is, intuitive resolution of internal debates about meaning. Those who believe that real art emerges by itself before an empty canvas or from an inform piece of material would do best to resolve this metaphysical puzzle by researching the proper field of knowledge, rather than to subvert beforehand the true idea of art. Consciousness alone retains the task of selecting, reducing the referential sensuous data, advancing its perceptive capacity, as well as processing meaning and values. When it comes to values, forms can be determined given substance, and turned into language of art.

³⁷ The fallacy that has separated art from the intellectual faculties, I believe we owe it in part to Nobel Prize-winning scientist Robert Sperry (1913-1994) for a rather unclear explanation of this subject. He, too, placed a division between the functions of the two hemispheres of the brain, saying that the right side of the brain is more imaginative and artistic than the left side, which is more analytical. The division of these two functions is indeed relative and insignificant under the proven physiological facts of neural interdependence and referential memory which is at the base of human consciousness. Sperry's similar belief has induced artists, critics, and historians into neglecting the cognitive and perceptual nature of art, which led prejudicial theories to become dichotomous with the very physiology of the brain to the point that made perception and cognition mutually exclusive.

Since consciousness is extensively infinite, all aesthetic judgments, we shall learn in the text, are never final, because by a general rule, they are always in need of extensive analysis and higher knowledge. Some may think that this kind of reasoning does not concern artists, but I can prove that when taken analytically this discourse makes sense, and that is why no one could show it to be otherwise. On the contrary, human judgments, aesthetic included, have only one reductive, narrowing form of reasoning for constituting an aesthetic consciousness.

Although I believe that information may be processed in different ways in the brain, I meant to imply earlier that one may not think primarily through images, symbols, words, or numbers without formulating concepts. One may not arrive at a concept before obtaining perception of the object or the topic in question. In all cases, the perceptual process must be brought to a judgment of completion, which in this case is represented by the work of art. The validity of the work of art in this case has to do with applied human intelligence and degrees of conceptuality.

For this reason, I must assume that abstract processes do not substantially change brain mechanisms and brain functions, as one may be led to believe under some well accepted theories of art; concepts do show their validity, according to Kant. For this reason there is no substantial difference of mental processes and employment of brain mechanisms between science and art, or between brain hemispheres, when the faculties are left to work in a coordinated fashion. Certainly, we cannot impose limitations of thought or standardized processes upon either one of the hemispheres, but we should allow the artist maximum freedom to develop complex ideas and to function optimally with both hemispheres of the brain without cultural or social restraint. By the same token, we should allow school curricula to be interdisciplinary rather than reductive as manifested in contemporary approaches to art. The student begins with appropriating the latest style, not the latest theory of substance.

All knowledge is holistic because primarily relational and relative because of its limited applicability. However, a particular value can only be established in relation to a superior universal one. My expanded theory of perception demonstrates that, in the mind, all reductive, deductive, inductive, and synthetic processes engage all the faculties simultaneously, which are bound by the same circular perceptual pattern that establishes a logical order. Most psychologists ignore that the original intention is the impetus of perceptions, in turn motivated by beliefs or by active preoccupations. Either an interest or a myth may condition the incoming impression, modify one's intention and trigger forms of distorted manifestations, which may reinforce even the most obscure thoughts held in memory. Some have developed therapeutic art methods to cure obsessions and idiosyncratic pathologies by controlling the value of incidence. If we are concerned with the anomalies of artistic behavior, we should also be preoccupied with

reestablishing logical, perceptual and rational order. An art therapy may start with a reformulation of the intention as a basis to establish direction for all the faculties of the brain, but if the work is intention less and repetitive, any successive act is left to chances and to prejudicial, external influences that invite the subject to dig deeper into memory and at times to retrace child's memories associated with compulsive distorted behavior and other mental disorders. On the contrary, when a rational consciousness shapes intentions, it moves and initiates linear cognitive and perceptual processes and expressions that reinforce conscious determination.

It is clear that my concern is to establish the conditions for the production of art as conscious participation in the processes of humanization of the world. The distorted expressions, often reinforced in memory by adverse psychological conditions originate in childhood and cannot be accepted as art simply because of their non contextuality. Postmodern art seems to have offered an accepted level of insanity in place of historical conformity. It can be understood by my study that amorphous functioning of the faculties promotes those pathologies psychology calls fixations, phobia, paranoia, anxieties, polar or bipolar dysfunctions, etc., which are clearly evidenced in works of art. Indeed, any adverse psychic solicitation may disturb the state of conscious harmony and disrupt intentional, rational order, which should be the product of normal functioning of the faculties. Likewise, exaltation of any of the faculties, the imagination included, could produce abnormal mental conditions.

Does this mean that the major fallacies of Modern Art are attributable to particular forms of madness? The trends of most works of art are the products of erratic mental behavior, which seems to be acceptable and desirable as excellent source of eccentricity and originality. The madder the artist, the more original is his or her work. This is absolutely not what makes the artist a productive and finite individual would like to show.³⁸ Nevertheless, irrational behavior and insanity are exhibited in prominent galleries and museums much to the detriment of quality and human intelligence. However, this example calls for a lengthy discussion on the definition of sanity and rationality, which can be found in the text, particularly with reference to Foucault's *History of Madness*.

The rational quality of the subject-object relation is what determines the healthy state of mind that communicates sound ideas such is that of true art at any level of consciousness. In other words, the inner eye by which the artist sees the world makes a significant difference upon the general production of art. Bottom line, a shallow consciousness is one that communicates appearances alone.

³⁸ _I like to point out the tremendous disparity between Leonardo Da Vinci's and Jackson Pollock's intentionality, approach, and artistic behavior. They are both considered great artists in their own way and in their own time, but at this point, one may want to reflect also upon their characteristic tendencies and opposite artistic behaviors, namely the rational versus the irrational.

Appearances cannot be ends to themselves for they are signs and symbols referred to as “signifiers” of whatever substance is expressed by the subject, is not what is “signified” in the body of the work of art. Inevitably, the artist who has had prior relationships with the world embodies experiential knowledge and refines his or her essential language form. Refinement of meaning is part of the perceptual linguistic process insofar as prior experiences become formative of the next perception, while posterior ones are syntheses that form the communicative body directed to the *they*, to put it in a Heideggerian way. Ultimately, what is perceived by others as a result is what they believe existed as totality of being in the artist’s by his or her ultimate realization of consciousness. This is how perceptual processes refine and define meaning, this is why art relates to contemporariness of time, and this is how history prepares the ground for anthropology.

Subsequent perceptions of the finished work will reveal that the level of substance which existed and was represented at the time of the execution has left a process of thought and syntheses open. The essential meaning of the ideal object is now embodied in the object itself, like in the works of Michelangelo, which will show no existence at all if the artist did not possess the substance and the sensibility to communicate human concerns in visual language, though such ideality must have been brought out beforehand in verbal language as tangible form of reasoning before being converted into a visual representation.³⁹ The perceptual actions of pre-and post-expression determine the relation of the subject and the *they* (the public), as advocated by Hegel and by Husserl. Such relation must constitute a world of objectivity in the mind of the artist to renew the intentional state as a preconscious condition to move the art work toward the expression of the ideal.

The question is how to acquire the means for a constructive rational consciousness capable of pursuing the ideal in art. Hegel suggested tuning into the universality of reason (the *apophantic*) in order to overcome “negative freedom” and allow this idea to be the means toward a greater consciousness. Since consciousness is always a consciousness *of* something, this thought can well be applied in art. Reason establishes the “order of things” in the mind; true meaning and true values move intentions into actions. Further, in general, reason evokes or invites reflection, and by reflecting upon the true meaning and the essence of things ahead of time, the artist may expand his/her perceptions to larger pictures of what Husserl called validation of the “*life-world*” (*Lebenswelt*)—a word that justifies the natural being among the other living things of the world: people, animals and plants. It seems to me that we have here defined a reflective

³⁹ What was once referred to as “composition” was no more that structuring of visual language. This comparison though does not define substance or the reality of being of the art work.

consciousness of art that encompasses the consciousness of the world and addresses its concerns toward universal values.

Thus, no abstract thoughts or ideas are needed to produce a work of art, but rather precise contextual arguments that motivate and adopt the signifying powers of more direct expressions of knowledge. The structure of consciousness that was also Merleau-Ponty's main concern for consciousness is always consciousness *of* something, and being the perceptual process transcendental from subjectivity to objectivity, it applies more specifically to the art process. The artist measures his or her internal reality against the reality of the world. In phenomenology, the subject-object relation affects both inner particular and outer, general qualities of being, in other words, the artist affects the world by affecting him or herself first from what he or she learns. As a result, the artist's actions and behavior are to produce the kind of teleology that Aristotle and Leibniz endorsed—namely, an art that advances the *telos* of mankind. The *telos*, as I said earlier, is a model of how the conscious individual artist may act with a purpose in mind if he or she were to consider the totality of the subject-object relation in a conscious way; if he or she were in a state of oneness with the world, perceiving the world and, likewise, producing and expressing an expanded perception of it through the medium of art.

The constant return to the notion of perception of this study signifies the need to constantly realign and reassert the validity of this complex and controversial capacity of the mind. The implication of the world in the perceptual space, clearly a Husserlian trait, sustains the phenomenological ground validity and capacity to change things in the world of the work of art. Merleau-Ponty's pronouncement that "perception is everything" is here appropriate. Indeed, everything in the world influences our perceptions, yet the world remains the measure of all perceptions. Everything may be impressed in memory by the constitutive consciousness and can be applied in the art object at any time. We may assume that, after obtaining a realistic notion of perception, the art expression may take upon the same dimension in the mind that generates the work of art and ultimately, the same may make others participants of its truth by purposive communicative action. This being thought and said can be universally accepted as true perception, which may bring more significant art in museums and in the streets of society.

If we could equate every work of art with the consciousness of the world, we would guarantee the preservation in museums of those qualities of nature that make human beings special individuals. I, therefore, envision preservation only of works of art that are testimonials and examples of ontological and anthropological values. The museums' existence should rest on the principle that what can be valid for one is valid for all and that history is not only a chronological reservoir of data, but a qualitative distillation of values in time. As mentioned earlier, Heidegger

equates ontology with those values that in time materialize into anthropology—meaning that what contributes to the essential human nature cognitively translates into physical nature through cognitive, perceptual, and genetic incorporation. This notion, which microbiology can now prove, is what Merleau-Ponty called a process of “incarnation.” Call it incarnation, emancipation, or acculturation of human nature, but any of these terms mean appropriation and progress of perceptual knowledge and refinement of existence at the intellectual and biological level of refinement, which artists should take into consideration.

Heidegger treats phenomenology as synonymous with ontology. But even if this analogy is a bit fictional because difficult to fully actualize, it is sufficiently clear that phenomenology opens the way to the understanding of ontology for its undisclosed degree of incorporation of reality into human existence. To the extent that what is revealed can be appropriated, ontology is self-defining, for its meaning manifests itself as potential incorporation of knowledge. The idea that pure essential knowledge can be embodied into consciousness simply by bringing it to bear and that phenomena can be perceived by virtue of their distinctive capacity is not the same as becoming a part of the conscious body. Phenomena, according to Heidegger, are often hidden from reality. This belief renders more problematic Heidegger’s *appropriation* and a bit insecure the *incarnation* theory of Merleau-Ponty. What makes phenomenology so relevant to the theory of ontology is its contribution to the advancement of understanding and perception of human existence by the distilling method that isolates phenomena so that such knowledge may be applied by the subject, treated as object of consciousness and be directly integrated into its being.

In order to pass from ontology to anthropology, it is then necessary to think of anthropology as an ultimate end in terms of human destiny and existential becoming. Otherwise, what other ends can we possibly have in mind when we attend to philosophical, scientific, and historical tasks? The understanding of the concept of art taken openly and universally establishes the same perceptual movement that ought to remain present and expressively evident in time in the art work; otherwise, why do we need to preserve art works in museums? The ontological-anthropological movement should justify the implicit universal demand. My interest in phenomenology extends to its long-term goal to make art works to become anthropological tools. This is possible because anthropology distinguishes human substance from its referential for. We have seen that that which Kant refers to as *noumenon* is distinguished from the *phenomenon* by its cognitive value. That which denotes the phenomenal difference between reference and sense is not incumbent upon the continuity and necessity of art as a medium of human substance. On the contrary, phenomenology helps in the conscious identification and the perception of the essential values of the work of art, as it

does with the causal connections and interactions among the antecedent phenomena that have brought it about. Phenomena are the only reliable manifestations of the natural world, said Husserl. The natural laws govern the entire causal spectrum including the bringing into being of the work of art. In art, as it is in life, reality must be appropriated into consciousness in the way it is, not the way it is imagined or represented in dreams -- as a movement and concatenation of phenomena. Art must faithfully relay the essence of nature through its media. For this reason, phenomenology is not only a method of reasoning, but a method that uncovers facts of nature and art in their essential form.

We may now, from this moment on, operate a symbiosis and say that, ontologically and anthropologically speaking, the potentialities of the human mind are as infinite as time itself, but only if consciousness is immersed into the great universal problematic of an extended and transcending existence. Human consciousness can be constituted as a realistic transcending body of perceptual knowledge—perceptual because receptive and open to the phenomena that can be apprehended in consciousness. What Husserl refers to as *presentness* of phenomena is precisely the conscious individual body of potentially experiential perceptual knowledge present before the object of perception. Because of it, consciousness is always in an optimal condition and proof of actualized perceptual apprehension.

The artist faces the world with an ontological body of knowledge before expressing him or herself through the work of art. This body of knowledge is then confronted and the result is transferred into the art work. The critic, the historian, and the common observer ideally face the work of art and acquire the same degree of ontology or the value of the work. If this does not happen, the substance of the work is dispersed and lost forever. This means that the relationship between maker and consumer of art is not just spatial, dialogical or comparative, but evaluative at the ontological level. Ontology is in fact the measure and the substantial projection of human existence. Its notion, once understood, will redefine art and art history and implement those homogeneous natural values that characterize the progressive course of human existence, once they have indeed been appropriated.

Ontology can be found also implied in the Kantian Universal History, as a history of the values of mankind, projected as truthful and purposeful concept of human nature (*ontos*). My discourse on the ontological values and disvalues of art has humanistic and anthropological value for it aims at determining the difference between history and historicity. In fact historicity is often narrative for narrative's sake, (telling artists' stories or events) often subjective and a-contextual with no anthropological value, which can be seen historically as counterproductive. What cannot be preserved as truth, as certainty, and as validity of existence does not help the ontological fulfillment of art and even less the development of the species. In

reading art history from this broad ontological perspective, one can realize its inadequacies principally for what can be characterized as detachment from the general a priori principles and the true philosophical ends of history found in Kant's, Hegel's, and Heidegger's works.

Phenomenology is by me adopted as a philosophy of truth for the purpose of cleansing the history of art and separating the substantial from the subjective and the prejudicial narrative. In other words, the true notion of history demands that we distill what should be preserved as universal value. Historicity does not reflect the dynamic of ontology—a history of preservation of true human values as universal ends. If, in fact this concept of historical preservation applies to what is essential to human existence and human intellectual development, we owe it to ourselves to apply due reforms especially in the field of education. All historical narratives must, therefore, be taken at face value and relate them to this a priori principle of proven validity, for we must make sure that whoever follows in time will not fall into error, but maintain the value of substantial continuity. The universal human values of history cannot be interpreted in any other way, for they sustain human transcendence in time. If the history of art does not incorporate such values is because historians do not possess a historic consciousness as defined in Chapter Seven of this study. The question then to be asked is the following: Can a universal history be propelled by better art or vice versa? Heidegger's differentiation of history from historicity was intended to bring us back to the central principle of history as defined by Descartes and Hegel and set the continuity of millenary effort in producing a substantial basis for human existence. This basis should be maintained and not overthrown, as it has happened in the history of art.

Universal History, in Kantian views, is that which preserves human substance, which remains mostly unwritten. It can be determined, though, through a general synthesis of “historicity and historicity” (two Heideggerian terms) that do not simply offer specificity of meaning but allow the application of linguistic antonyms. Kant's three *Critiques* are precisely an explanation of what human history should have been although such vision was not so clearly defined as an existential end. I relate this thought with the true values of art because this, although expressed in vague philosophical linguistic terms, has been both acclaimed and neglected by historical narratives. No lesser function can be assigned to the work of art than that of communicating human substance to be bequeathed by historical tradition, which is how art can participate in the universal history of humankind.

Society still reposes the art activity and artists with the highest regard and aesthetic values, but we have allowed it to debase all cultural values and to move to the margin of culture. We have opened the field of value to childish criticism and commercialized all sorts of images supported by the broad and ignorant

acceptance of the *tout va bien*, to the point that we are now no longer sure about the true meaning of aesthetic and art anymore. However, I say with enormous phenomenological confidence that what is expressed in the work of art is always no more than the level of consciousness that motivates it, and no rhetoric can change that. We cannot transport the work of art into a dream-like environment such is “the museum” and change its existence to satisfy our whims or our desire for fantasy, entertainment, and mystic symbolism. The lower the level of consciousness, the less valuable is the art. Indeed, the language of the work of art expresses no more than what the artist embodied, good or bad, and preserves or denies no more than the level of substantial knowledge due to humanity.

The work of art is indeed a document to the history of humanity. Nothing eludes the veracity of its language of what is or is not expressed or said. Works of art cannot be interpretable in other ways—certainly not by the subjectivity of a critic who announces his “universality.” There cannot be spiritual transmutation of the object of art from when it leaves the studio and arrives at the gallery or at the museum other than its reality of being. Devoid of their aura of mystery and mysticism or subjective cultural aggrandizements, works of art are linguistic objects like any other objects on earth. Reality of being is one quality which history will not renounce: no object of art may find shelter in abstract language in order to hide its impotence and meaninglessness. Only what exists as being will stand the test of time. The artist often forgets the tools that can make him or her a powerful being toward humanistic changes in the world. The effectiveness of his or her art rests precisely on substantial reality of being.

Through phenomenology, the reality of being of the work of art can be ascertained. The perceptual act of the artist, which has given birth to the work of art, can be traced to the source and critically analyzed beyond the mimetic appropriation of language, but cannot be undermined by passive indifference. The critic or the historian has the duty to trace the initial verbal expression that motivated the original intention of the artist. The original intention denotes substance and motivates the desire to change things in the world. If value exists in the art, it should be found in that original intention more than in the work itself. If consciousness was present at the time of conception, consciousness will transpire, or found through phenomenological analysis. Art is, therefore, a medium that transfers what has become the artist’s intentional substance by way of conscious growth.⁴⁰ To the public’s mind no typicality of “styles” would suffice, unless the art work is immersed in an artificial critical halo. Again, the work of art, once it has materialized, becomes a tangible representation of the reality that existed in the mind of the artist. By this token, all representations must, obviously, undergo

⁴⁰ Obviously, this notion subverts the typicality of styles as desirable and identifiable characteristic of internal meaning and reinforces the true intentional qualities of the artist.

scrutiny and objective interpretation in order to overcome the typicality of “styles” and all other rhetorical, linguistic references. The work of art demands full perception from every angle. I believe I have proven to myself that this can be achieved only through the phenomenological method. Regardless of interpretation, if the work of art does not meet the endemic demand for inner meaning, it will remain encapsulated by its own mediocrity in perpetuity no matter how pleasing or impressive are the style, the presentation, the environment and the prestigious home in which it is housed or exhibited, or the publication in which it is reproduced, etc. Like all things in the world, it will remain in perpetuity a linguistic marker, a testimonial of the artist’s level of consciousness, of what he knew and did not know or forgotten.

Constituting one ontological ground of validity on which to rest all interpretations and validity of art objects seems something that Habermas would propose. Art is for the maker and for the consumer an experiential medium more than experimental and as per ontological principle should aim at the highest ends, which should be disclosed beforehand. The artist should be prepared to offer a long lasting humanistic experience. The art process leading to self-knowing, self-understanding and self-growth in terms of universal constitution of the individual being therefore the experience is primarily reflective. The artist enjoys the intensity of the work while in progress. The same intensity is then passed onto the viewer. The ends of art define the artist’s care and presence in the world. Rational conscious intention that shows concern about the world and produced the right interaction among people is not at all undesirable. World issues are topics invoked since Aristotle’s time. Currently, most artists are limited in addressing only personal concerns. After that, there can only be senseless thought and intellectual stagnation in the mind of contemporary artists that do not engage in existential issues to make this a better world.

The work of art, thus, may play an important role in the edification of a universal consciousness as Hegel advocated. His social and ethical advocacy to be found in his *Lectures on Aesthetics* (1818- 1829) is a significant collection of ideas. The notion of history and political philosophy is all about engagement that influenced philosophers like Heidegger, Luckacs, Derrida, et al. Hegel was not only concerned with classical studies, but with the future of art in society. His arguments are related directly to his phenomenology and in particular to the topics of the perception of art represented in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. When a work of art is shown in a museum, it should not only say to the world what art is, but what contributes to human emancipation.⁴¹

⁴¹ It seems that at this point I propose nothing new, since the social function of the artist in ancient Greece was well defined in the higher positions of the administration of knowledge. This task has been forgotten and replaced by pluralistic, ambiguous, and entertaining productions of images as art. It means that human substance has been

During the glorious middle Ages, images were drawn and painted with excellence legitimated under the metaphysical belief of the “genius.” The ‘genius’ was an extremely “conscious artist” equals to a scientist, somebody endowed with a supernatural gift. To be a genius did not come easy. Hegel in his lectures on aesthetics describes the work of the ‘genius’ as something the artist must strive for. Each work of art had to be a project of study and research. Nowadays, the artist receives the same honors and is attributed the same historical notoriety though the art work is less demanding and bears no near the quality and precision of the old days.

This study offers a sharp criticism of the pretentiousness of some artists who compare themselves with the Masters of the Renaissance. The refusal of pseudo metaphysics and of the fetishism that has turned art into a cult of the mysterious, the irrational, and the pathological realms for the sake of mere trade and merchandising is well taken. Artists should prioritize purpose and content, though advance new conceptual approaches, in order to put their art to good use and substantiate anew the history of art.

Language must be produced in the mind before execution under conscious necessity to communicate meaning. An artist has at his disposal all sorts of media—e.g., traditional, in addition to sophisticated electronics. He or she must communicate only what is believed to be the truth in an effort to reach the finitude of his or her intentional thoughts. The art expression though must remain a necessity of the mind only under logic concerns.

No dream-like and childish expression should be allowed to reconstruct the consciousness of art. In short, if art is defined as language, it is because it has the power of communication, like the Egyptian hieroglyphics, which means that art expressions must fulfill the objective linguistic demand for communication of meaning that acts positively on the world. This problematic refers to the topic of predicative linguistic expressions, which is thoroughly treated in Chapter Three.

Phenomenology opened the doors to perception and understanding also from the perspective of quality language and revealed the necessity that binds language to human substance. The content of language must in every way satisfy the demand for human evolution – and this idea goes beyond science and technology. As the understanding of man’s perceptual processes advances in the world of philosophy and psychology, more light is to be shed upon the intricate functions and linguistic interactions within the faculties and how data passes from the substantial to the referential grounds to enrich and instruct the senses that attend to finer apprehensions. No doubt that the language of art must have its own physicality and conceptuality, but emphasis on peculiarity alone and denial of what

overcome by ephemeral interests and subjectivity or by shallow externalizations, which by traditional historians, such as Vasari, equated with cultural decadence.

art should represent, namely, the intrinsic nature of linguistic expressions defeats its communicative function.⁴²

The language of art is not an empty frame of references, or it is no language. This principle cannot be discounted against the idea of forms and composition. Language is not simply a system of signifiers, of signs and symbols, aimed at assuming, metaphorically hiding, discarding, and replacing meaning. Language is the referential body of human substance and human intelligence, and this must be felt as an unmistakable operative message. The beauty of language belongs to naturalism and to the romantic age. In today's world we must deal with reconstruction of existential values.

The transfer of substance to a linguistic expression does not signify the end of the perceptual circle, but often the beginning of new developments of meaning, as transcendental aiming at improving as quality and excellence, but never reaching perfection. In all cases, the continuous circular reworking of the language from the *micro* to the *macro* brings substance to a particular and universal refinement. Ideal language, though impossible to attain, is the goal for any artist, poet, writer, et al. who want to reach the highest level of expression and communication, but ideal language can only emerge from ideal thought, and the circle of perception can aim precisely at it.

At this point, Hegel's *sense certainty* as the first perceptual stage comes to mind as the beginning of an endless linguistic process. Consciousness is also a vortex in which substantial meaning is constantly expanded and refined as holistic body of language. A work of art, as the product of consciousness, is always the beginning of a long process of substantial realization, never to end because language offers immense perspective manifestations – immense because the end of any perspective signifies the end of human freedom, like the fall of a galaxy into a black hole.

The continuous linguistic implementation will eventually produce new perspectives and new passages of knowledge from the artist to his or her audience like the transposed lived experience mentioned in Husserl's *Experience and Judgment*. With this potential form of communication the artist can open him or herself to a whole new world of experience and embody the true ontological structures of humanity, which clearly stand as a positive advancement of culture and anthropology. ⁴³

⁴² No one can say that language is a mere form of entertainment, though poetry would be tedious as mere linguistic exercise. At this point I am reminded of that Irish group of singers who sing songs whose lyric text is only made by sounds or by "Bla, bla, bla."

⁴³ Claude Levi-Strauss (b. 1908-d. 2009) had a vision of a structural anthropology in which language would play a major role since all can be seen as language, if we will, and everything belongs to some system of language: the environment, food, clothes, tools, the arts, the sciences, etc. all have specialized language and system of naming that symbolizes and communicate vital meaning for the continuation of anthropology. Following the dynamics of

Language plays a determinant role in preserving human customs, traditions, myths, and in fostering the aims of anthropology, but only if there is a philosophical plan that identifies it as such. Structuralist failed to supplant the phenomenology of language, being bound by logical causal structures. Thus, Levis-Strauss with all his experiments among aboriginal tribes, failed to determine linguistic causality with specificity reformulating language in the same manner one retraces “the empirical childish action that arranges crystal balls by color and devices a theory of structural differentiation.” As a result, phenomenology was not supplanted and at the end, the Structuralists found it necessary to adopt it. Phenomenology reminds us now that any language projection shows the wills to produce an active consciousness. The Structuralist method was never in conflict regarding the primary perceptual necessity of language, because that would defeat any notion of anthropology. In spite of its revelations, the study of structural language continues beyond the consideration of the contextual human substance, but there is nothing new and substantial in the anthropology of language, except for the exploration of unconscious and contradictory modes of communication.

This, however, constituted the fall of Structuralism as an applicable method. What supports the larger contextual ground of anthropology’s final end is an entirely different theory of appropriation. Contradictorily, Levi-Strauss’ Structuralism does not concentrate on the substantial constituents that fulfill knowledge as an existential necessity, which inevitably brings about human developments. Language, in his belief, is a dynamic association of the principles that govern symbolic systems of social reality, but any symbol is evolutionary and remains socially unstable as a linguistic component. That is why, in his mind, once the system is in place, the restructuring and redefinition of language is rendered unnecessary. Obviously, this particular thought has many lacunae insofar as language may undergo total *deconstruction* without taking into consideration the rules constituting its symbolic restructuring. This occurs precisely under his contradictory beliefs that form necessarily comes before content and the datum before the object. Instead, as I have discussed in the study, the logical necessity of linguistic expression must be observed. The logical necessity of language always arises as an existential necessity for communication of values, otherwise, why does one have to talk? To write? Or to make art? However, Levi-Strauss’ beliefs only to question the reasons why art emerges as a linguistic expression from the inner to the outer without assuming that even this discipline is active participant in the anthropological project.

language, Levi-Strauss deconstructed and reconstructed cultures and anthropology as well and arrived at the theory of an ideal consequential condition.

The anthropological project exists as long as there are schools and universities in our societies that implant language into minds. A correct conception of language as it can be found in the study, contributes to reassign to art congenial, legitimate, epistemological, social, and cultural role and contributes to the belief that there must be a conscious subject behind any linguistic expression. The necessity to reopen the inquiry and reawaken the interest in the linguistic necessity that makes up the expression of art is an effort toward achieving the anthropological validity of the same.

Levi-Strauss' views helped us reflect upon and understand the correct ways art as language may contribute to the quality of human life. Language formation remains the tangible testimony of such contribution. Let us determine, for instance, the contribution given to our anthropology by all the Modern Art works stored in museums. Behind these works, the artist's intentionality stands as silent language that breaks down the millenary cultural formation. The question is how to assign these works any anthropological import if indeed they are empty. Ultimately, as Levi-Strauss points out, both the rational being (the *ingénieur*) and the a-rational being (the *bricoleur*), as the two sides of the linguistic spectrum, namely, the maker and the consumer of symbols, will continue to question each other on what language signifies.

The history of symbols we call art is frozen in time. Contemporary art trends are new forms of "totemism" precisely because they stand as examples of symbolic preservation of identity without meaning, which is "non-identity." Human substance is the sole dynamic force behind language. Levi-Strauss believed in what Heidegger had already advanced with regard to the process of *acculturation* of human nature. The identification of the subject with certain totemic linguistic signs does not signify movement of acculturation and, consequently, anthropological movement. Similarly, there cannot be unconscious demands for a greater communicative performance, especially through the sophisticated use of art and metaphor, without a decisive process of acculturation. At this point, the artist is free to replicate the savage mind wanting to simulate the initial stimulus of desire for communication, combining the necessity to embody meaning into symbolic forms, but it would be like acting on a stage of representations rather than living the script of action language. An art object should be a form of communicable substance, whether practical or spiritual, regardless of cultural concerns.

From the *micro* to the *macro*, the world is now a performing stage for linguistic productions. Diversity is the central theme that runs subjective emotions wild in the world. Artists compete in singularity and disparity—all this in opposition to the principles of anthropology, which dictates substantial, purposive language and communication of meaning at the universal level. The common

fallacy that disregards linguistic anthropological principles in art is the same that prevents art from engaging in intellectual development. Incumbent upon linguistic expressions are systems of trade, ready to cut support to anything that does not conform to the principle of play and entertainment. Yes, because art is now led by the leisure principle.⁴⁴ An intentional conscious structure of language is one that assigns proper meaning to images and words, but the tribe's esoteric conception is still in place. In other words, the artist must know his or her interests and what he or she wants to communicate through the language of art. Evolution is a mysterious word and *telos* is beyond any culture's vocabulary. Moreover, he or she must have the courage, not to attack religion, which is often used as a way to gain notoriety, but to attack a system that keeps the arts underdeveloped and repressed. We have come to a point where the pluralistic "language" that amuses and entertains has grown to exhaustion. A historical synthesis and self-defining actions are now due.

In light of Husserl's logical phenomenology of the *apophantic* (often referred to as genetic logic), we must set forth a cognitive pre-understanding for the perception of art that reflects the truthfulness of critical, self-evident judgments, which I treat in Chapter Five. In other words, the artist, before exerting language, must remind him or herself that what he or she is doing is going to produce results with regard to building humanity. I feel it is my duty as a writer and artist to address historical and sociological concerns to reawaken the spirit of the Renaissance for the present and the future. For this reason, the study of Arteology brings to a synthetic whole the ethical and aesthetic philosophies of art and life as a body of cognitive pre-understanding and, above all, as a tool to separate the essential meaning from the mass of prejudicial, subjective notions that are all-pervasive in modern and postmodern productions of art.

Postmodernism is our time for historical and epistemological synthesis. We are the actual heirs of all the historical and philosophical fallacies of art—those which I define as comprehensive of *tous va bien*, or even the philosophy of *laissez-faire*. If we assume that this era has contributed in any way to an anthropological project, we are in error. Under a pluralistic philosophy of art no qualitative language can be construed. That is why an accurate hermeneutical exegesis of the concept of language is necessary in order to take out the multifarious prejudicial contingent notions of art as language and to reintroduce a logical, purposive discourse of the art object as substantive body of critical work.⁴⁵ At present, we are faced with an obliterated critical literature that proves to be groundless, because

⁴⁴ As a matter of fact, in many periodicals art events are listed in the leisure section, rather than in the culture section.

⁴⁵ I, myself have initiated a series of art works under the heading of "Art about Art."

groundlessness is imbued in the linguistic conception of the art object. So not only must we reform the concept, but also the history and the criticism of art.

Language is a medium of communication, but at present, the language of art has no philosophical function within the socio-cultural space. This condition has allowed the perception of art to be dispersed or submerged by so many contradictions. Losing the language of art is like losing a part of humanity. It is a loss of time that can never be regained in the history of humanity, but also an ethical failure in the contextual continuum of anthropology. Art has fallen astray from the very universal center of values, and philosophers knew it at least two centuries ago.⁴⁶ Nietzsche in particular in *Human all too Human* made this point.

Irrational behavior diverts the entire course of nature because it purports language subverting the principles that sustain good art. This reality holds the very basic and fundamental reason on which to rest all ideas of art because it constitutes a pre-given ground for prejudicial judgments, opposing the essential structure of nature. There seems to be in place a “history” of non-appropriation and/or an outright resistance to the recognition of the natural laws as human history in the very conception of art. Thus, the current rule translates with rejection of the wisdom of nature and of 2,500 years of philosophy of reason. Because of this rejection, contemporary art does not have the material to meet the spiritual needs of mankind; it cannot understand itself nor define its purpose and its function in life. It also lacks the self-consciousness that makes the artist responsible for his or her own actions and for actively reconstructing and advancing the cultural art tradition.⁴⁷

From Denis Diderot (1713-1784) to Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714—1762), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), and Friedrich von Schiller (1759-1805),

⁴⁶ Kant, in the *Groundworks of Metaphysics of Morals* (1983), gave us a clue how to govern our actions and behavior and how to center the same on established ethical and “universal” principles: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” The universal laws operate on the essential reality of nature and human nature as well.

⁴⁷ The Greeks placed art at the center of communal life under their theocratic, polytheistic beliefs, but Plato realized the fallacy of beliefs resting on the realm of illusions. Aristotle gave it a higher status, but could not dissociate it from *techne*. The Romans put it to the service of the empire. The Renaissance achieved its highest manifestation under religious will, but Giorgio Vasari (1511-1574) narrated it in a very casual way, hardly distinguishing it from the craft being produced in the workshops of Florence. *Naturalism* sought it as mimesis of external nature and thus brought it back to its Platonic conception. The seventeenth-and-eighteenth century aesthetic philosophers charged it with much metaphysical speculation. Freud thought it belonged to the unconscious mind, to a pathology of the ego, subject to all sorts of internal-external influences of the psyche, and thus in need of psychoanalysis. Nietzsche and Heidegger finally pronounced it dead, and ultimately, Picasso believed it had become “the industry of the lies.”

the questions of aesthetic and art became central to philosophy, but any or all of these philosophers' theoretical approaches were unsustainable due to a political idealism that went far beyond the confines of human understanding. We can see that the meaning and the substance of art can no longer be left to subjective critical interpretation or to metaphysical absolutism, and this is precisely the reason why nothing has been produced toward establishing a new order of ideas and new values as to promote a challenging dialectical discourse between art and human existence. Postmodernity, the era that called itself radical deconstruction and historical, synthetic reinterpretation of time, has not been able to retrace or apply the fundamental principles of art, nor to define its historical substance. Adulterated by Modernism, confused and annihilated by the historical forgetfulness, postmodern art is dead or moribund, in the sense that it is de-contextualized, annihilated, and still preoccupied with mere play of imagery to sustain its cultural existence. Therefore, a possible independent structure of values that meets the reality of the world and that grants a just freedom is waiting to be realized, but only after a historical revision has been actualized.

These conditions call for a hermeneutical exegesis of history to reassess the general credibility and authority of the current demiurges of subjectivism. I believe I have satisfied this requirement. I have finally developed a concept of art that follows the true historical and philosophical necessity of human nature, thus rendering such concept inseparable from those fundamental ideas of life, nature, and human existence that constitute the individual rational being of tomorrow. For any concept in life, we need philosophical legitimacy, or our discourse falls out of context. Since philosophy is the foundation of both our culture and our knowledge, it became obvious to me that higher theoretical standards of aesthetic and art would have to come out of these considerations.

Postmodern art critics and historians chanted hymns of glory and lighted ceremonial fires to honor Modernism, while Clement Greenberg as its main sustainer, could not erect a plausible and sustainable synthetic theory of art. As a result, ordinary and too common events are still emerging from Greenberg's time capsules containing his subjective perceptions and false aspirations. His personal life is, like a fossil, resting at the very core of most Modernist malaise of works specifically commissioned to amuse the bourgeoisie or directed and designed to please friends and relatives. Nevertheless these works acquired fame and immortality in history books as a private holding of monetary value. Ultimately, the more Greenberg attained fame, the more capital he spent to render public his private, subjective opinions still sustaining auction prices.

At this point of the art discourse, one must for a moment reflect on the reasons how certain artworks were able to reach monetary value superior to the masters of the Renaissance. It is now obvious that this constitutes alteration of the

fundamental principles of art. The way a particular work of art counts eludes the anthropological process supporting the correct perception of the humanistic values of art, as well as the values that define its roles in society and in the history of the world.

As I mentioned earlier, the principles that guide the dynamics of value of the history of art are not the same that define the philosophical principles of mankind. This means that we must redefine the work of a genius and that certain qualities of being are still obscure. Just as Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel have indicated, the value of history is not based on the sole narration of wars, tragedies, and pestilences, but on the edification of human substance. In the same vein, art history should evaluate appropriate and apply the same principles distinguishing the values of the individual being.

The dynamism of human substance requires the constant reinterpretation and reassessment of events in relation to the character and the intelligence of the artist. As to the value of the history of art, the artist is not the primary herald of truth in the making, but only a monad as Leibniz and Husserl described. Preservation of the artists' human substance for the sake of the entire "monadology" is the only way that history may render credit to artists' lives and to their effort to preserve the historical tradition of the ascendancy of human intelligence. We live in a fast revolving cultural world where true values are constantly threatened by false ones often emerging as radical and contradictory because aggressively introduced and unconsciously adopted.

Historical reassessments allow us to keep a watchful balance over human behavior to assure the correct preservation of values: prospectively, introspectively, and retrospectively, for this is the nature and purpose of sound historical judgments. In other words, the project of art history should be regarded in exactly the same way, as the movement and expansion of human substance, not as storytelling or private stories within stories, which we arbitrarily call history.

Again, art history, like the general human history, is about qualitative development of mankind, not about idle conjectures or subjective narratives, nor is it a statistic or cabalistic production of liking and disliking. Again, this type of art history that embodies ontology is yet to be written. That art history must be a movement within the general movement of humanity, besides being a description of the who's, the how's, or the when's of events, must be pointed out. Art history must reflect the principles of human history as the determination and advancement of substantial reality.

Consciousness of history signifies the course of substantial embodiment of an entire temporal tradition, that is, time encapsulating the causal values that constitute past, present and future substantial developments. We know the present in terms of the past, but we can also assess it in terms of the future as we possess

the phenomenological tool to furnish a vision of it. The true causal reasons of life must constitute the dynamics of all historic judgments, or we lose historical continuity. With this Heidegger constituted the meaning of time temporality as causal chain of events. He introduced the idea of *contemporaneity* that expresses a particular exponential condition presented ontologically as progressive existence. Husserl, his teacher, said it no less effectively before him by denoting that the conscious individual always approaches the object with what he calls *presentness* in the world, which requires the incorporation of the and synthetic temporality of individual existence. Heidegger enlarged this notion to a phenomenological ontology which equals to a historical *authenticity* of being. A work of art becomes historical when it encapsulates the ontological substance of its time and more. A definition of ontological existence is precisely the embodiment of the active substance of history into the subject's existence being transferred to the work aimed at historical preservation. In this way, we have an active and productive individual existence—a great example for the structuring of the historical consciousness of the art in society. These ideas apply to the notion of the active individual artist, but they also invite us to reflect upon both life and art simultaneously as interdependent existential entities of human substance. The way one feeds upon the other makes us reflect even more upon the reasons and upon the extent to which human substance, as a fundamental set of values, has been left out of the context of art history for so long.

For that matter, the history of art, written as epic stories or chronology of events in the empiricist mode, does not describe art's potential as an existential asset. This substantial matter, which has been left out from art narrative, has placed the same in a dichotomous condition as to act against itself and retard human development as a whole. Even if we were to accept Levi-Strauss notion of "form before content," describing and narrating merely formal aspects of art expressions and leaving out whatever progress human substance has made throughout history, we fail to take into account the proper dimension of art and its participation in the making of the world.⁴⁸ Reintroducing the correct historical principles in the history of art is not a simple matter. It involves analysis of past aporias, presentation of corrective notions and the willingness to introduce and accept changes. The general principles of history sustain the prospected notion of

⁴⁸ Again, this is both a historical and an anthropological setback that reduces an entire culture to *idle talk* language (talking about nothing) and *forgetfulness* (in terms of who we are as humans). These two Heideggerian terms go together, and with this I mean to say that, when an important contextual value is lost, such as that of human substance and its implementation in the history of art, the discourse of art is merely marginal and altogether irrelevant.

a new history of art in which the human intellectual condition is always present as motion of human substance and anthropological point of reference. All historical events have substantial effects in a causal phenomenology, which must be evaluated and rendered as one micro-macro relation. This formula excludes the application of fantasy and negative freedom, toward the production of “new” and “sensationalistic” events.⁴⁹

It is difficult to produce a historical synthesis from a field of contingent phenomena — contingent because are bound by accidental necessity. The true, the just, the necessary, and the sensible must agree by logical necessity and one single component cannot necessarily be left out by the linguistic *deconstructions* of *Postmodernity*. I prefer not to use the terms *deconstruction-reconstruction* in tandem for my phenomenological analysis because the two terms together dictate appropriate synthesis as singular entities and separate evaluation upon the rigor of the principles that maintain historical continuity. This point seems appropriate for me to consider in view of this large interdisciplinary discourse. In fact, no continuity of underlying phenomena could be maintained and perceived without following the causal chain of events, determining a synthesis of reconstruction. A true history (reflecting a reality of being) must be preserved and be given an ideal beginning to future developments by such causal phenomenological perception. Historically speaking, deconstruction seems to have found its final definition after the empirical pragmatism’s isolation and confusion of experiences by the entire philosophical community. We learn in the study that history should be a set of realizations that provide the ground for future developments, which means that it must maintain active the efficient values of the past and of the present and move them toward future developments. There is no history without continuity. A historical synthesis is the needed “philosopher’s stone,” and the turning point, from realized fallacies. It seems to me that this point offers the correct evaluation of history.

A hierarchy of values is needed to satisfy that which the Aristotelian term of *polis* designates, which is to harmoniously integrate all human values and resources, especially the intellectual ones, and apply them for the sake of the common good. Politics as a science should be preoccupied with advancing this holistic concept, by integrating the intrinsic values of all intellectual resources of art and the sciences rather than with the material adaptation of styles to a market economy. I hereby present the need for a major shift of art from being the signifier of a non-congenial linguistic paradigm to a center of the social dynamics of values.

The non-congeniality of the support system of the arts is a problem because it does advocate such dynamics, which confirms the fallacies of an entire historical

⁴⁹ History implies both deconstruction and reconstruction of values. One need not dismantle the “old” without a synthesis, as J. Derrida says in his essay “The Father of the Logos” (*Dissemination* 1981).

and political system that has turned indifferent and suspicious of the arts and considers provocative and threatening to the system of support. Against all political theories, economically developed countries are not encouraged to apply the principles of humanistic values, which conflict with the free enterprise system. The strange thing, I must note, is that states and communities expect the arts to grow intellectually by selling insignificant commodities.⁵⁰

The passage from political values, the *logoi* to the *polis* is all too evident because of the rooted disinterest in raising social consciousness to some level of aesthetic sensibility. The individual economic interest and the free enterprise system leave little room for expansion of aesthetic thought, which remains contradictory among philosophers in spite of Kant's very plausible concept.⁵¹ His notion of aesthetics embodying ethical principle is correct because it forms the basis of all other human aspirations. Humanism is a universal realization of true values that cannot be left out of the arts. Countries cannot build around their borders high walls to separate human desires or repress freedom of thought and of creed, as in the Middle Ages and have the blessing of their religion. There are no more Chinese dynasties that feel the need to build more walls, while there are demiurges of art building barriers in order to protect their art investments from losing market value. Pope John Paul Voytila (1920-2005) advocated building bridges rather than walls among people. The Hippies of San Francisco shouted to the crowd during the 1960s: *Make love, not war*.

Humanism, as we can see, is interpreted in many ways. The freedom to be cannot be suppressed without a chance of resurgence. Its values may be latent, but remain opposed to the inadequacies, injustices, ambivalences, and contradictions of our societies. The world will finally unite material resources not the intellects, which will be scattered by the un-freedom of material Darwinism.

The world cannot be organized in such way as to off-set humanistic values of cultures and disperse the course of anthropology. Global communication may be action to spread intellectual wealth. Presently, while it is important to say that economic progress helps artistic developments, the way it exercises its power over it is often the cause of both ethical and aesthetic decadence. It is true that the Renaissance was wanted by powerful and wise men, but is also true that the decadence of Rome was caused by men who were powerful and un-cultured. Only

⁵⁰ There is a predominant belief that, if the economy does not support something, then it means that it is not ethical, not worth it, or that it is not meant to be. This is a drastic and despotic statement, one that defines the dominance of matter over minds whereby ideas of wisdom are suppressed by economics, and one that calls for some sense of adequacy to ethical values.

⁵¹ Of course, Kant does not produce continuity of the three critiques and in his third critique has some difficulty in defining aesthetic judgments.

pure knowledge and wisdom assign culture the proper humanistic values. Humanistic developments do not arise in history in a spontaneous way. They must be consciously planned. For this reason, it is neither possible to conceive, nor to admit into history, artistic events manifesting themselves as mere economic enterprises, that is, not without the purposive employment of humanistic wisdom and knowledge. This problem suggests the need to educate anew socio-political power structures to secure what is needed in society, which is culture at the highest levels. It is possible to have nations supporting the true values of art as a long-term investment in the future of the culture of humanity as to inspire aesthetic and ethical behavior from the lowest to the highest class of individuals.⁵²

A new vision of society is needed in order to bring about ethical responsibility and social commitment to the profession of art. A rational concept of art can operate only in a rational concept of society. Aristotle's "common good" begins with the artist conscious of his or her socio-cultural and ethical capacity to exercise certain powers toward realization of a new vision of a rational society. "Not all good is desirable," said Aristotle pointing out the distinction between worthiness of the good and causally making good things happen. Kant in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1956) took this teaching as good. Reason must exercise persuasive power over the will of mankind, toward establishing what is the ultimate and ideal good; the arts and the sciences must be bound by the rational wisdom of nature, namely the natural laws which determine what is good for the human intellect and a holistic type of existence. According to Kant, the intrinsic worth of anthropology must reflect the simplicity and the bare necessity of "pure practical reason." There is a pure and simple ethic we must abide by in order to achieve a potential anthropology, and that is the determinism of nature.

Kant placed particular importance on the causal power of practical reason as the only regulating ethical instrument to improve human nature. Purposive reason of the highest nature is the aim of Aristotelian philosophy, which is not at all in contradiction with what I am advocating for the arts. Knowledge of the higher nature changes values, customs, habits, and behavior, that in time modify humanity's physiological nature, and this is how Aristotle saw the course of anthropology.

From Kant's practical reason emerges the teaching that anchor the notion of art onto the values of nature can enhance qualitatively human existence in the world. Is there a better purpose for an artist than a natural reason for being? The reason of nature is all-encompassing of the creation that surrounds us. This is not at

⁵² One must note that, for instance, after listening to a a concert or a radio event, the announcer says precisely these words of support by the NEA: "A great nation deserves great art". The ambivalence of this statement is quite obvious, since it shows all contrary notions bequeathed in this book. "A great nation is the one that makes great art," seems more appropriate from my point of view.

all “naturalism.” It is not copying natural setting mechanically, but it is an integration of the spirit of nature and its infinite greatness.

An end in life needs to be constantly reiterated and sharpened in order not to derail the energy necessary to accomplish it. A war fortress or a weapon, like Da Vinci’s designs are more than engineering and architectural plans because they must pay attention to the causal laws governing physical dynamics, gravity, atmospheric conditions, stress, expansion, molecular strength, etc. These laws must be abided by meticulously, in order to guarantee performance. Historians and theoreticians have been the architects of the idea of art but have failed to produce a general synthesis of the universal knowledge that sustains future development. Astray from Kantian thinking, they have displaced energy and human resources from anthropological ends, altogether. The absurd visions advanced during the 1900s to achieve autonomy without reason will appear to the reader highly controversial, but today, after 50 years of work, all questions of art have been answered in this book. The vision advanced today is to achieve a satisfactory degree of humanity with the help of substantial reason, not accidental reason. It is not by reductivism and isolation from universal knowledge that the autonomy or the humanity of art is achieved. On the contrary, such autonomy is achieved through maximum appropriation of knowledge.

One hundred years ago, artists were weary of the repercussion of the industrial revolution. DaDa artists moved to reject the newly formed bourgeoisie still signing a compromising pact because they did not express their vision of heuristic art. Art must teach people how to be humans beyond formalisms. Given that Modern Art has overcome formalisms, it is time to stop dwelling upon them and move on with the business of the responsibility of being humans. This important message was never expressed explicitly. Sometime, art is still bound by the support system that cares about formal representations. To battle over forms of representation do little good for the causes of humanity.

One cannot be mistaken in judging art works for what they are; one cannot protest against forms of bourgeoisie esotericism with more symbolism either. The message of art must be straight as an arrow and thus devoid of metaphor. This can be said after almost one hundred years, for the only testament of the artists’ cultural and political struggle is their work, which stays and still speaks the truths even beyond its physical existence. The works of art of these last 150 years, from naturalism on, have been displaced from true human concerns and human values, both by artists, who did not empower their consciousness and by historians, who totally decontextualized and displaced the artist’s inner concerns. When art is disconnected from reality there is a growing insecurity because its vision is being obfuscated.

A conscious intellectual structure is what secures the artist's individuality. A conscious concern for the future is missing today. Today, whatever science and technology produce is blindly accepted, incorporated by artists into their subjectivity and adopted with humble adaptation, for, in their mind, there are no formations of rational or philosophical alternatives, no fronts against which to object and no *status quo* to confront. Artists are like tourists on vacation because they are not called upon to make ethical, moral, or spiritual pronouncements as they feel they can ignore the problems of the world and have a good time.

Both art and philosophy have accepted a type of amorphous and hypocritical form of existence that has irremediably brought them to the same level of the bourgeoisie's level of production and encouraged consumption for the rich and the famous. This phenomenon alone has turned art into an industry of entertainment. To this effect, the material ends of art were pointed out and rejected by H. Marcuse, Sartre, and by Picasso himself more than 60 years ago. Artists have been totally integrated into society's commercial system while remaining indifferent to the hegemony of capitalism, to science's exploitation of nature, to pollution of minds and of the environment; to chemicals and to the destruction of the entire ecosystem. What do artists do about this state of affairs? Nothing. Under these conditions, there will be no task for future artists other than being eye-pleasers, fulfilling the bourgeoisie's eccentric desires, which leaves out their original concerns and their capacity for critical analysis, synthesis to advance humanistic values.

Again, if we reflect upon humans, who, like all other beings of this creation, are bound to nature's causal determinism, good or bad, we must do everything possible to advocate intelligent guidance of actions and behavior and to advance the faculty of reason as a mode of thinking and working. Only a few artists of the late 1900s believed this to be the rule of art.

Looking back at history, the DaDa and the Surrealist manifestos sound like the wish list of spoiled children, not with much vision, expressing concerns for an unknown future and a vision they did not possess. Quite plausibly, they could not possess the intellectual tools to fight the growing social complexities of industrialization. The cure against a growing technologism can be no more than constituting a consciousness of nature and to retrieve its endemic existential reason. After this statement, 2 simple questions are mandatory: why all things in the world exist? And shouldn't we find a better reason to fulfill our existence?

Only the advancement of reason carries the prize for the fulfillment of the right to exercise freedom of expression. Freedom cannot be arbitrary or "negative" according to Hegel and Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997). It is not to be found outside the basic and immutable necessity of human nature. This is certainly an ethical problem which neither art nor the political sciences have attempted to probe. It is a

fact that technology does not advance scientific knowledge as much as it advances the complexity of human life. While it makes some aspects of life easier, it renders others catastrophically difficult. Its constant demand for energy, conversion of natural resources, new materials, and waste disposal have significantly compromised the integrity of the environment and, above all, changed the physical nature of the planet. We are more susceptible to viruses and diseases today than ever before. Our basic attitude toward life is so conditioned that threats to our health and general wellbeing. There is no telling how our intellects have to cope with the arduous life problems and vicissitudes. In other words, technology mounts such a multitude of contingent complex and adverse phenomena in the causal field of human life, which must necessarily be isolated in order to have a sense of real existence or to separate one cause from another. All these factors affects negatively our intellects instead of enhancing its “creativity.”

All this is done in the name of progress! Then, we ask the empirical psychologist or the psychiatrist to fix our mind. Empirical psychology that claims scientific certainty, but that still after 200 years cannot discern between causal psychic and physical phenomena, must still learn the phenomenal dynamics of the brain. We may say that phenomenology has a hard task to correct all the fallacies perpetrated by empirical psychology and establish some sanity in all this, which in substance must be isolated at the phenomenal level in order to simplify the existence of a complex society.

The freedom to be and the freedom to act accordingly must not be antithetical. From a rational ethical standpoint, Spinoza in his *Ethics* criticized the Cartesian dualism of thinking. As opposed to an extended substance, he proposed a unity of substance as a God-given or nature-given gift. Recognition of a superior being, in his view, requires humble mental submission. He recommended adopting a sure maxim that rests on the acceptance of the reason of nature itself, against the risk of an imperfect knowledge and imperfect freedom.

It is our imperfect reason that causes the imperfect freedom and our chaotic existence. Freedom in art should be understood in philosophical terms alone and, consequently, arrive at analysis and synthesis that guarantee its exercise within the spatial validity and openness of thought. The faculty of reason not only provides the understanding of freedom’s intrinsic nature, but also its boundaries. Freedom without boundaries is “negative” because it falls under the spell of prejudice and psychopathology; therefore, it is both imperfect and far more limited under any illusion.

The topic of the human freedom would require a large treatise of its own, because so complicated and intertwined are its causal ramifications. Therefore the reader should be surprised about the recurrent return to the subject of freedom every time this word is implicated or applied in multiple contexts. As explained in

the main text, freedom can be measured by the degree of relinquished reason and objectivity for the sake of prejudice and subjectivism. Artists, who believe in freedom un-philosophically, i.e., without a conceptual structure, cannot understand the natural causal necessities and natural conditions. Kant, in this regard, makes an excellent discourse in his 3rd critique. Artists are not free if they accept the influence of all sorts of prejudice.⁵³ In other words, there is no freedom when the subject deprives him or herself of the authenticity of being, or when the causality of reason has been forfeited. Consequently, there is no meaningful role for art other than to bring this type of intellectual freedom into existence. Presently, market conditions do not allow the implementation of any concepts of freedom to come to fruition.

I am sad to say that art literature revolves around empty theories of freedom identifying with no rational logic. The dissemination of subjective illusions does nothing to reconstruct the idea of art, because, like any other concept, art is in constant need to redefine itself culturally, aesthetically and socially to cope with a changing world.

According to Kant, Schiller, George Santayana (1863-1952), Croce, Henri Bergson (1859-1941) et al., aesthetics transcends all forms of knowledge by embodying a superior idea of freedom. I explain in the main text that a state of “pure freedom” is merely an illusion, since superior freedom is the result of an “agreeableness” of ethical and aesthetic reasons resting on the voluntary acceptance of the practical laws of nature.⁵⁴

Can art aspire to pure, practical reason without first undergoing a process of ethical and aesthetic catharsis? Spinoza (1632-1677) affirmed that there is no freedom without a comprehensive notion of nature because we belong to nature even if culture drives us away from it. In general, William James (1842-1910) and Jean Piaget (1896-1980) demonstrated (though in separate fashions) how human consciousness achieves full potential through reflection on one’s nature. Self-knowing and self-consciousness allows the artist to entertain an open and rational relationship with his or her own nature and the environment, placing consciousness in a consistent and direct interaction with the larger picture of nature’s principles. An open and rational relationship with nature is necessary to exercise maximum freedom of expression, although nature demands absolute respect for its laws, and in exchange, it offers absolute reliance on its potentialities of being.

⁵³ These artists produce as much damage to the original idea of art as any other form of ignorance. They reflect the Kirkegaardian view, which limits freedom to the choice of *either or*, which is insufficient because both positions can be influenced by prejudice, idleness, or illusion.

⁵⁴ Kant too, is contradictory when he speaks of “pure, practical freedom,” and renders the feeling of agreeableness negative and heteronymous with respect to the laws of nature. In other words, the spirit of life must dwell on the same plane with the spirit of nature in order to be free.

The natural laws prescribe at least one cause for every form of existence. Only illusions have no causes therefore no reason to exist, whence the reliance on the truth of being in order to be sure to be standing in one's own two feet. For this reason, freedom of art, like all other human concepts, cannot be lawless; it must be exercised within the parameters of the laws of nature and our social environment as second nature, or else the subject becomes victim of self-entrapment.

Prejudice is the major enemy of freedom of expression. One does not earn freedom of expression without first having achieved freedom of thought.⁵⁵ The conditions of thought are met when the notion of freedom is admitted into a structure of rational behavior. Anything outside the laws of reason signifies "unreason," because it is equal to a psychopathology. To be free and to be insane are two different states of being, which Foucault's *History of Madness* well describes.

A Kantian maxim prescribes that a constitution of reason and will determine the powers that legislate over individual freedom. Since such constitution originates in the subject, this alone contains the ingredients for freedom's fulfillment, which in our case may signify a movement towards aesthetic and ethical perfection. The two may be synonymous when there is the understanding or the integration in the harmonious organization of nature, according to Kant. Without this consciousness, we cannot feel free, because we fall prey to external forces (external to ourselves), such as those of other individuals or the inadequate conditions of prejudice, insecurity, paranoia, anxiety and fear, which remind us of Heidegger's concept of *care*.

As a result, we can determine our own freedom reflectively, but it must be I who wants the freedom that is bequeathed to me by my own nature and by my own knowledge; and it must be I who frees himself by relinquishing the prejudice of culture. Thus, freedom stands primarily on self-knowledge of what we are and in the separation between our culture and our nature. Hegel's analogy of the interdependency of the "master and slave" is another example of what constitutes reflection on self-conscious freedom.

When we advance and adopt this new idea of freedom, we necessarily advance the humanistic idea of art as new possibility. Most importantly, this idea of freedom prepares the ground for new possible and actual developments anthropologically important as the Copernican revolution. We find ample substantiation of it in Douglas Hofstadter's *Godel, Escher, Bach* (1979). Hofstadter found that the genesis of the human brain is greatly advanced by the more complex stimuli and complex causality caused by highly reflective behavior. Reflection is like telling the cells of the body how to behave to achieve the most in

⁵⁵ This is one of the fallacy of Abstract Expressionism and what has been called "non-objective art."

line with the laws of nature. This consideration allows us to place our attention on the long-term effects of the arts with respect to the advancement of human life. The “grandmother cells” are the purveyors of advanced intellectual faculties. The fact that the arts have the potential to advance cellular complexity in the brain should be explored beyond what I have already done and reported in the study. Let us remember that ultimate end of art is anthropology for a better humanity. No other final end is available that would compare with anthropology.

I show in the study that the complex reflective experiences the arts produce in the brain are converted into physical stimuli and accelerations of neuron movements toward the formation of greater genetic complexity. Although such set of phenomena have not yet been mathematically quantified, it can be adduced that the outcome is proportional to the kind of input and to the level of intelligence applied. Knowledge can be not only referential, but primarily conceptual and cognitive to affect cellular reorganization. To substantiate this point one needs to look no further than to mankind’s possibilities of intellectual advancement as the motor that drives anthropology.

If it is true that the values of human substance correspond to positive anthropology, any theory of human knowledge, of science, and of art would be reductive without taking the dynamics of substance into account. Humans rely on knowledge and intelligence for everything they do and for the causal bond existing between nature and human nature. The level and profundity of knowledge and of reason, the method and use of such knowledge, determine the level of biological complexity. The complex relevancy of mental reflection is mainly why unconscious behavior finds no logical and scientific validity. By this token, there cannot be valid art expressions without the consideration of reflective cognitive knowledge. We can consider instead the various levels of substance belonging to various conscious levels of being that define the capacity and richness of thought assigning sensibility and intelligence to art expressions. But we must now ask ourselves: Why did Modernist critics did not come face to face with this issue and avoid the wealth of cognitive and microbiological science knowledge? The answer to this question explains why there is such a poverty of meaning in the history of art, when it is the task of art to distill, preserve, and re-contextualize itself according to newer scientific and philosophical findings. Why is human substance not yet a common contextual ground of interest and validity in art or about everything humans think and do? Why did historical narrative never avail itself to the analytical, philosophical knowledge to question the true concepts of art, of freedom, of substance, or of history? Why were these important philosophical tenets ignored and forgotten altogether? The hermeneutic of art, as developed in this study, attempts to answer all these questions. In addition, the study attempts to

constitute a body of thought and a theoretical epistemological perspective for future exegetical reflections.

I have developed this expanded argument so that the reader shall recognize the true potential of art in society. Ignorance and prejudice not only determines the limitation of freedom of expression, but annihilates human intelligence. Modernist artists abolished the frame of the painting because they saw it as too restrictive to spatial visual expansion, but did not expand the concept of art to free the intellect to cross the confines of prejudice.⁵⁶

The term *Modernism* would make no sense today without its antithetical discourse that failed to distinguish style from substance. Artists today believe that to be controversial is a necessity. Controversy especially against the Catholic religion is interpreted as a good instrument for stirring up the interest of art in society and for rejecting traditional views of representation. Instead, it is not style and representation that we should be worrying about. We should worry about the lack of intellectual capacity to attempt work of substantial magnitude to affect the world, and about discontinuity of what is to be retained as a tradition of value. Somehow the ridicule of culture proved to no sufficient form of criticism, especially when the latter does not entertain intellectual interaction, but solely stereotypical attitudes.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Some artists, like Jackson Pollock, have been obsessed with freedom of expression, while being unconcerned of freeing themselves from their own idiosyncrasies. Why did Mark Rothko accept the commission of the Marlboro Gallery of New York for 3,000 paintings knowing all too well that it would turn him into an industrial producer and would induce him to suicide? Mark Rothko was then honored with a chapel in Houston, Texas, which houses permanently some of the paintings he mass produced. After Mark Rothko's acceptance, all artists came to believe that mass-production of art works was not a sin. Many artists, Picasso included, have turned out thousands of works in their life time while Raphael (1483-1520) was once criticized for having more than a hundred assistants.

⁵⁷ Impressionism, typified by the early works of Gustave Courbet (1819-1877), Jean-Auguste Dominique Ingres (1780-1867), Edouard Manet (1832-1883), Pierre-Auguste Renoir (1841-1919), Edgar Degas (1834-1917) et al., was to show a keen observation of reality outside the studios and under the sun, away from the mythical, classical, academic, and naturalist representations. The development of chemistry and pigments of the Industrial Revolution generated a new incentive to turn out paintings that would unleash illusions for the senses. Therefore, artists went beyond themselves in executing works beyond known formal disciplines of representation. The craft of pigment making and mixing was then replaced by factory ready-made tube pigments. Thus, emphatic colorful representations suddenly became the new thing of art that satisfied the eye of the bourgeoisie. But they simply could not overcome the contradictions between the demand for rich opulence of colors and forms on the one hand and the humility and simplicity of the executed subject matter on the other. Indeed, this was another contradiction of modernist paintings. Somehow, in retrospect, Impressionism can be seen as a transition from the artist's obsession for perfection of representation, visible in the works of the Pre-Raphaelites, to

My discourse is not about forms or formal structures, but about intellectual structures. No one has ever said or prescribed that the artist cannot be an intellectual person who delivers highly conceptualized writings. The difference between forms and substance is the same as that between representing and expressing. For this reason, the Impressionist artists, regardless of styles and colors, were the last to show any concern for the substance embodied in the idea of painting.⁵⁸

It was the bourgeoisie who brought into the context of art the concern for styles—those “sophisticated” connoisseurs with an alleged critical eye whose taste was supported solely by their interest in social status and social power. Those who turned the history of art into a history of styles are responsible for today’s vacuity of substance in art. The end of Impressionism marked the end of the concern for substance and the beginning of a history of styles. It was also the end of the intellectual artist, the artist who embodies in his consciousness the knowledge and the concern for humanity, the artist who experiences the world of reality and brings it to a critical synthesis of artistic expression.

Postimpressionism marked not simply the breakdown of the image, but the beginning of the art of revolt. Cézanne was an amateur artist who could not paint satisfactorily or, at least, could not compete with his impressionist contemporaries like Renoir, Claude Monet (1840-1926), or Camille Pissarro (1830-1903). Some believed he was the father of Cubism, although his work had nothing to do with African art, which was believed to be the major influence. It had only to do with

the neo-classical academism in the vestiges of natural forms and to the forming of socio-critical attitude made of extravagant image formulation.

⁵⁸ Away from the daguerreotype, outside the walls of their studios, the artist’s interest was to represent humanity in its humble state and open the field of perception unconcerned with stylistic innovations. Vincent Van Gogh (1853-1890), was concerned with styles, until he was told that his work was unacceptable, yet he continued to transpose into the canvas the simplicity and the reality of the human labor, the toil, the strife, and the frustration of simple life against lordship and against the elements. He never compared his own style with that of any of his contemporaries, nor did he copy anyone’s style, unlike Picasso who copied the Futurists and simulated Georges Braque’s (1882-1963) cubist paintings. Even though Van Gogh did not tackle the great problems of humanity, he sought to enter into the landscapes of natural phenomena and human nature and portray at the same time an array of new colors and optical innovations, which were of no direct concern of his. All this he expressed in the letters he sent to his brother Theo. The greatness of his work, we may say, derives from his humble spirit and intense humanity, which overwhelmed all other qualities of his paintings. This argument shows how great works are recognized as such only when we move beyond the conception of “style.”

obsessions of overcoming his beliefs of the insignificance of his own pictorial representations.⁵⁹

Concerned solely with external representation, his work became that of an atypical illusionist searching for special effects. At the time, there were painters who copied the copy of a copy, a practice well established, especially in the Louvre circles, merely for the sake of acquiring the skills of composition and representation. There were also those who copied the copy of a copy for the sake of ridiculing original works, like Marcel Duchamp, who deserved to be called “a thief of notoriety,” or like Picasso, who made several copies of his predecessors, including Georges Braque.

History shows that art for the sake of humanity ceased to be a concern among Postimpressionist artists who, unable to compete stylistically with their predecessors, felt displaced and dispossessed. Ultimately, the history of art, namely a de-conceptualized narrative, always identifies historical values with what Heidegger associates with the quality of *antiquariness*, which places value on anything old. It happened that rejection after rejection, the brush of the Postimpressionists became a weapon against a society that rejected them, or a dagger that never reached its target. Afterwards, there became established the belief that bigger brushes make bigger strokes and that this device produces more sensations and gives the painter more power in the social arena. The brush stroke has inevitably its own metaphor of sensuous stimuli, but, when a tradition falls apart, we just have to wait for someone to pick up the pieces to reconstruct it, but that has not happened yet.

Outside the intellectual and humanistic concern, the Futurists, the Surrealists, and the Fauves were to make art a play of signifiers, a child’s play reinforced by critics and historians as partners in crime, and supported by public ignorance. This is also a small example of how an entire historical process can be misdirected by subjective critical intervention. We can now witness the chronology of those developments that made no significant contribution to the history of art or the history of humanity.⁶⁰ _

⁵⁹ This statement, obviously, contradicts Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of Cézanne’s tree. My deliberation comes, aside from Cézanne’s own considerations, from the personal conviction that Cézanne had problems with perspective representation, which turned accidentally into a stylistic “motif.” In fact, there is nothing in the history of art that lets us believe that he had any specific knowledge to engage in analytical work of representation, or to develop and apply, for instance, like Da Vinci, a theory of colors.

⁶⁰ With the work of the Fauves revolving around Henri Matisse (1869-1954), Raoul Dufy (1877-1953), André Derain (1880-1954), Maurice de Vlaminck (1876-1958) and then Braque, Picasso, Joan Miró (1893-1983), Fernand Léger (1881-1955), Marc Chagall (1887-1985) et al. began the history of styles and comparisons — an empirical game to embody the pretentious autonomous idea of *L’art pour l’art*. Of course, the changing of styles shifts the context from the inner to the outer periphery of the artistic concern — all at the cost of the humanistic idea of art.

Summarily, the inner substance, namely, the core of humanity should be primary, while well suited language is to be valued for its expressions. As a general rule, the best suited form of representation must match the synchronic coalescence of meaning. A perfect example of intense and overwhelming representation of substance we find it in Leonardo's *Mona Lisa*, where forms match substance and produce an intense and overwhelming unity of the signified and signifier. The desire of finding language to serve the expression of substance incited Leonardo to acquire the knowledge of the optical laws of representation and to understand their application to produce an alliance with the inner virtues of his model. Observation and application of the laws of physics were to serve his vision, but exceeded the capacity of what humanity can accomplish. His invincible faith in science is what carried him to greatness. How in the world can we put the work of Da Vinci next to a Picasso and draw a similar conclusion about humanity?⁶¹

This study obviously intends to open the field of research in all these areas and find the historical fallacies and ambiguities that stand in the way to art's humanistic development. Its major aim is to supply the much needed historical and epistemological analysis and synthesis to ensure an existential, holistic approach to the new idea of art for the future.

I just mention the differences of life comportment between Leonardo and Picasso. From a socio-political point of view, the different approach is perfectly legitimate. One is free to approach the work in any way he or she likes, but extravagant modes of existence, as we find in Picasso, Dali, or Duchamp, who could not influence or alter the true nature of the concept of art. Art is still stand there, like an ancient Greek Temple. An entire reevaluation of the history of art is thus necessary under a new order of values transpiring from the art work. Art that is contradictory or idiosyncratic with the very nature of humankind cannot be aggrandized by the overly exalted character and state of mind of the critic or the historian. Under the idea of art as comportment, the entire existence of most contemporary artists can be placed under a more extensive analysis and fail to pass any test of reason.

The simplistic explanation for the shift of critics and historians rested on the fact that, with the advent of photography, there would be no more interest in subject matter content. Therefore, what was emerging was an ephemeral pastime that was breaking down, distorting, or dissecting the image, in order to turn it into a feast for the eye, and each artist had to find different ways of doing it.

⁶¹ Human substance is exhibited not only through the work of the artist, but also through his life comportment, his dedication to research, and commitment to overcome the obstacles of linguistic expression.

I believe this question is proper because it concerns the future of humanity. Cohesiveness between the concept of art and that of human behavior and its system of beliefs is a necessary ingredient in order to achieve intellectual correctness and determine the true values of art. Since, by perceiving the art work, we perceive also the life of the artist, this logical resolution seems to call for the perception of art to rest on its legitimate ground of existential necessity and on the true intentions of the artist. Therefore, removing the prejudicial layers of historical givens that alter the perception of art and defining that which makes art valuable to humanity becomes a matter of right and wrong.

Disoriented and confused by the loss of fundamental values and devoid of any intellectual discipline that guided the attention to and concerns about humanity, artists and intellectuals of the late 1800s and beginning of the 1900s offered no alternatives and no sufficient voice through their art and writing against the dehumanizing effect of science and technology. Manifestos were written under the fear of political and economic reprisals, thus limiting the problematic to stylistic concerns. Under a full scrutiny the “manifestos” of these hundred years exhibit much hypocrisy, rather than setting new courses of history.

The critics, the historians and the “taste makers” acting as demiurges of appreciation and evaluation, controlled the written word and the intelligentsia with the support of the grand dames and financiers of society. Their theories of styles and the reasons they constituted socio-cultural values, still echoes for their incoherent and insignificant referential ground. This is why their voice cannot be given proper historical weight.

The motion of art history, I have mentioned, should be no different from that of human history. For this reason it should be linear in carrying the philosophical fundamental principles and values of humanity the way Hegel explained. I am aware that the factuality of history relies on interpretation, i.e., on description of how ideas come into being and are being translated into action, meaning, values, and linguistic forms, but evaluation of events is the task of the historian, which has to do with the social need to preserve values in time.

Because the history of art was affected by prejudicial phenomena, we cannot speak in terms of its ontological and anthropological values. It is a fact that, in history books, no convincing argument can be found as to how Modernist historians were able to alter the course of a historical tradition without a logical and rational synthesis. Apparently, in art, the belief that a historical change implies the destruction of the antecedent is still alive today. Francis Bacon (1983) in his *Novum Organum* explained the difference between “translation and alteration” as one of the mere changes in apparent “diminution or augmentation of human substance.” But, the nature and the substance of art are being changed without a substantial reason. As it has happened in art, this is equal to “corruption”

(*Ib.*, p. 32). Bacon's idea is interesting because it reiterates the integrity of human substance that obviously must be preserved rather than dispersed.

The Surrealist manifesto of André Breton (1896-1966) was the only event that dissociated itself from the Dadaist predecessors. The Surrealists engaged in a fierce battle against DaDa for control over the market, but they were later united in the famous successful exhibition of Paris 1926 that included Francis Picabia (1879-1953) and Marcel Duchamp. Even the sharp criticism by the poet Guillaume Apollinaire (1880-1918) did not help change the course of history. In retrospect, artists only contributed to the establishment of a tradition of false symbolisms that protracted beyond the year 2000. This fact is not apprehended by the masses or by galleries and museum-goers who continue to accept everything new as in fashion and propose without reflection or concerns except for the mere taxonomy of style differentiation. Today, as it was yesterday, the bourgeoisie elite, bound by its own ignorance and perceptual idiosyncrasies, simply accept nothing more than art as stylistic mode, thus contributing to the intellectual stagnancy affecting society and the world.

Since then, museum and gallery attendances have grown substantially, while the concept of art has remained static and more meaningless. This means that the indispensable necessity of both the consciousness of art and that of the world in the mind of artists have been put on hold or annihilated by subversive behavior, or this increase in attendances is simply due to great merchandizing techniques. At a distance of time, the old historical manifestos can only be interpreted as mere expedients for justifying substantial inadequacy and "corruption" and as false pronouncements of humanistic values.

These are facts that can be established when objectively analyzing the history of art. Objects of art are sold as mere commodities masqueraded as historical objects. The truth is that false historical beliefs always cause socio-pathological repercussions. Apathy, forgetfulness, and intellectual vacuity are associated with the production of art today. The stylistic liberation of art is a myth that equates to (*or leads to?*) de-contextualization from the central humanistic thematic—a malady that reconstitutes itself indefinitely as formalism to oppose the process of substantial concretization.

If the art work is purposeless and devoid of substance, it will remain this way *vita natural durante*. This study embodies the right knowledge to prove that the art object produced today under the idea of *L'art pour l'art* is still a nonsense to itself and to any philosophy of life because, being merely a concept, art cannot be a representation of itself, which leads to the *pathos* of psychology, because the art work is always the actual representation of the artist's state of mind related to a particular contextual time.

Erwin Panofsky (1984), proposed searching for a primary and a secondary meaning of styles, but I reiterate that that which is limited to external appearances stays as such and often shows with much evidence the kind of illusion and anxiety of the artist. Heidegger referred to the art of today as a malady of forgetfulness of those who, because of lack of alternative ideas, cannot overcome the indolence and idleness that obliterate the true meaning of existence. Historicity is now a tradition of the many contradictions to be found in it. A tradition can be built on anything, as long as it carries with it the myths and the “sacrality” of history. Art, in principle, is a part of true human existence, which renews itself by its internal energy, but it becomes a nullity when its substance is lost in time. In lieu of these passive tendencies, art has lost its meaning, and what remains for mankind is a quest without aims.

Abandoning the continuity of reason and the rational roots of human nature has caused the historical paradigm of art to shift “aporetically” rather than to move forward synthetically and epistemologically. In this way, it dismissed its own right to exist. A causality of illusions does no more than generating more illusions. A de-intellectualized art cannot claim autonomy because it will not know the boundaries and the significance of freedom. Autonomy is good government of freedom when it is guided by the principles of reason. Otherwise, it will always be a succubus of the adverse forces of the all too powerful subjectivism that operates in society. Art cannot, under these conditions, prosper and constitute the fundamental philosophical truths of human existence, of freedom and individuality. It is a fact that those artists who miss this point are necessarily displaced and alienated from their true being.

When something is accepted in society, it not only becomes a trend or a custom, but an overlapping semiotic tradition. *L’art pour l’art* is a carousel of imagery, modes, and fashions revolving around a tradition old and new that accepts substitutes for real values. It is also a carousel for the writers of art who spin it, like a merry-go-round, by glorifying those who ride in it, destined to become dominant myths of the same tradition. This is the incubator of false prophets who consciously or unconsciously relives the mythologies of a surrogate historical time and, paradoxically, actively participates in the stage of an illusory world of imagery. Dwelling in a virtual world alienates human existence from the temporal, historical reality of the real world. When illusions mix with reality individuality is lost. When this happens, we have very dangerous pathologies manifested as identity crises, anxieties, and phobic conditions. This phenomenon is explained in the text with the help of Heidegger.

Conversely, according to Hegel, a constituted individuality is a conscious potential presence in society. To establish a real existence and consciously participate in the historical, anthropological process requires a holistic existential

consciousness of being. If these qualities are missing, there is no rational freedom and no individuality because there is no *raison d'être*.

Moving toward the completeness of being is a project to which Heidegger dedicated much space in his book *Being and Time*. The conscious human being is an entity of “authentic” individual existence both in art and in society. The authentic artist is not conscious of his/her function, integrity, and commitment to society. Again, the negative established tradition of *L'art pour l'art* can be viewed only as a profitable material expedient toward financial enrichment by both sides. When, between the artist and the world, we suspend the epistemological subject-object relation, we realize that art has lost its own *raison d'être* because it ceases to seek truths and values and exists only under the illusion of freedom and of performing for its own sake. This means that what stands opposed to the movement of the subject-object relation and prevents the artist from obtaining existential consciousness and self-consciousness is a condition of regressive pathology.

As Hegel asserted, all consciousnesses have a natural tendency to expand and to embody the best of world's values. If the artist upholds such a concept of art, it signifies that he or she is automatically a beholder of substantial reason and can play an active part in the socio-political process. For example, even today, the artist remains unconcerned about the problems of the world and societies at large. This contradiction was once endorsed during the 1960s by Clement Greenberg, who at the time, quite strangely, embraced Marxist ideology as a fashionable way to gain positions of power. Under this credence, artists, quite hypocritically, considered themselves proletarian workers, while profiting from the art boom and sharing the profits of the commercial successes of their gallery supporters and financial operators.

Political contradiction in art is quite common in the history of Modernism. I went to great extent to research the impact of Marxism on Modernist artists and critics. The artists and critics of the time did not hesitate to move against their own intellectual beliefs to satisfy market demands. There is no ethical justification by acting as a *fou de cour*, or to exhibit ideologies without beliefs, but economics can corrupt anyone – “just name the price.” Greenberg appeared to be the director or false demagogues and Harold Rosenberg, his contemporary, criticized him for his contradictions. The 1960s was indeed an era of ill-fated history of false political beliefs in which artists aimed at a type of unsubstantiated autonomy consenting to repressive mental conditions in exchange for material support. To embrace an ideology without believing in it or being aware of its meaning and scope was at the time an acceptable condition that only produced monetary rewards in exchange for an alliance with the bourgeoisie.

We may now say with certainty and charge the art history of the 1950s and 1960s to witness the so-called “proletarian artists” forfeiting freedom of expression for financial security. Marxist ideology was resounding on the world’s political stage, which became a vogue in America. These artists were first condemned by the so-called McCarthyists who at the time represented much of the political buying power of the American bourgeoisie and then condoned. Clement Greenberg accepted to trade his bogus ideology in exchange for building large art collections thus shifting the problematic of art back to conservative formalistic concerns. He then shifted his argument from Marxism to the visual problematic of the “picture plane” and rediscovered his interest in Clive Bell’s “significant forms” (1920).

However, Greenberg’s game remained unpredictable throughout those times. His work, often incoherent and confusing, was always eloquently presented. Good rhetoric always generates both praise and confusion, and by his incomprehensibility he created an aura of mystery around himself, which demanded respect and authority. He achieved success because his rhetoric was always taken seriously enough to confuse and to indoctrinate New York’s buyers of art were instead “followers” of a non-denominational sect altogether so that artists had no choice but to follow the leader. His character was so forceful as to tell his protégé artists what to paint in order to fit his plans and satisfy his stylistic preferences. Historicity still adulates the works advocated by Greenberg considering him a cornerstone of American art.

The reader will understand why not everything that is produced in art is worth preserving as history. We cannot praise, or emulate Modern Art critics and historians for treating anything that occurred in the past with much historical respect, especially when the principles of history are not observed.⁶² The misapplication of the principle of history arises, obviously, out of a complex aporetic historical manipulation that brought material gain to those investors who stood behind Greenberg. Clement Greenberg aimed precisely at acquiring the power for determining the historical value of art works, and he accomplished that quite successfully. Serge Guilbaut (1983) thought he stole the show of Modern Art by pure rhetorical means, which made New York the art capital of the world. Since his retirement and his death, there has not been another central powerful figure in contemporary critical trends. The leadership vacuum produced the era of “pluralism” of imagery, the art of the *tout va bien*, of everything and nothing.

Aesthetic philosophy had been in disarray since the naturalists. The struggle continues as there is no distinction between empirical and phenomenological truths. Arthur Danto’s *Disenfranchisement of Art* (1986) describes this “historical” time in

⁶² I refer this statement to what Heidegger calls the quality of *antiquariness*—namely, what I mentioned earlier as conservation for the sake of the old.

which a theory of non-theory becomes an accepted dogma in art, but my question is: How much has this state of affairs retarded humanistic growth? There is no question that an empty concept of art brought to the forefront insignificant structures of beliefs that are detrimental to humanity. I explain in the book why the price is one of retardation and loss of intelligence being paid by society and humanity as a whole.

The lack of a discipline of thought, of directional thinking can be characterized as the problem that brought about the de-intellectualization of art. By taking away the rigor of thought in the art process, one may obtain perhaps a copious production of abstract imagery, but that is all to more detriment of the production and preservation of values. This degenerative phenomenon, using Umberto Eco's semiotic language, shows displacement and dispossession of the *referent*, which places art at the level of decoration, pastime, and entertainment and does not provide artists a reason for being, a worthwhile end, or a commitment to tradition and historical continuity.⁶³ Postmodern Art continues to reintroduce itself as a new genre and to reinstate itself as the *status quo* of avant-garde aesthetic, while it is no more than juxtaposition of ideas and image arrangements. Postmodernity is like Napoleon crowning himself emperor again. The reasons for "art" crowning itself queen of human endeavors are dissimilar in kind but not in purpose, which is the sad part of this contemporary trend. Post-Modern art will not challenge the *status quo* of society for fear of disturbing or deflating the market—just like in politics where no one dares to say why and how global warming affects the quality of the environment and the economy.

From the standpoint of Postmodernity, there is nothing aesthetically constructive to be drawn from the legacy of Modernism, except for the propensity to repeat the historical aporias, the celebration of the artist's subjectivity, or the right to portray ignorance and irrational freedom as historical assets.

Modernism was also the era of great philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger. We need philosophers, especially existential philosophers to explain how art can become a positive and qualitative social instrument. This is not a new statement, since many philosophers have written about it. This discourse appears more evident when we allow existential phenomenology to form our aesthetic consciousness—as to what it really means to dwell aesthetically in the world. Aesthetic existence is to engage in a superior unity of values to propel the universal movement of human substance. Heidegger believed that this type of

⁶³ This problem was in the mind of M. Heidegger (1977) when he wrote his famous essay on Van Gogh's painting *Peasant Shoes*. Still today, no one challenges this artist's historical legitimacy because his humanity is all too evident in his works.

existence is “for the other,” namely, for the sake of humanity. From this perspective, the individual being of the artist embraces the greater task of refining the perceptual faculties of human nature because the profession demands it.

Contrarily, Arthur Danto’s “disenfranchisement” of the artist from the *organon* of humanity describes a type of reality that is hard to believe. In his opinion, if another Leonardo existed, the world would not pay attention. This means that the aporias of post-Renaissance humanism—that mixture of empirical inaptitude, confusion, and naïveté, combined with the illusion of freedom, is still ingrained in the perception of art and is responsible for alienating the contemporary artist from the world.

Some writers, like Théophile Gautier (1811-1872), Stéphane Mallarmé (1842-1893), and Baudelaire, maintained opposing view about naturalism while retaining much of its empirical beliefs.⁶⁴ Naturalist artists could have contributed in their own “style” to the perception of nature, but if the concept was not acceptable his message would be lost. Baudelaire wanted the artist to attack natural principles. I know of no new trends that have not been met with resistance at first. Synthetic corrections are difficult to apply to history, especially under a distorted notion of natural history. It is a fact that after the “new” becomes old, what is old has already become historical, and as such, it acquires a reliquary, untouchable character. Obviously, not all that is old is valuable and worth preserving as an example of applied human intelligence. All notions are temporary, possessing transitory value waiting to be reassessed; nothing can be labeled “historical” without substantial reasons. Some historians prefer to reinforce their historical judgments without considering that prejudice has no causal powers, only accidental ones.⁶⁵

We possess the philosophical tools for arriving at determinations of substance, but we are deferring their usage. Critics are still searching among mere justifications of senseless cultural events as manipulations actualized merely to stimulate market demands. I have analyzed the various trends and found that the simplistic conception of art criticism does not serve the principles of historic preservation. Museums around the world are autonomous entities that are in the business of selling cultural products whose value is supported by artificial market demands. Adorno believed that cultural autonomy is cultural hypocrisy, especially

⁶⁴ One must wonder about critics who place too much emphasis on modes of representations and pay no attention to the humanistic content of the work. Forms of representation are characterized by typicality of nature, which is like a person speaking a different language.

⁶⁵ Nowadays, works of art are evaluated in terms of trends and auction prizes, which are controlled by material wealth, as was done in the 1960s. Collectors like Sachi and Sachi Co. may take the initiative to introduce the works of an uninspiring artist like Sam Faton and the rest of the art community applauds.

in an interdependent world. Nothing can justify a culture that does not follow ontological or anthropological principles and defers intellectual pursuits. Said succinctly, now, in spite of significant philosophical developments, what goes into a museum or a history book is dictated by high power entrepreneurs with no sense of humanity or culture.

Many thinkers have tried to redefine the notion of culture and to determine the best philosophy to govern its principles, but the discourse always returns to E. Kant. Kant's *Practical Reason* (1956) precisely expresses the belief that humans have the right to act according to their nature, but not against it, therefore any culture that dichotomizes human nature cannot be accepted. Displacement of ideas for the sake of leaving space for marketable novelties is an assault to the principles of history and culture. This state of affairs reflects the shortsighted criteria adopted in museum preservation of art works that does not interpret reality, but displaces it. The artists who produce thoughtless work upon demand, the critics or historians who become economically dependent on collectors, on galleries, or powerful politicians who even pass laws to support a corrupted system of support, possess no aesthetic integrity. Exploiting art for economic reasons is tantamount to retarding the consciousness of art and the entire process of the social acculturation of humanity.

Selling illusions and a false spirituality elevated to the idea of art should not be accepted in society. This unfortunately occurs because museums maintain a demiurge *status quo* claiming absolute knowledge on a discipline (art) whose domain is restricted even to schools and universities.⁶⁶ The blame falls on historians and critics who lack philosophical knowledge and ethical integrity, for it is acceptable for both the historian and the critic to invent stories and alter biographies or to make subjective attributions of meaning about empty works of art.⁶⁷

The written word can be driven to total exaltation and alteration of reality, which in art was referred as “creative criticism;” it is a literary skill supported by fictional devices to exalt the masses. The license to “create” upon “creations” is

⁶⁶ In fact most university adopt curricula of “Museum Study” in their departments of art and education resting on the same deceptions.

⁶⁷ The exercise of the literary license to “create” upon false creations and exalt fictitious art without scruples serves well the great art financiers since the public is even more ignorant and lacks philosophical and ethical critical capacity and philosophy and ethics are not part of the required curricula, not even in law schools. Perhaps Walter Pater (1839-1894) was the first critic who moved from literature to art criticism and helped establish what was after called the “British School of Criticism” transplanted in the New York Art scene. Walter Pater was also an asceticist and a student of Plato who saw in formalism a sort of spirituality._

quite diffused in art literature. It dispenses the critic from conducting proper analytical research and allows him to write fictional essays. These literary genres turn art into entertaining storytelling, which are very effective tools to provide the element of suspense and complement the widely accepted fiction literature. What criticism means as fundamental method of evaluative judgments belongs to another disco to trace back to Diderot, which exemplifies new concepts and philosophical principles throughout the study.

Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1919) is the first work that laid out the principles of criticism. Criticism must be positive and productive analytical work to bring to the open the real human values encapsulated in the work of art, and in order to do so, it must be coherent with these principles. The application of imagination on critical work is not a positive attribute and does not satisfy critical functions of achieving qualitative ends because it brings about a halo of illusions and displacement of the thought that constitutes values. To be critical is to expel everything that does not support fundamental principles of existence. There is no better way to define criticism in its own rights. History must accept the critical position that takes into account reality as such for it is the repository of real values. Opposing basic ethical views or even religion may provide social acclaim and prominence, as in the case of Greenberg, but it does nothing to establish the truths of art. Such criticism withstands no debates or arguments on the principles that was founded on or that supposed to sustain it as humanistic activity.

Greenberg has shown how to replace practical reason altogether with illusions thus how to turn upside down the entire notion of art. The count of audience or of readers and viewers is not an accurate thermometer to measure the righteousness of criticism, neither is the so widely accepted esotericism a substitute for philosophical knowledge, which certain critics have revered and worshipped rather than interpreting it objectively. In sum, that which constitutes imaginary visions of what should actually be strictly analytical work places the art discourse farthest away from human existence.

Some critics took the example from Clive Bell (1881-1964), an early influential Modernist critic who found the meaning of art resting on mere composition and arrangement of forms. None of Bell's critical works can be related to the epistemological, cognitive, or ontological theories of the time. Why such divergence and absence of philosophical debate on some topic like art that needs so much assurance for its existence? The illusion that meaning can be found growing on trees seems a fallacy still rooted in contemporary criticism. Meaning instead is obtained through interdisciplinary research and discourse because we live in a world of interdependent phenomena, which means that, for us humans, there has to be a necessity of reasons determining substantial truth. Thus, good criticism cannot arise from imaginative ideas, but from the reconstruction of the

causal meaning extracted from the text (the work of art). Meaning cannot be measured by the little emotions that colors and forms can provide, which may excite the senses, but that constitutes no substantial thought, which is at the basis of human feelings.⁶⁸

I explain in the body of the text that having a sensuous experience of forms and colors is a small part of the aesthetic experience, hardly significant because evoking only subjective sensuous responses, but Bell ignorantly attempted to objectify them and attribute to them universal values. From sensuous experiences to esoteric exaltations there is a short distance. It suffices to mention that even empirical philosophers spoke about the “deception” of the senses and the necessary scrutiny necessary to determine reality of being. Kant also spoke about what Bell referred to as appreciation after a state of “agreeableness,” which I mentioned earlier.

Language is not what forms the mind can bring to bear or what can speak meaningfully to the mind. Does this mean that Abstract Expressionism, whose intent was to annihilate cubist forms, applies to or can be interpreted from the perspective of “significant forms”? Or, shall we say that whatever is attributable to historical narrative is in contradiction with the very phenomenological truths we can establish about qualities of forms, which are merely reductive language and confined to the senses? So what was Bell speaking about when he was describing the emotions of significant forms? Should the meaning of significant forms be attributed to feeble disposition of impressionable minds? As we learn from Hegel’s and Husserl’s teachings, an external form is a vehicle for reaching human substance. Therefore, Kant’s “agreeableness” should be intended as harmonious bending of form and content, not just form, which provides ample room for the interpretation of the aesthetic experience. If there is something that forms should

⁶⁸ The passage from impression to perception, which I treat in Chapter One, substantiates this argument and explains why both the movements and the differences existing between these two terms. All sensations, being mere stimuli, and apprehensions must first bear meaning in consciousness after proper reflection. Bell (1920) gave a good example of non-excusable philosophical ignorance, for in his time the works of Hegel, Husserl and Langrebe had already been published and available. His notion of art thus rests on the level of sensations, the level of “significant forms,” which, in his mind, remained mysterious and impenetrable. Well, from this point on, there has been very little progress in the understanding of the perception of art, for his idea was in fact quite contradictory.

In each [painting], lines and colors combined in a particular way, certain forms and relation to forms, stir our aesthetic emotions. These relations and combinations of lines and colors, these aesthetically moving forms, I call ‘significant forms’... (*Ib.*, p. 68)

evoke, it must be measured as meaning relating to some higher degree of value, not to dream and fantasy. Fantasy has no real, existential significance for humanity.⁶⁹

Empirical differentiation of external forms and colors produce captious ambiguities that turn the quest for art into a puzzle, which entertains rather than sharpening and educating the senses. Again, it is human thought that constructs meaning and sensitizes the senses. Bell goes along with empirical philosophical thinking only when he tries to find a correlation with reflective thought that is puzzled by what he called an “aesthetic hypothesis.” (*Ib.*, p.68). In spite of the contradictions, many critics have quoted him after his death and built on his views of art, even if he did not make much sense.⁷⁰ Indeed, Modern Art criticism, we may say, is still the exclusive domain of the heirs of the British empirical school of criticism who found mere excitement in external forms. The social tendencies and the true existential reasons that motivated the shift were never entered into the true historical context; but according to Bell, art was only a matter of producing “aesthetic exaltation” (*Ib.*, p. 72), which equals to “sensationalism” without substance.

The politically successful move, after the Armory show of 1913, was for these critics, helped by notable American financiers to stop the importation of European art and establish the New York art market and the school of American artists. Moving beyond Cubism and toward more abstraction, the field of imagery and colors became more direct and more accentuated. As a result, the school of American Abstract Expressionism of the 1940s came into being. Financiers like John Rockefeller, Peggy Guggenheim, et al., brought a new twist in the historicity and depersonalization of art, which made artists operate as automatons.

New analytical interpretative, ontological, and phenomenological methods must now be called into action to trace back the nature of art and make its true being self-evident. Art should be more conceptual and more open to a diversity of subjects. Ontology stands for quality of being thus artists must be engaged in searching for true human values. With this type of criticism, I try to make

⁶⁹ If we look at the following statements in the context of the common confusion of theories of impression and perception, we realize that he must have had some influence in order to generalize so securely I by saying that “all systems of aesthetics must be subjective” (*Ib.*). He believed that what moves a person to have an aesthetic experience may not be entirely understood bear explanation. The artist’s business is to arrange forms in some “mysterious way” so that they may move the spectator (*Ib.*, p. 69). This confusion and contradictoriness, now so widespread in critical theories and historical narratives, defeats the fundamental aesthetic principles.

⁷⁰ After Bell, many continued on the footsteps of fiction as to make the notion of art more enigmatic. These British critics built on the work of their predecessors to establish what was referred to as the British School of Criticism. To name a few, Roger Fry (1866-1934), an influential artist and a critic was responsible for giving the name to “Post Impressionism,” Herbert Read, (1893-1968), tried to bring together pragmatism and art criticism, John Canaday (1907-1985), the first synthetic art historian and critic, Tom Wolf (1931) a political journalist and a cultural journalist, and Hilton Kramer, (1928) a major influential critic, and strong supporter of Clement Greenberg. These critics and others who followed are responsible for shifting the problematic of art from philosophical substance to literary formalism.

Postmodernism look at itself in greater depth and to prospect the potential ontological capacity that lays dormant in the history of art.

Modernism left us with subjective and close fields of interpretation to exclude what is most important in cultural and political life. It allowed no critical body of knowledge to establish art as a social consciousness. “Historical criticism,” as Clement Greenberg sustained a notion of criticism that showed no epistemic capacity and no relation to the motion of human history, but took support from laudable references, like Bell, and by comparing colors and hues between his painters and those from the Renaissance. Strangely enough, Hilton Kramer (1973), who reviewed Greenberg’s book *Art and Culture*, said that Greenberg’s “immutable laws” are no more than ways of arranging abstract forms in “decorative patterns” (p. 116).

The media power and media manipulation that designated notoriety to the New York Art School and opinionated readers constituted no support for semiotic configurations, but helped confuse even more the major issues of art. Greenberg tried to justify Modernism as an era of self-criticism in which art discovers itself through its “media” and becomes a pure activity (*Ib.*, pp. 5-6). He marginally and unsuccessfully called on Kant in order to substantiate the “logic” of his thought and to make human values easily interchangeable. His powerful legacy, though, demonstrated that a financial empire can be built on ambiguities.⁷¹ It was so that art suddenly became the object of psychology, and the Freudian essay was rediscovered.

At the time, humanity was devastated by the tragedies of two world wars, and instead of being interpreters and actors of their time, these artists devoted energies and resources experimenting with distortion and dissections of mere external images. Some remained totally indifferent to the political scenario of war tragedies. Others defected and emigrated to safe havens such as Switzerland and America, forgetting their origin, their people, and their artistic and social duties and obligations. The world today still lacks harmony, peace, and well-being and many artists still lack the social consciousness and duties of concerns and popular participation that is demanded by all members of society. Some, in spite of their social and political disinterest, call themselves intellectual, yet they show no intellectual political intervention.

Schools and universities still ignore this necessity. The artist who chooses to ignore the reality of the world betrays art’s humanistic function, like the soldier deserting the front-line in wartime. We see today the consequences of that disinterest and detachment transmuted into apathy and indifference toward the

⁷¹ To be added to the list of “spoilers of art” were E. H. Gombrich (1909-2001), who thought that art was only an illusion, and Michael Fried (1939) who thought that art is only “objecthood.”

humanistic future of society. Critical disinterest and iconoclasm are social attitudes arising not from truly historical and philosophical necessities, but from a culture of art that breeds and worships subjectivism, that creates idols and heroes out of nothing.

The emphasis placed on repetitive production of anomalous expressions that transgress traditional modes of being, that merely excite the senses, and that violate ethical and moral life cannot continue to be worshipped as art. There must be higher goals for individuals that are blessed with intelligence and creativity. Artists as intellectuals cannot be providers of sensuous entertainment and pastimes. Like all conscious individuals, they have a function in life, or this will represent a tremendous waste of intelligence and socio-political resources.

Why do people choose to be artists if their ends are other than humanistic? Artists should have an active and intensive intellectual life and be dealing with the great questions of humanity. Instead, they are indulging in image-making and, thus, are perceived and understood as traders of the little illusions they provide—like those *petites perceptions* that jugglers, performers, and entertainers sell on the streets in front of the Bouburg or the Metropolitan museums. This, in particular, expresses the need for schools to prepare new artists for higher tasks and demand that they choose their mission in life. I believe this study can help artists in establishing a better image of themselves and become active members of society, as it was in ancient Greece.

The political history of the last 100 years or so has been marked by the innumerable advances in technology and commerce that have brought welfare to the working classes, overthrown Marxist ideologies, destroyed the Berlin wall, and at the same time, quite amazingly, brought information among art workers. Today, art has become a large scale industry competing for trades and capital investments, and its destiny is in the hands of non-congenial institutions and private for-profit enterprises. The functions of art should be above material concern. This fact was obscure in the mind of Karl Marx, and it still is in the mind of those who choose to support artists. In fact, this era of new world order, of global communications and economy, of industry and technology, demands the scrutiny and the contribution of all members of society, especially of artists with vision. A humanistic reconstruction of the idea of art is needed to maintain the primary concerns for humanity in an ever-growing, lawless, and ruthless world.

Arnold Hauser, in his *Social Art History* (1959), revealed the need to allow artists to expand and incorporate the expressive humanistic potential of their times. The arts and the humanities are instruments for striking a balance between relentless, undisciplined profit-oriented cultures that commercialize the intrinsic values of human nature. Let the intellectual human faculties of the artist develop

according to his or her inner potential and move against any form of reductionism. Hauser said:

And yet it would be wrong to deny to art all claims of achieving truth, to deny that it can make a valuable contribution to our knowledge and the world of man. [...] Attempts to demarcate the different fields in which this world-view manifests itself may be very promising from the epistemological point of view, but to the sociologist they appear as violent dissections of the realities he studies. (*Ib.*, p. 233)

Rethinking, reassessing, and redirecting the generative forces of art is a historical necessity for the responsible artist. There is a “philosophical,” sociological, and aesthetic necessity for the reformation of the very idea of art—philosophical in the true sense of rational achievement of ends. Without this restructuring of ideas, artists are locked in a one-track mind that can only generate more *ad hoc* anomalous conditions. Kant called for a spirit of humanism in art, one that can center the efforts of research on true human values. On the contrary, Modernism has remained impotent and has incorporated the social pathologies it once sought to expose and to correct. The lack of a self-critical consciousness among artists and critics is as evident today as it was to the eyes of the insecure and confused writer and poet Baudelaire during the early times of Modern Art. Today, in spite of substantial organizational and financial support, the arts are far from self-realization and have reached intellectual breakdown and annihilation of the spirit that once animated artists to be all that they could be as individuals.

Schools and universities will be faced with these great questions: Should artists say what art is, or should they be told about it? But how can an artist know what art is and what is his or her place in society without knowing, without incorporating knowledge? By this, I mean that the pursuit of art and that of knowledge are one and the same activity. From a general historical scrutiny of the last 200 years, it is quite evident that the attainment of knowledge and wisdom are not in schools’ art curricula. On the contrary, subjectivism is being elevated to a form of God-given virtue and to a narcissistic spirituality that produces empty minds and self-proclaimed gurus in the arts.

The Aristotelian concept of *polis* can provide guidance to these artists, for the purpose of political science is to integrate a congenial concept of art harmonious and productive toward a rational organization of individuals. If this were so, today, artists would express themselves in such contexts or propose new rational ideologies instead of advancing their own subjective convictions. If this Aristotelian concept were incorporated into the notion of art, there would be a full integration of both art and artists into the societal whole. Moreover, a sociology of

art would be recognized as one activity at the service of humanity. Here is what Hauser said in this regard:

Even in art, the most human of all human forms of expression, this alien character is felt whenever art is treated as pure form [or not]. A work of art, taken as a purely formal product, a mere play of lines or tones, an embodiment of timeless values without relevance to anything historical or social, loses its vital relationship to the artist and its human significance for the person contemplating it. (*Ib.*, p. 235)

This political assessment, judging from the ongoing critical dialectic of the time, was alive among critics such as C. Greenberg, M. Shapiro, H. Rosenberg, H. Kramer, et al., but failed to arrive at a destination and to be adopted as a logical conclusion as a theory of art.

Again, Postmodernity, as described by Francois Lyotard, has not yet established itself as such because philosophy has not yet been able to produce a synthesis of ontological values to redefine aesthetic thought. I now ask phenomenology to intervene and attend to the production of a postmodern ontology. Postmodern history accounts only for a chronology of events, invoked by a handful of critics and historians who practice it as an established, diversified “mode” of appearances and distinctive social attitudes. I repeat that appearances by themselves, when they do not lead to substance, should not be a concern on the part of the public. As a result of much concern for appearances, the artist sees him or herself in a peculiar way, extraneous to his or her own nature, and certainly not a part of the universal movement of human substance. As a repetitive matter of course, postmodern art history has taken the artist’s production once again as mere image-making, to be boxed in and preserved as visual relics. Images, good or bad, once on the public field, are idealized and iconized so as to become permanent referential fixtures of culture. When art history is to be understood only as external exhibition of forms, it confuses the idea of humanity ingrained in the history of art and offers no purposive reflection upon salient human values, toward the expansion of human substance in both art and society. This is precisely the essence of Hauser’s message.

Far from being the era of reinterpretation and synthesis of the past, Postmodernity turned out to be a mere linguistic exercise — if we want to call the play of forms and color “language” as many critics do. The “new” ideas, applied in architecture, art and philosophy, are again characterized by references to early modernist imagery and theories such as “weak thought” (here analogized by Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo, 1997). A weak thought is not a philosophy, for it changes nothing in the philosophical spectrum of human existence. If it leaves

things as they are, if it can be easily paralleled with steered market demands, and if it is not propelled by the phenomenological force of human substance, it is easily adumbrated by the existing ideological confusion. The critics who steer market demands are obviously unconcerned or incapable of dealing with the true problems of art. Art is still defined by 'style' and by its market value. It takes a true humanistic reformation to correct this non-congenial condition. Advocating everything that is produced as art, while disregarding humanistic values as useless, destroys the very idea of humanity.

The idea of humanity is still unknown or misunderstood in the arts. Most of the time, it appears as such a big word that no one dares to pronounce it. Should art become a socially conscious activity, humanity would be the research topic of all arts. Against a holistic idea of humanity, the chaotic production of imagery and emphatic subjectivity of the artist would be dispelled because it would be treated as a non-virtuous and undesirable quality by critics and historians. In spite of all presuppositions, the critical and historical climate of today does not offer the terrain from which art can emerge naturally as a humanistic excellence.

Switching to a humanistic context, the field of art would treat the language by a taxonomy describing the virtues of humanity as a primal consideration and "style" diversity as a secondary one. Value in art would not fall under the economic and stylistic differentiation set by auction houses and other commercial institutions, but under the substantial validity that constitutes a social consciousness, especially if a proper evaluative criterion had been in place. Art should be a part of the quest to search for a better humanity. In that case, a qualitative elected board of advisers would be constituted to determine the true validity of the work of art, like it was during the time of the schools of Urbino and Florence. Philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, science, history, sociology and anthropology would be the disciplines of acculturation for those who aspire to become artists. Under this practical discourse, a dealer could sell works of art being truthful to him or herself, filled with humanity in the same way he or she now sells modernist works.

Postmodernity is merely a theory of spineless styles and a zymology of appearances, which do not propose a new contextual ground of linguistic validity. It can be so defined because it failed to make a synthesis of the philosophical values of the past and propose new ones. In fact, little did it do to fully understand and preserve the Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenological teaching which it claims to be the heir. Noted historians such as Wolfflin, Panowsky, Shapiro, Hallaway et al., though belonging to an earlier period, entertained the same understanding of styles. Postmodernity re-proposed a blend of old and new

imagery as if it were the ultimate end of art.⁷² This shows how Postmodernity is dissociated from the real world. Most importantly, is this the kind of “authenticity” of existence Heidegger sought as precursor of Postmodernity? To this author, it would seem almost unimaginable that a social ideology in time of war could still revolve around styles as it was during the late 1800s and the 1900s (*Ib.*, p. 244). In addition, the idea of “style” is most perplexing when it becomes a divisive political and ideological factor within the art world.⁷³

This detachment and disinterest from world affairs and from humanity translates with a widespread philosophical ignorance and inaptitude. I still have to find a book to tell me what art is for and what its real function in society is. Because of this widespread ignorance, the gap between human reality and art has grown tremendously wider. This can be ascertained by the numerous references made in this study, which are also meant to invite the reader to test my assessments and to make a close assessment of his or her own of the philosophical and perceptual changes that are required in our historical time to catch up with the “new humanism” movement. I cannot help but to sense the void of meaning in art as I read art journals and magazines. My disdain is accentuated when I think of how material interests and power succeeds in keeping the public under a state of philosophical ignorance and cultural apathy, so that it is not induced to stand up for art’s responsibilities in the world. Under a general state of denial, it is easy to even reject the universal principles of one’s own existence as contingent upon art and artists and thus relinquish freedom and individuality. People, especially those in a position of power, resist changes, which will bring real socio-cultural autonomy in art merely to safeguard the market and private investments.

The politics of *laissez-faire* and (free enterprise) represent the existing political philosophy of the art business. It is the *status quo* of art today, supported

⁷² To be noted is a postmodern writer, Nicos Hadjinicolaou (in Frascina and Harrison 1983), who in his essay “Art History and Class Struggle” presented them as a “visual ideology.” Can the socio-political world be divided and differentiated only by styles?

⁷³ How ephemeral can art be under such political circumstances? Can anyone write or differentiate for me the humanistic values among the styles or the kind of doodling of Jean Arp (1887-1966), among the icing jazz painting of Piet Mondrian (1872-1944), among the silly collages of Miro, or among the foolish paintings of Chagall, etc.? Were these artists individual entities of human substance, or simply clowns who sold their work to entertain and amuse? Again, did any of these artists fulfill the aesthetic and ethical responsibilities required by their profession? How did these artists participate in world history or in the making of humanity? They went to live in Switzerland or emigrated to America so that they could continue doodling and playing with the idea of art while their people were dying for a cause.

blindly by the market and by public and private contributions that change nothing. Art should be controlled by the Department of Education and should benefit as primary undertaking because it advances human intelligence – when it is imparted in the right context. Art history and criticism should be the watchdog, but instead they too serve the so called “free enterprise” system, and a times, accept bribery and embrace economic hegemonies at the expense of social evolution.

Those who exercise hegemonic powers over the arts win the economic battles but lose the battle of living in a humane society. We often hear of financial supporters imbuing their social images with pride for having funded this or that show, supported this or that museum for taking credit over senseless exhibitions that fail to enter into the heart of social concerns.

If all this is done under the idea of freedom, that is, without reflecting on philosophical misguidance funding unworthy exhibition like the mentioned Ofili’s Brooklyn Museum’ show of deprecation painting of the Virgin Mary decorated with animal genitalia. A due inquiry on the damage done to the heritage and function of art in society should be conducted along with assessing possible damage to the support for the arts inflicted by irresponsible artists upon society and humanity as a whole. The state of pluralism, of the *tout va bien*, alleges that everything is art while it is a dispersion of human energy and economic resources — a type of social Darwinism of the rich and the powerful disregarding social ethics.

Under these circumstances, freedom of expression is only a purely hypothetical social excuse to divert intentions and annihilate human values. In addition, when there are socially powerful factions steering art to the other direction through psychological and material means, we know that there is something substantially unethical about society most certainly a chronic pathology. I have spoken earlier about the hegemonic influence of Greenberg. If this is what the market needs to establish a product, then it means that economic powers reign supreme in society where ignorance of the arts are rooted in peoples’ mind and cannot be eradicated for generations to come.

Most surprising was to recognize that the general audience hardly opposed the Ofili’s exhibition, which was directed specifically against the Catholic community, which did not oppose the show with enough force and determination. In fact the show caused some controversies, which were easily overcome by the organizers.

The despotic power of a market support system excites and confuses the masses to the point of rendering them insecure and powerless to decide for them as to what constitutes value in art. For society to accept the idea of “anything goes” or of pluralism is clear example of lack of sustainable ideas and a discipline of values. Art thus, like Picasso said, becomes a “lie,” a heresy perpetrated to benefit

some economically and damage the masses intellectually and anthropologically. Under such adverse climate, any idea of art can be easily adopted and discarded, depending upon who can exercise more economic power. The false belief that a free enterprise in art is a good thing should invite some reflection. Free enterprise works well under a free and ethical society, not the other way around. It allows many sophisticated entrepreneurs to operate shamelessly on a strictly material ground and to apply the same marketing strategies applied for any other commercial product, such as devious advertising. A work of art can bring enormous financial returns under a system where ignorance is predominant. Many prefer to invest in art rather than in the stock market. Those who can establish prestigious spaces to sell art works have the power to dictate monetary values at all times. The idea is to pay little for a piece of art but sell it high to make huge profits. The extravagant social butterfly Peggy Guggenheim was one of those who paid very little for art works and built a priceless collection. Artists would beg to sell their works to her for pennies.⁷⁴ Freelance critics and historians make themselves available for hire to these entrepreneurs to justify with the written word this infamous game of power and exploitation of art and extend it even further. There are no adequate remedies for the fortuitous and “hegemonic” practices and for this type of despotism. Critical and historical writing should be an act of conscience and of faith. During the Renaissance, art was believed to be an act of faith in humanity. After the Industrial Revolution, artists have shifted their faith and beliefs to the power of money, who remains the sole player of the destiny of humanity.

I call those art writers who offer themselves for hire “surface writers.” There are now two categories of surface writers: the fictional and the allegorical. They both, by their attitude, embody the pretentiousness of influencing others and can exert more sensuous stimuli than they can bear with their writings. They can marvel at the littlest peculiarities and bring about superlative descriptions of their experiences as if they are all too often struck by metaphysical inspiration.

Contrarily, all modes of representations could be allowed under any form or idea as long as human substance is maintained and advanced contextually. This way, the audience can recognize quality of content as opposed to trash. There would be no problem with pluralistic modes of representations if the artist’s intent

⁷⁴ Her humanistic idea of art, in my opinion, is buried with the nine cats at the Peggy Guggenheim home in Venice (now a museum for them too so that they may not be forgotten and be brought to greatness). The late defunct apparel salesman Leo Castelli, the shirt maker Sydney Janis, et al. worked in the same fashion and became rich by building many more priceless collections over a period of 40 years providing good investments for their clients.

remained focused on the truth of being as that which produces the true sense of humanity. Losing this sense in art signifies, for any artist, to be heading on the highway of despair. Bertolt Brecht in “Popularity and Realism” (cited in Frascina and Harrison, 1983), explained,

Anyone who is not a victim of formalistic prejudices knows that the truth can be expressed in many ways and must be expressed in many ways. One can arouse a sense of outrage at human conditions by many methods—by direct description (emotional or objective), by narrative and parables, by jokes, by over- and under-emphasis. (p. 229)

The use of metaphors may distinguish and validate artists and writers, but art as well as writing requires conceptualization of meaning and communication of essential values. Considering that all language carries a certain degree of metaphor, direct language is always more desirable for reducing meaning to its bare essence. That fine line of necessity that connects the inner substance of artists, poets, and writers with the medium of the language requires no interference in order for the projected meaning to be pure. We all are free to express what meaning we can bring to bear, but any meaning rests on an existential necessity of value. There is no meaning without some substantial value. Metaphor is often used to obfuscate the necessity between sense and reference, which reduces the power of intentions embodied in a work of art or a work of writing.

The legitimacy of metaphor is often transgressed by ill critical intentions. Many philosophers have spoken about the dangers of metaphor and many critics use metaphor skillfully to conceal what instead should be transparent and self-evident. Emile Zola (1960, p. 38) again describes the subjectivity of art critics as “disgraceful business, flattery and admiration of trumpery.” When critics could not accept “new manifestation of humanity in the face of the realities of nature,” during the romantic realism of Hugo, Balzac, and others, critics were regarded

like musicians who play their own tunes simultaneously, hearing only their own instruments in the appalling hubbub that they are producing. One wants color, another drawing, a third intellectual quality. (*Ib.*, p. 38)

In sum, intrinsic and necessary language provides a common ground for the definition of positive critical discourse. If my affirmations are proven true, my attempt to redefine the very notion of criticism will serve the causes of art and

humanity for Postmodernity has grown a-contextual with regard to the understanding of humanity.⁷⁵

To exhibit a crucifix immersed in a jar of urine, pornographic images of a child or the Virgin Mary decorated with human and animal genitalia and receive critical acclaim, is to reject humanity itself and having returned to primordial state. Critical acceptance of such aberrations shows unscrupulous behavior, a scarce level of intelligence and a lack of responsibility and morality on the part of the critics.

Critical judgments must interpret art objects truthfully and treat them in the context of an entire culture. Art works of mediocre status, which contaminate the spirit and denigrate human values, cannot be integrated in a historical context in terms of what constitute humanity. This is what Zola meant by the word *human*. Obviously the cultural preparation of the artist and of the critic must be questioned because such behavior affects the community, the country and the world as a whole.⁷⁶

The gravest of all errors is when politicians seek advice from hypocritical critics who pass as experts and advise on public policies; support for the arts cannot be significant and tangible when art stands on surreptitious and corrupted grounds of validity. Art should represent the best of humanity, not the worst. The public has the right to reject what is put before it for the purpose of exploitation and notoriety.⁷⁷

Museums and art institutions are often independent business enterprises receiving government funding, which especially in such cases make illicit and contradictory the use of public resources. In any democratic state there should be in principle a body to control how public resources are spent. Contrary to this principle of the *polis*, museums are public institutions, publicly funded, privately run and motivated by private interests. Those who run them are often common

⁷⁵ Much too often works that bear idiosyncratic significance and that offend culture, sensibility, and what most people hold dear in terms of systems of beliefs and traditions are being desecrated for the purpose of entertainment, amusement, and self-aggrandizement. Such are the works of the artists Andres Serrano (b. 1950), Robert Mapplethorpe (1946-1989), and Chris Ofili (b. 1968), et al.

⁷⁶ The question is how such subversive art got to be exhibited in galleries like the Corcoran Gallery of Washington D.C., the Tate Gallery of London, or the Brooklyn Museum?

⁷⁷ Like all users and abusers of power, those who forward their tax-deductible contributions to the arts and call themselves “philanthropists” or “patrons of the arts” are often motivated by personal interests, like Sachi and Sachi Company, the sponsors of such outrageous exhibitions. It is to be believed that these exhibitions were particularly designed to outrage the Catholic community and to yield high financial returns.

business administrators who possess mediocre knowledge, but use museum's money to build private art collections of their liking. Today, the so-called administrators of culture seem to rest their decisions further away from humanistic concerns. They often include their own artists in museum's collections to boost the price of their investment. The public mission to educate and acculturate, which was once their sole preoccupation, has turned into ambition for high financial profits. This is the reason we see public institutions turning into economic enterprises, involved in social events, Real Estate, entertainment, and commerce. There is no doubt that these concerns, in the end, compromise their main scope of existence as reservoir of cultural values and jeopardize art's humanistic growth.⁷⁸

The way multinational companies exploit opportunities and regard themselves as patrons of the arts, while installing plaques on the museum walls and profiting from trading and lending their collections, is beyond the moral logic by which we have always regarded the activity of art museums. But this only shows how an alliance of ignorance and power becomes a threat to culture and to society. Surely, this is a type of hypocrisy not congenial with the human values the arts are supposed to herald. The humanity of the arts, as it is laid out and signified in this study, can set an example of integrity and human decency in this respect.

Material desires and greed turn artists, critics, and historians into private entrepreneurs at the expense of the spiritual and intellectual growth of society. In sum, the system of support is set on a dichotomous course with art's potential congenial development. Art exhibitions like the "blockbusters" are planned on economical rather than cultural impact like any other public attraction sold and advertised in television and newspapers. The use of aggressive marketing strategies designed to sensationalize events rather than question, educate, or challenge the visitors, offends the very idea of art as the highest activity of the intellect. What is missing is, then, a genuine effort in relaying to the public the true state of the arts and projecting a spirit of the authenticity of human existence, of right and wrong, of natural and spiritual values, especially in times of cultural and moral decadence, of wars, when the entire system of values seems to have been shattered. This is why art falls back into a vicious, mediatic circle that reminds us all the more of what makes the artist a mindless player in a heteronomous game responsible for art's decadence and demise.

⁷⁸ Museums, acting as private clubs, are now investing in the stock market, trading and selling art objects with private and public collections, competing in publishing, running restaurants, merchandising, owning and running retail shops, and even going against principles of social health by seeking support by taking funds from cigarette companies or allowing cigarette advertising which is banned by many countries.

We cannot speak of social progress without speaking of the intellectual and cultural advancement of the arts. In this regard, the public media make things worse, since they ignorantly and actively participate in the expansion of the fallacies perpetrated by museums. All this nullifies the humanistic message of art and produces a disservice to society. The disservice is obviously twofold: on the one hand, the notion of art is decontextualized; on the other, the true values that generate humanistic developments are erased from the perception and memory of the history of art, which is blown to unimaginable dimensions of false values. A historical decline occurs when values and language are erased from memory and a decadent state of affairs takes its place. If we look at the spirit of innovation, which indeed produced the Renaissance of the 15th and 16th centuries, we realize that it is the accretion and the influx of new knowledge that produces desirable changes; it was the research and unification of philosophical thought, of values, and of intents that promote intellectual developments, not the exaltation of subjectivity or material interest.

Most exhibitions are geared to sell the edifice of the artist's subjectivity, not his or her contribution to humanity. Museums and media alike use the artist's notoriety as an appeal to both increase attendances and to maximize incomes, much like Hollywood enterprises. In other words, the disappearance of a humanistic contextual basis from the production and divulgation of art works signifies the suppression of the most significant aspect of art, namely, suppression of values, and dispersion of public interest.

Nothing is ever gained from a stagnant public ignorance. This study proves that art and society are necessarily interdependent on many levels of existence. Consequently, we cannot speak of social progress if we do not have an expanded criterion of public acculturation. Take out this discourse and you have reached a dead point in the history of art—the same denounced by Heidegger, Nietzsche, et al. as “the death of art,” which represent the crucible of human values. The point is that, if you see society in disarray, blame it on a whole set of reasons whose responsibility falls not only upon politicians, but also upon artists, because they fail to enlighten society with humanistic thought and to claim their right to transcendence.

An advanced notion of art reflects automatically an advanced notion of society and vice versa. This statement should help correct the contradictory policies in government. By supporting the advancement of thought in art, a government can advance the good causes of society, especially when the arts pursue a humanistic goal. Obviously, no national policy can be devised in support of the arts until a university of knowledge is instituted and the social heuristic function of art understood. That which can determine the true humanistic values of art also assures the perceptual, conscious growth of artists. In other words, if the

purpose of art institutions is to educate and enlighten society, there has to be a body of knowledge and a general project of conscious completion of the individual artist. To this day, there is no such intention being expressed anywhere or by any institution.

The political government of a community or a country should now look primarily at the substantial return of long-term targeted investments of resources supporting the intellectual energy that yields humanistic developments, affecting also other sectors of the economy. Most importantly, there should be no dichotomy between public education and the education of the arts. Art should shed the distinctive light of humanity to the other disciplines, upon the community and the country, in order to animate public spirit. The beneficial effects of such actions may be limitless, and this realization can be drawn directly from the main text. Lastly, economic support for the arts should be placed in strategic, potential areas of intellectual growth to better serve society as a whole.

Contrary to typical iconoclasm, the arts must help society in the realization of fundamental human values. Have the arts project the intrinsic necessity of human values, and you will have a better world. A message of humanity will greatly contribute to the solutions of most problems in the world, such as protection of human rights, elimination of hunger and poverty, homelessness, and public diseases, safeguard of the environment, establishment of moral ethical values, etc. These are all impinging problems of a world the arts have set apart of. Humanistic values help societies building responsible and sustainable economies that enhance the quality of life. This discourse seems to be leading to the fact that, if political leaders support the arts with intelligent strategies, society will spend a lot less to cure some social illnesses in the world. The arts and humanities can initiate a process of reflection that engages the public on a higher level of values like no other forms of education has done before. This is precisely the project of a New Humanism, the same I try to promote in the book.

The problems of the world should concern all members of society, artists included. Displacement of values in the idea of art signifies lack of rational completion and cognitive finitude of the art work, and consequently, derailed individual behavior in society, false consciousness, and limitation of freedom, etc. These are negative aspects of the socio-political problematic we face in pursuing a moral philosophy rather taking refuge in a social psychology. The reader will learn in the text that social consciousness is rational individual behavior participating in the common good under the recognition and reliance on the mastery of reason and will over action and behavior as a social discipline. Take away rational control from the mind, and something else, or any prejudicial aberrations and anomalous conditions will take over individual and social behavior. As we learn in the text, the emphasis on subjectivity placed in society inevitably lead to anomalous

conditions that contrary to the common good. Subjectivity is unlearned behavior that shifts the social problematic from a rational philosophy to psychology and from structural to pathological behavior. He, who magnifies his or her own ego, is a fool that cannot accept world reality.

The major role of society, whether possible or impossible, is how to build the complete and independent individual – dependent only to reason. It is obvious that if individual development were to be geared or structured on a rational philosophy of life since childhood, there would be no need for social psychology, psychiatry, or mental drugs. Individuals would have the tools to educate themselves and meet the expected rational behavioral standards.

The question now is whether artists are able to envision and work toward the new goal of a rational society, as Habermas suggests, or allow the hopeless escalation of the social aberration of our time. This entire study aims precisely at the reversal of a widespread a-rational and non-conscious, senseless behavior in art, which, I believe, contributes nothing to the moral structures of society. The hopes expressed here are that the theoretical body of knowledge presented in this book be practically and uniformly implemented by artists, critics, historians, politicians, and administrators.

My book allows the reader to reflect on valuable criteria that enhance the understanding of the work of art as highly conceptual set of ideas to serve worthwhile ends, beyond external modes of behavior, entertainment, and excitation of the senses. Private and public institutions, schools, ministries of culture, or even the USA's National Endowment for the Arts, etc. should take notice of these possibilities.

The idea of concentrating the resources on strategic areas of intellectual growth obviously discards the belief in plurality and multiplicity normally advanced and promoted by those dumb business men who are in the arts for the money and have no interest in the acculturation of society. Supporting scattered, non-directional, pluralistic art is like generating cross-cultural forces that annihilate each other and represent a dispersion of human energy. The ideas that emerge from this study can well serve as political criteria for supporting the arts, for everything that disperses intellectual energy retards the rational edification of the social individual and society as a whole. I reiterate that art is a human concept, not a God-given concept that can be advanced into a directive, unconscious social idea and, at the same time, be centered on realistic human values. Such ideas have been formulated here as a humanistic project of social transcendence—now, they only need to be put into practice.

The idea that art may be an indiscriminate logical exercise is to be decided by the artist himself or herself, not by the market, the institution, the critic, or the historian. Artists are “all too human” as Nietzsche mentioned, in accordance with

their most advanced desires. Indiscriminate pluralistic and a-rational art only produces a vagary of empty ideas, which further confuse the imagistic vocabulary. Art does have to pretend to purport superior, metaphysical, or mystical tasks. It must be valued for its existential content of meaning.

Nietzsche went too far when he mentioned that art is a divine gift of the superior man because it defeats the ontological principle based on perceptual acculturation. This statement, though too idealistic, places art above all human activities. Most philosopher of art show inevitable contradictions for they maintain the metaphysical, Platonic dimension of the work of art. Indeed, artists are not superior beings, but they are beings that have been called by the historical tradition to advance human intellectual development. This is why, once they have decided to become artists, they must maintain an adequate level of culture and commitment.

Their energy may be dispersed in the air, but not their ideas, which remains like a furrow in the field. Nietzsche was aware of this state of affairs. He pointed out that art is not taken seriously because the masses possess no ideas of art of their own therefore cannot have a meaningful aesthetic experience, except the mere excitation of the senses. However, the artist cannot stop sending out intellectual stimuli to the masses that have been denied food for the mind for centuries. That is why, in spite of the growing number of museums, foundations, and other art institutions, there is still a widespread, general ignorance as to what art is. There is little or no research on the intellectual potentiality of the arts and their integration and interaction in the social arena. The research done in most art schools and universities is mostly “historical” (of course, without a philosophical conception or the principles of history) makes it totally meaningless for it does nothing to advance the intellectual capacity of the arts.⁷⁹ This should be the problematic of all arts institutions.

Again, here is what Zola said:

Ignorant people laugh with complete self-assurance. Knowledgeable people—those who have studied Art in moribund schools—are annoyed, on examining the new work, not to discover in it the qualities in which they believe and to which their eyes have become accustomed. No one thinks of looking at it objectively. The former understand nothing about it, the latter make [only] comparisons. (*Ib.*, p. 37)

⁷⁹ As I mentioned earlier, education of the masses is an ontological problem. Advancing the masses’ intellectual capacity is also an anthropological problem. If the masses are ignorant or indifferent to art, the responsibility falls precisely on the artists and on the educational and institutional system that has failed to recognize the problem and, therefore, failed to institutionalize the arts’ true values. Indeed, museums should place emphasis on this problematic, rather than acting like country clubs with fancy parties and fancy catering.

Even in Zola's time, the mind of the artists failed to educate the eye of the public. Artists sat on cafés talking about nothing. The mind points to the problem and opens the eye to see the object in its real nature. The educated eye opens the masses' perception and understanding. The mind of the artist can prospect the greatest intellectual radius of possibilities and the eye can be alerted, focused, educated, and become perceptually receptive. The eye must then report back to the mind etc. so that the circle of perception may expand. The mind, which instructs the eye, must first be aware of causes and antecede contextual hypotheses in order to open the field of possibilities. Institutionalizing mere modes of appearance like museums do helps neither the eye nor artistic developments; they simply reduce the field of possibilities of perception and understanding to focus the mind on one topic at the time.

Francis Bacon believed that by acting upon the mind, one not only assumes control, but can enhance the nature of the perceived object. The object's intrinsic and extrinsic nature is not entirely accessible to the mind unless the latter exercises special analytical powers. For this reason alone, mind-body necessity is more central to philosophical than to psychological discourse because we all see what our mind wants us to see, what interests us, and even more, what we can be conscious of, and that means to acquire existential certainty of the object with the full cooperation of our intellectual faculties. By keeping the mind in the dark, unaware of the world, the eye will see nothing. This is valid in terms of the individual eye and of the collective eye of a multitude of individuals.

When it comes to placing the idea of art into a social context, we must act, as Hegel suggested, upon the internal reasons and norms that can be organized as structure of ideals to benefit a community of individuals. I can only speak of the specific role of the arts in an ideal social structure. This study opens the social field of research quite substantially. In other words, the political principles that embody the highest social good are the sole to be considered in the book toward the best employment of the idea of art.

The moral sense of duty introduced by Kant is necessary to any human endeavor, art included. It is not just complementary to the motivation of action, because it is both the motivation and the action. Duty toward the common good is a moral imperative because this is the reason communities of individuals exist in organized, collective existence where everyone must do his or her part. One has the right to choose the role to play in society, but once the choice is made, one may not forfeit the ideal for which he or she stands. Many artists play their role in society irresponsibly, which means that public awareness of this state ignorance is missing.

The concept of society as an ideal union of collective individuals must be interpreted beyond the notion of material, economic, and political systems. The

employment of such a concept must be envisioned and taken into account when we deal with the concept of art, for we know that an ideal society can be far from being a reality anywhere in the world unless a total reformation of the ideal good comes to the foreground of validity. We wish that Aristotle would come back to life for his famous dictum “*the good is what all desire*” This discourse arises from The Aristotelian ethical realm of thought seeking the “*greater good*” for all mankind is still valid because it extends to intellectual values, and for this reason, it cannot be discounted or undervalued as an implementation in art’s qualitative judgments.

By this I mean to say that the implementation of an ideal concept of art needs to comprehend a wide spectrum of ethical knowledge to support the formation of the social individual and the relation of the part to the whole, (the community). Art can support the greater good only by supporting the conscious completion of the individual.⁸⁰ From the Enlightenment we learned the greatest concept of the individual toward which art must play a central role. The edification, identification, recognition, and adoption of the intellectual tools that form the complete individual are matters belonging to the human right of being, all that he or she can be and living according to one’s highest potential.

Let this be clear. The artist is not a preacher of humanity. He is a maker of it. Whenever a work of art is exerted from the hands of an artist who possesses this particular consciousness, the work must be recognized as a product of the same humanity the artist possesses. We now know what Aristotle meant by the *greater good*, and we know how to implement it in both the individual and in society after the philosophers of the Enlightenment have optimized it. In addition, Hegel told us that we must see the whole spectrum of purpose and necessity in the concept of the *common good*, which has social and political implications. The common good must be accomplished. The work of art can help because it is a public statement that demands action under a pure sense of duty. In other words, we must follow the supreme orders of social duty, but we must know which ultimate ends they serve. We do not blindly obey the order of a superior call without knowing its necessity.

The idea of duty arising from Kant’s philosophy of Practical Reason brings about a special spiritual feeling of satisfaction in the artist. Such feeling is widely treated and implemented in the study for it endows the artist’s behavior with purposive and concrete ideas of social belonging. Social good embodies all ethical and spiritual causes of the work of art. The artist’s compelling social duties and purposiveness to his or her work does not diminish his or her freedom of expression as an inalienable right. Freedom of expression is willingness to express.

⁸⁰ This point, which is reiterated emphatically in throughout the book is central in reconstructing the image and the function of the artist in society.

The purpose and the necessity of this kind of freedom is also a feeling of satisfaction and accomplishment when achieved by the artist who attends to the common good of society. With this feeling in place and the positive consciousness thereof, the artist can fulfill the general interest of art and serve the cause of humanity. What better purpose and what better cause can art serve in society? This feeling is derived by what Heidegger characterized as *ontological consciousness*, whose formative structure this study aims at bringing about by generating a growing sense of belonging to the world, which arises as interest in humanity.

Again, the interest in humanity is the sole legitimate thematic of art. All the rest are arbitrary constructions of historicity. We have to go back to the Renaissance to determine the true humanistic meaning that motivated artists to do what they have done, and I have done so with limited space in the same manner in which Heidegger traced Parmenide's authenticity of the *onto*. This means that art's potential to deliver messages of humanity is at the essence of its own intellectual growth. An analytical socio-humanistic concern allows the artist in this sense to also address the creative energy toward his or her own essential values and, therefore, to be instrumental to the good of humanity. In other words, make a model of humanity within yourself and be an example for others. Being an example for others means to produce a state of interdependence that actualizes beneficial social changes.

From a Baconian perspective, art stands between the knowledge of human nature and nature itself. Leonardo's concept of *conessione* is an applicable analogy of interdependence between the microcosm and macrocosm, which constitutes the basis for the artist's critical knowledge and critical capacity. This brings us back to an extended concept of the Aristotle's *organon* of nature. The consciousness of nature furnishes the fundamental reason for the notion of interaction and application of values as critical tool and as a norm for artists' behavioral conduct. Existence of all animate and inanimate beings is, by this principle, integrated in a universal *organon* of knowledge. As in Leonardo's life, art exercises this activity of humanistic research, judgment, and communication as a commitment to the holistic principle of art, which is also dealt with in Hegel's aesthetic as a commitment to maintain the highest intellectual standards of art.

We have so far established that there is an endemic necessity that justifies the existence of art, and on this necessity we must build a hierarchy of values. The discourse is in actuality more extensive. I am not speaking about a formal aesthetic discourse here, only implementing the substantial arguments that make art a valuable social asset and that we can assign to this activity no less significant value. Art is not about dreams, and illusion, but conscious finitude reflected in the art work. Conscious finitude depends upon a constitution of the values that allow the

advancement of humanity. This view was shared by both the thinkers of the Enlightenment and by the fathers of the American Constitution. Not all men seek enlightenment and finitude, which is the true worth of mankind, but “all men are created equal with certain inalienable rights,” to seek enlightenment and finitude. The accomplishments that define individual finitude require the knowledge, the dedication, and the sacrifices necessary to move beyond prejudice and subjectivity, achieve objective conscious completion, and thereby sustain said “inalienable rights.”

Toward this end, Hegel’s notion of stoicism in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1967) treated in the study provides the appropriate contextual ground. The universal reason of Aristotle’s *organon* and Leibniz’ *monad* are models of individuality and association -- individuals working harmoniously together within a larger space of collective energy represented by society and the world. Each monad (part) distinguishes itself as subject embodying the objectivity of nature (the whole) and as individual conscious finitude. The monad contributes to society (to the *monadology*) not with its extravagant desires and modes of subjective behaviors, but with the knowledge and wisdom it is able to embody. Leibniz’s *Monadology* is a guided rendering of the universal principles that brings together all animals of this planet. The individuality of the artist cannot be properly formed without the implementation of the principle of association. The future of humanity depends on the objective knowledge of art and science.

The obscure modernist and postmodernist assumption that value is subjective cannot be supported by a rational philosophy. Humanity gains nothing from meaningless expressions of modes of representation. Through the correct notion of perception, we learn in the study that to see is also to understand and to perceive art at the essential level, which recognizes the intentional consciousness of the artist. This means that nothing is denied to the artist of the value he or she possesses. Art qualities are always commensurate to what the artist understood and perceived before or at the inception of the art work. Therefore, the work is entitled to the due distinction and recognition it deserves. Under this precept, an array of reforms is needed to set forth a system that provides all individual artists the opportunity to achieve congenial conscious development.

A method and an authority for the distinction and recognition of values at all levels of artistic achievement should be unequivocally instituted. Qualitative distinction must follow an open philosophy of value that can be used to govern critical, historical judgments and the exchange value of works on the basis of their contribution to humanity and what supports the idea of social good, rather than “stylistic uniqueness” for the sake of the “New,” as H. Rosenberg suggested. Presently, the lack of such a philosophy defeats the existence of both private and public art institutions.

By a philosophy of value, I mean principally that the artist fulfills the particular intellectual needs of society and develops inductive and deductive capacity to arrive at the ideas that govern the employment and the representation of the various forms of knowledge at his or her disposal, to challenge and inspire public minds. The authority of defining values in art should not be left to the market, (the wolves), or to other ruthless, private speculative domains. All institutions should avoid compromising on real values and embrace the principle that advances the humanistic values of art as a common social project.

The public's desire to know and to learn about art, as well as the desire to participate in its intellectual developments, is not at all dormant even as I speak. This is most evident in the significant increase in museum attendances and the expansion of school curricula, but there is still much ambivalence and confusion as to what represents real social value in art. There must be a distinction between lower and higher arts. Confusion in today's system of individual and political rights is at the core of problems of the fine arts and the illnesses of society. For instance, under the fundamental principles of freedom, transgression or blasphemy, in any form of communication and artistic behavior as well, should not be covered by any political constitution, yet the first Amendment of the American Constitution admits it, which confuses both the arts and society as a whole.⁸¹

Many art institutions, in order to raise funds, proclaim that the arts, especially the "fine arts," enrich the quality of life, but they are not specific in what way this occurs. Fine arts' imagery has been at the forefront of visual aggression since the 1960s. There is only one way to enrich the quality of human life, and that is with human values, and for this to occur, a complete reversal of artists' ethical and moral standards as social individuals has to be erected vis-à-vis their art

⁸¹ The constitution, especially the right to freedom, supposed to reflect the fundamental principle sanctioned by the Enlightenment, which was the inspirational source of the fathers of the American Constitution. Yet we have experienced art works made with human blood, with body parts, with sexual paraphernalia, expressing much unneeded violence, masochism, blasphemy, etc. This fact appears graver because artists feel they have the right to impinge upon the constitutional rights of others. It is known that the fine arts can draw large audiences and enjoy much media attention by being controversial, original, and somehow challenging the status quo. Some artists would do anything to get media attention. Typical social phenomena of such widespread visual violence can be seen everywhere. Art is one of the many media that produce without a doubt examples of social irrational behavior that has dangerous psychological repercussions upon society. Images are powerful influences upon the psyche, especially on children's psyche. They can disrupt the harmonious functioning of the faculty of reason and the discriminating action or distinction between good and evil. We have witnessed how violent images can turn into violence in school violence in America. Granting the artist the freedom to perform such acts of social violence is against any principle of freedom and a disservice to society.

education. This work is exposing all that is wrong and all that should be done in the art education in order to expand and define art's special functions in society. A model for social policies at all levels (city, state, and the world) can be developed after this study becomes operative as a worldwide project to institute a universal research program for a better understanding of the ethics of art. However, ethical social studies of the arts should be a separate curriculum in order to produce the moral force that animated artists during the Renaissance.

Both in science and in philosophy, the term *reductivism* connotes a negative sense of narrow and partial understanding, or the application of limited knowledge of a particular subject. In particular, it denotes the missing relation of part and whole as particular and universal value. The antithesis to this state of affairs is an interdisciplinary approach to multiple views that reflect a broad application of other dimensions of knowledge over the broad spectrum of human existence. Being a part of a highly regarded profession, like that of artists, demands responsibility for possessing a broad philosophical, ethical, and scientific knowledge that meets the challenges for the exercise and advancement of the profession. In short, any serious profession is a fellowship that often requires the application of the latest knowledge and the sharing of information and resources with other fellow men of different disciplines under the purpose of common human ends. The common goal of all professions is to unite distinctive cultural and intellectual capacities for the achievement of common causes. It was a fact that Renaissance artists, with their interest and dedication, produced significant achievements in such a way to demand respect precisely for incorporating whatever degree of universal knowledge was available at the time into the idea and the thematic of art, thus placing the same on the highest level of humanistic achievements. Commitment to the advancement of art, sense of duty, study, and devotion became the trademarks of the art profession during the Middle Ages, and I find no convincing explanation that this fact should be ignored or suppressed.

Modern artists, although recognizing the greatness of the Renaissance, chose to relinquish any form of knowledge and exercise pretensions in its place, thus failing to implement the spirit of art as intellectual pursuit. Unity of purpose and excellence are, therefore, the virtues, the challenges, and the desires that have come to pass with the modern times. Photography has halted the interest in exact representation of forms. Art has evolved beyond representation, which means not abstract representation, but beyond conceptual structures of language that encompass the consciousness of the world and humanity as a whole. Those who do not understand this concept relinquish the idea that an artist can in actuality encapsulate the knowledge and the consciousness of the world in a work of art. Those who still believe that art is only play and representation and not a logical process of thought, or a rational discipline of the mind, undervalue the potential

conscious developmental capacity of both art and the artist as a potential social individual.

The historical, well rooted intellectual denial of art has not been included in any philosophical or scientific discourse, letting any inquirer assume that art arises from a state of nothingness⁸² is heresy. In conclusion, neither Sartre nor Heidegger could produce a feasible nihilistic theory, and no artist can ever prove the benefits of the art of negation. Heidegger-Sartre controversy was precisely due to an impossibility to even imagine a phenomenology of nothingness. One cannot justify the total disintegration and disappearance of the values of human existence as long as there are proofs of substantial values in natural history. Nothingness is not what our anthropology is about. Human beings change both mental and physical structures, in accordance with the natural laws—however positive or negative they may be, natural laws are operative at all levels of existence. Genetic intelligence, which normally moves toward enrichment and greater complexity, is not advancing at the same pace to render mental structures more efficient. The question is whether it may be reduced to *nothingness* simply by way of *forgetfulness*.

The Sartrian-Heideggerian controversy somehow leads to the core reasons retarding anthropology. The intellectual vacuity that affects the arts today has exactly the same effect. We may be comforted that total dissolution of human substance is not a possibility — not until after the total destruction of the human race; that substance may rest latent in the human mind and resuscitate when the moment comes. Erasure of genetic memory, though being a disturbing thought, is hard to imagine, which makes any work of art a product of culture, and as such it must carry the weight of human natural history. I have provided sufficient space in the main text and elaborated this thought with the help of M. Heidegger.

It is a fact that the idea of art has now undergone a philosophical denial that has certainly proven negative and detrimental to the intellectual growth of humankind.⁸³ Looking back at history, Modernist and Postmodern theorists somehow have been successful in erecting the hegemonic projection of art's intellectual demise, but have not envisioned the threats of its regressive mental conditions. This can be proved regardless the unavailability of scientific data, since art ignores any interdependence with the other disciplines of knowledge. No

⁸² J.P. Sartre failed to fully explain what a state of nothingness means in terms of conscious or unconscious state. My contention matches Hegel's notion of "natural consciousness," meaning that as long as there is existence, there is some level of consciousness. Sartre fell into contradiction when he failed to recognize existence in a philosophy of negation. Indeed, a dialectical discourse between being and nothingness should culminate in a nullity of mind. In practice though nothing is dispersed in the mind, even in the absence of conscious recollection, human substance cannot be claimed by sustaining a negation of being. The Einstein "string theory" project is yet to be proved, but it may one day demonstrate that there never was void before the creation of the universe.

⁸³ This point may not be quantified scientifically or mathematically, but it is clear that lack of appropriation of knowledge signifies lack of intellectual expansion thus a reverse of the anthropological process.

matter how one turns it around, the resulting idea of art devoid of knowledge is unacceptable under an anthropological standpoint. In other words, we can prove scientifically that ignorance makes no philosophical or anthropological sense, though its presence is quite evident in art literature.

Nihilism is a disregard and dispersion of intellectual energy and human intelligence, which does not require philosophical justification -- only identification and avoidance of the same. We all should be alerted by this consideration. One wonders what incapacitates an art critic to intervene with all his or her intellect before empty works of art. This study wants to reverse this condition by producing the most rational and updated interdisciplinary theoretical approach to art criticism. The need to correctly assess contemporary works beginning from the intentionality of the artist is most evident for human intention is prepared upon mental reflections, which by nature should be rational and constructive, like an architectural plan.

This conclusion makes art criticism not simply a rhetorical exercise, but one that is primarily analytic and synthetic as a method of extracting the real essence of the work of art that rests in the artist's memory after the work has been executed. Lastly, I arrive at the conclusion that critical work can be performed significantly only after having established a contextual basis for a phenomenological model of art criticism. In other words, I have laid out the way the mind works in a phenomenology of perception. The art critic must first follow the phenomenological grain of the coming into being of the work and then move to comparative qualitative judgments, not the other way around. Examples of this type of criticism, produced with the phenomenological method, have been included in the text, which should be of great help to future critics and for the general public interested in obtaining a critical eye.

Taking Modern Art's theories at face value, a work of art cannot simply be selected by way of comparison, as what is not been established as a model for the art expression does not possess validating powers. The only perfect or somehow perfect models of art expressions have been produced during the Renaissance. Some art critics begin their inquiry by searching for visual ambiguities as if the formal structures that have been rejected in the history of Modern art could be determined by analytical thinking. Then it is true that all art, sooner, or later, becomes formal once it has been introduced in a contextual frame of references. This would appear to be inconsistent with any type of rational logic and more so, self-contradictory.

Visual or imagistic ambiguities, by logical reasoning, do not pose a psychological problematic that could be treated as art in the realm of psychopathology. Art is the most rational construction of the mind. It is my opinion that, if it were not so, works unguided by reason would be displaced

outside the environment in which they were initially produced. Displacement from their original space of belonging would signify de-valuation and loss of their intrinsic and original significance, whatever it is. Placing a-rational works in a museum, as I said, results in a heresy because it decontextualizes all such institutions, defeating their purpose of preservation of universal values.⁸⁴

The authority that decides upon the selection of the work of art to be housed in a museum must evaluate its substance, while the virtual space cannot be confused with the contextual space where the artist lives and works. The artist begins the work in his or her studio, in the streets, or in the field, and that is where the work belongs and where it should remain. In sum, assuming that the museum is a political center intended as *polis* in the Aristotelian sense, the rule is that the work should not be placed in museums unless it addresses common universal values or speaks an ideal language established as a universal model. In other words, the museum must first establish the principles of “historical preservation” before preserving anything.

Should this argument make any sense, it will call for banishment of all desecrations of cultures and traditions, of religious images, etc. and define unethical and immoral everything that violates the right to freedom of thought, of speech, of religions and more. In an ethical model of historical preservation any linguistic product, unless produced by an ethical structure, that is, under moral principles, could not be recognized as art. Under such disciplines, the artist would have ethical responsibilities like any other individual in the exercise of public functions; he or she would have control over his or her sensuous experiences and knowledge, to form meaningful linguistic expressions and initiate positive perceptual, cognitive processes in the mind of others, which proves that language cannot be but an organization of signs and images in all human expressions, art included.⁸⁵ —

The paradoxes of Modern Art become heresies when implanted in the minds of the public and thus pass as historical landmarks and spiritual accomplishments. The major hypocrisy is the one that advocates art for the masses without a definition of language. When the interest in art does not go beyond the little social

⁸⁴ By this I mean to say that a work of art is the product of certain environmental conditions—once the conditions are removed, as by transporting it into a museum, the work loses linguistic and contextual meaning, which is the same as losing the right to exist.

⁸⁵ Otherwise, what good can we attribute to a disorganization of imagery other than a senseless language? What we see with the eyes of illusion has always relative meaning. Some chimpanzees and some donkeys can paint as well as many abstract artists. With this I want to say that I welcome any argument that would make me change my mind. Otherwise, no one can object to my phenomenological statement before finding a more correct definition of language. My statement connotes with one of the many contradictions of Modern Art reflecting both philosophical and psychological ambiguities of values. The doctrine of Modern Art seems to be “the emptier and the more confused the images are, the more widespread acceptance they receive, and the more institutional support they receive.” This phenomenon allows value to be dispersed or connoted with chaos.

games and the pretenses that will procure popular acclaim and financial returns, there is an apparent belief that everything is language because we can always furnish a semiotic interpretation and formalize its acceptance.

The control over the pluralistic idea of art by art entrepreneurs is something other than an expression of language. The hegemony that supports and sustains market demands and assures monetary value to art collections at the expenses of the intellectual growth of the arts is made of empty language, that is, based on the pretension that what the artist is saying is of as much intellectual and humanistic value as its basis for human comprehension. In other words, the study explains how manipulation of the idea of art, phenomenologically speaking, affects the socio-cultural development of the masses. Governments of the Western world treat the arts as modes per se without demanding rationality and feasibility of ideas in the context of a political system and simply make political decisions based on general consensuses built with common hegemonic methods.⁸⁶

Art is the best assets of humanity. A crime against this very asset is also one that interdicts or annihilates the interest, the knowledge, and the vision of human destiny. Some artists believe we should go back to our animal, instinctual life—in other words, back to primordial times, which shows in their works—and reverse the anthropological course of development, but mankind is supposed to have overcome the primordial, instinctual life in favor of *intellectus archetipus* millions of years ago. Intellectual development must go on or there will be no science or philosophy. Obviously, it is not by producing art as representation of animal behavior that we improve the understanding and the positivity of human intelligence. The thinkers of the 18th century equated animal nature with lack of spirituality. Spirituality is that which places mankind above the animal nature and to the level of the divine creation of nature itself. The human spirit is not something we are endowed with from birth. It is something that evolves within the human mind. Evolution of the human spirit is establishing the validity of the inner substance, in harmony with the recognition of the powers and the limits of human freedom. The consciousness of human nature is precisely the highest attainment of

⁸⁶ Skillful entrepreneurs can produce strategies that conceal the real motives behind tax deductible contributions to museum institutions, art foundations, and other non-profit organizations that spend public money—money that instead of going to social programs go to benefit the private circle of friends and to expand the private industry of art. This state of affairs has been going on since the 1940s and 1950s. The recycling of financial resources being passed from the so-called entrepreneur-patrons and museums is now a perfected system that enriches both the entrepreneur and the institution. __

substance, thus the overcoming, rather than the re-enactment, of man's lower instincts and inclinations.

Anthropology, I have explained, is a commitment to total denial of primordial behavior and advancement of the behavior we acquire through perceptual knowledge in time. I have called this in the main text "positive anthropology." An artist should not cultivate the illusion of liberation from a cultural environment by falling back to a state of ignorance, but endure actual freedom by conscious synthesis and expansion of his or her own culture projecting the universality of values that provide connections with the rest of the world. An empty mind placed before an empty canvas is not the beginning of a project of substantial synthesis and development of a positive anthropological discourse. The language produced by any synthetic thought is usually determined by the distillation of an entire process of definitions of value.

Art is merely taught in schools as the history of imagery and image-making, as a discipline that ignores the very meaning of spirituality. It is amazing how many artists of the 1950s, influenced by psychoanalysis and transcendental meditation, searched for spirituality in the wrong places, like the teaching of Zen and other forms of Buddhism and, at the same time, used images of violence, destruction, and desecration of cultural traditions. Some historians alleged that the paradigm switch was stylistic and an attempt to overcome the geometry of Cubism, which may just be another historical heresy because facts prove the existence of diverse reactionary phenomena at the basis of their art.⁸⁷

This idea became a driving force for the many generations that followed. But, although faking spirituality provided an instant success, the works failed to advance the idea of art, or that of a positive social criticism. It can be said, instead, that it turned out to be exaltation and acceptance of the very problems of society. Yet these works have been placed in museums, which by that time had become the altars of anything humankind does, under the belief that they deserve eternal glory for they can stand the test of time.

⁸⁷ Abstract Expressionism's mode of expression, judging from the works of Franz Kline (1910-1962), Robert Motherwell (1915-1991), Willem de Kooning (1904-1997), Robert Rauschenberg (b. 1925), et al., started as any other movement, as a reaction to existing sociological conditions, but produced irreconcilable contradictions between the meaning of human expressions and man's spirituality. Interpreted at a historical distance the work of these artists, no matter their price tags, are not sufficient examples of intellectual pursuit. On the contrary, they forfeited the meaning of humanity and anthropology in favor of images that only denote the lower side of human nature, which adduces no spirituality. After that, Pop Art popularized and monumentalized objects of the lower consumerist culture as "ready-made" linguistic signs in the Duchampian fashion, as if the same could be elevated to venerable spiritual status. These works, mostly executed by artists formerly employed in advertising, such as A. Warhol, Jasper Johns (b. 1930), Claes Oldenberg (b. 1929), Roy Liechtenstein (1923-1997) et al., simply exploited the psychology of advertising and merchandising and succeeded in their recognition as aesthetic objects. Essentially, the theory that any image or object can be placed before an observer/consumer and become an aesthetic object, simply is a political statement that supports capitalist ideology.

The geniuses of humankind are hard to define. These great examples of intelligence, champions of knowledge, represented in museums and other public institutions, have been presented to newer generations of artists and to the world as *non-plus-ultra* models of intelligence and cultural inspiration. We, normal humans instead, are now supposed to open the history books, be impressed by the glossy reproductions of their epic gestures, and believe the widespread, imaginative interpretation of greatness exerted by critics and historians under the auspices of the trusted financial institutions that sponsored them. But there are things we are not supposed to learn: we are not supposed to learn that Jackson Pollock, for instance, was a simple mind with an erratic behavior, that he was under therapy for complex mental disorders, and that he died after he impacted his car against a tree while driving intoxicated. At this point in history, we should make up our own mind and decide whether to acclaim a work of art for the high prices his works have reached at public auctions, or pity him for his complex psychotic conditions, for his alcoholism, for his personal frustrations about his own artistic inadequacies clearly shown in his works, which he himself often denounced.

Now, where is the mind discipline, the consciousness, and the wisdom that should accompany and inspire a “creative” intelligence? Are these abstract scribbling and doodling like children at play to be interpreted for more of what they are? What are the qualitative theories that sustain such high aesthetic value? Are these supposedly magnificent examples of humanity represented in museums and public spaces all over the world supposed to inspire generations to come and stand as cornerstones of the primordial examples of humanity? Shouldn’t we consider these works as part of natural history rather than art history? If so, why are we paying so much attention to products of ordinary culture? According to these artists, we are supposed to believe that “abstract art” stands as a twentieth century Copernican Revolution, and it should be re-enacted in contemporary behavior, as if 30,000 years of civilization did nothing to improve our DNA structures.

However, the primary lesson to obtain from these works is that they say precisely what they show as visual language, that primordial forms of expression should be accepted solely for the language they purport, and that they are poor signs of a political metaphor, which does not help in building better societies or to induce cultural or aesthetic values. What becomes an abstraction loses conceptual meaning, which does not engage the mind of the viewer. Therefore, those who claim to perceive Modern Art in the correct way are either dreamers, or they are infatuated by critical manipulations.

At this point in history, distinguishing between what contributes and what takes away from the true perception of art makes not only philosophical sense, but anthropological sense. We have the duty and obligation to reform the concept of

art for the future in spite of the hegemonic supremacy of art institutions and in order to convey to society a correct system of beliefs as art. To this end, the concept of art should undergo a general historical catharsis of *cancellatio memoriam* just as it was practiced by the Romans. We must strip away the prejudice that has been incorporated in the perception of art during the last one hundred years and leave solely what is historically necessary. One cannot erect a history of art by building stupidity upon stupidity, illusions upon illusions, and dreams upon dreams, because, like crumbling bricks, all non-constructive notions will have to be dismantled at one point or another.

The concept of the work of art must be restored in its integrity, in accordance with its rational human substance and its linguistic force and dignity recognized to represent the best of humanity. This is my wish. My argument can be taken as purely speculative without following the entire argument of the text that supports my thesis. I am convinced that I am proposing a major change in the history of art because I have discovered and laid bare its historical necessity. The work I have undertaken during the last 35 years has the purpose of correcting the problems that disrupt humanistic advancements and that produce alienation and exclusion from the *teleological* holistic structures of the world.

I believe artists must grow intellectually in order to overcome the prejudice of their historicity and win a place in society. To grow intellectually means to advance a conscious vision of the world beyond “cultural” indoctrination, or what is normally taken for granted. Truth must be discovered autonomously and phenomenologically. Art’s social function and what makes it a part of the historical and ontological process of humanity must be understood and set as priority in art projects. When humans choose to be artists, they must know to have become a part of a profession that compels serious intellectual work. The notion of social duty, thus, must be re-instituted in order to provide this category of workers and thinkers with social and intellectual legitimacy. The public at large should also be educated to perceive artists as innovators and precursors of a better and brighter future.

Prejudice is narrowness of the mind and must be eradicated from the perception of art; it is a major vehicle of ideological disenfranchisement from the immense possibilities open to art and prevents humanity from being the sole source of truth and inspiration. This truth can be tested against the complex contradictions of the massive critical literature that fills art libraries around the globe, which nurture exogenous critical writings that abstract the idea of art for the sake of subjective ego aggrandizement and notoriety. The more prejudice is nurtured in the arts, the more confused artists and their audience grow.

I dedicated a whole chapter on the criticism of art, first to determine its fundamental principles and then to prove that the Modern history of art and of its

criticism is a history of alienations, subjectivism, prejudice and powers that repress developments. The main text proves also that subjectivism decontextualizes art's legitimate concerns for truth and nature and deprives the arts of their philosophical legitimacy. Let me remind the reader that the idea of art was born in the cradle of philosophy, not in the private life stories of the critic or the historian.

All this drives the logical discourse of art to a dead point and makes the public more ignorant and more confused. The signs of a displacement of the idea and the perception of art can also be seen by the realization that there is one substantial unity in humanity carrying forward existential meaning, Kant's called for a true identification of the potential natural history of humankind. The future of the idea of art is undoubtedly tied with the future of humankind. This truth cannot be ignored. Art must, therefore, be perceived in this contextual unity and essential substance if it wants to grow intellectually.

Correction of the perception of art must, obviously, start in the schools. Under the present condition, students of art continue to inherit the same aporias passed them onto them by previous generations and the vicious circle continues to the point of "creating" false customs and tradition.⁸⁸

The movement, as I said earlier, was another social revolt against bourgeois collectors, but the destruction of art imagery never does solve or re-align the problematic of art and never establishes a meaningful humanistic dialogue for the good of society. The level of the social discourse often undertaken by artists often does not transcend qualitatively and never touches upon important and fundamental principles of humanity and culture. At the end, the artist's image is always the same: the producer of commodities for an industry that supports his or her material needs.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Although the DaDa movement was utterly psychologized, psychology could not identify its real intent; thus any of the literature written on this movement remains approximate, incomplete, and distorted, like everything else. I include a quotation from R. Huelsenbeck's *Memoirs of a DaDa Drummer* (1991). Huelsenbeck (1892-1974) was conscious of the problems of art, though, not necessarily possessed the philosophical tools to arrive at their solution. However, he cared to remind us that

DaDa contains a protest, a strong sentimental judgment of the artist
of our time, and, at the same time, a concomitant complaint for under-evaluation. (p. 63)

⁸⁹ Here the dialectic of "master and slave" to be found in the text is most appropriate and most revealing., which shows that beyond the production and exchange of commodities, there must be a university of knowledge to provide artists with the necessary intellectual tools and epistemological formation so as to develop new forms of language and a renewed idea of humanity within the core of the social organism.

The DaDa movement did not constitute a body of knowledge of its own for self-advancement and self-realization. This limitation precluded its own very existence as concretization of its socio-cultural philosophy. It could be said that the problems of the world would not be affecting humanity so gravely if the production of art expressions had been reconciled with the obligation of the artist to raise its state of consciousness. When a body of critical or historical thought is not present with an expanded consciousness to point out the truth and stimulate ideas and/or to render them clear in the mind of an audience, there is no message and no substantial and referential ground for artists to advance and for the world to correct the course of events. What remains is mere absence of thought, bringing the process to a halt. This is why the questions “What is art?” and “What is its role in society?” was unanswered during the DaDa movement and remains unanswered today.

Heidegger, in his book *Poetry, Language, Thought* (1971, p. 17) offered a definition of art: “Art...[is] no more than a word to which nothing real corresponds anymore.” This predicament is a historic realization that should compel thinkers to reexamine the specific problems concerning the nature of art, its conceptual and perceptual structures, its potential values, and its roles in society and in the world. Instead, according to Heidegger, art embodied in its generic and comprehensive term embodies the multiple reasons that destroy its own tradition, that activate all the negative forces operating in its history, and that dispersed meaning and substance.

As we proceed with the study, it becomes clear that the need to reintroduce a sense of humanity becomes an endemic necessity in the concept of art as part of recovering its intrinsic nature. I feel we must return this value to the idea of art and never take it away, or we reduce art to a common exchange of labor and commodities. This point, obviously, should be the starting point that also restores the correct principles in the system of support. The question is how to turn this logical end of thematic concern into a project of continuing research in schools and universities.

The transcending character of the human mind demands that all concepts, not just art, be expanded in relation to the changing dimensional ground of human existence. Because of the nature of the human mind, the perception of art cannot be static or groundless. This industry cannot manufacture in perpetuity ephemeral objects for mass consumption and call them art, ignoring arts true potential, concealing and substituting its true values, depriving humanity of its ontological tradition, and ultimately, retarding anthropology as a whole.

Under this condition, artists will continue to have no status, no dignity, no freedom, and no individuality. The Dadaists R. Huelsenbeck, George Grosz (1893-1959), and even M. Duchamp reiterated the need for a humanistic change—

not a change of style, as reported by historians, but one of human substance. I have often wondered why an artist of such intellect as Marcel Duchamp chose to play the part of the *enfant terrible*—in other words, becoming a disobeying artist, disobeying not only society's rules, but the most fundamental philosophical principles of humanity. Did artists of his time mean what they said? DaDa's attitude can now be seen also as a childish revolt against the bourgeoisie's dominance, because of philosophical ignorance. However, at one point, like workers on strike, these artists did compromise and gave up their idea of humanity. The publicity about their work was at the time recognized, which was what they wanted, and each went on selling his own work at high prices.⁹⁰

Establishing a philosophy of substance and of its essential meaning in art will at one point or another be required, as it is required in any other field or discipline of knowledge.⁹¹ This is what E. Husserl called the *eidetic* meaning hidden in a misinterpreted and unrealized natural history, which is an analytical movement of the past and present as synthesis, and as guidance for facing the future of humankind. Ultimately, this point suggests a new interpretation of art history from the phenomenological standpoint thus altogether approaching it from all angles, in order to identify and discard the given prejudicial conditions that hinder its growth and transcendence. Again, it is necessary to equip ourselves with a body of fundamental phenomenological knowledge in order to confront the entire problematic of the history of art, i.e., equip ourselves with the correct interpretive tools. This is what I attempted to do in the text.

I believe this study is needed by those who make art, those who criticize it, and those who look at it to attain an intellectual perceptual enhancement and inspiration. Indeed, phenomenology can help us foresee the potential development and the corresponding influence of art in time under this true and expanded contextual historical whole. The logic that consolidates humanistic validity under these premises is that the more knowledge is implemented in the genealogy of the

⁹⁰ Sadly, historians have not established DaDa's true intention or encouraged any study on the subject. DaDa was an event that can be described as an unduly reaction to contingent forces and to non-congenial states of affairs, more than an evolution of the idea of art, though its influence on Modern and Postmodern Art is still all too evident. Moreover, had America understood DaDa's initial intentions and entered into a dialogue, Huelsenbeck alluded there would have been a different history of art (paraphrased). The statement may bear some truth, but without a congenial discourse in place, historical confusion remains all-pervasive. Perhaps, one day, if this work will be understood, a dialogue and an open forum aimed at determining the true intentionality of DaDa and whether their notion of "substance" was introduced and pursued by the movement will be initiated.

⁹¹ In the main text I emphasize this need repeatedly, because without a clear notion of substance the entire edifice of human knowledge is deprived of a *raison d'être*.

perception of art, the greater is its expansion of the meaning and the values that constitute its consciousness. The reader shall come to realize that, if the true meaning of art constitutes itself naturally as a logical structural consciousness, the expression of art is likewise infinitely richer.

One of the principles of a structural, rational consciousness is that to every reflection corresponds a renewed perception, and to every perception corresponds a new realization and expansion of the initial idea. Let us try to apply this concept in art, but also show that much more is possible, because nothing is static, dogmatic and deterministic in the human mind. The developmental dynamism of the mind has no confines. It is as infinite as the natural laws that develop it. (Remember Einstein's pronouncement that our brain only uses 10% of its capacity). Our human minds are a part of the infinite, growing complexity of nature. Nothing should, therefore, be dogmatically assumed or presupposed even in this study. It is sufficient for us to follow the phenomenological development of reality to keep abreast of the life-world, according to Husserl. Heidegger encompassed this notion with a finite concept of authentic existence. Everything we know about art must be put to the phenomenological analytical test of reason and integrated into the greater context of humanity.

This study is an exercise of thought on the part of the writer and the reader. The reader is invited to join me in this circular revolving and reworking of intellectual material — in this spiraling movement toward the center, the *fulcrum* of substance. Again, this is the typicality and the dynamic of the phenomenological method. Therefore, I can only ask to be forgiven for the difficulties that simulate my agony in the writing of the text during such extended time, not for what appear as redundancies of discourse, which are a part of the process of reflection and the process of perceptual expansion. This includes going back to some unfinished concept and reintroducing it in a new light. The phenomenological method makes us realize all too often that a particular subject, a concept, or an idea may be in need of restructuring and that new treatments under new and expanded contextual conditions are needed until it is rendered plausible to the mind of the writer. This just identifies with my process of thought. Until then, any view from a different angle may be taken as partial in order to render the idea plausible, organic, and applicable. Ultimately, a thought may be in need of new language in order to broaden or narrow its meaning, its sense, its validity, and so on and so forth.

Important meaning cannot be spared of necessary reasoning, analysis, and synthesis. This is to say that there should be an economy of language, but not of meaning, especially in the interpretation of art works. I have great hopes to have contributed to the establishment that art as a humanistic endeavor with all the ethical, social, and philosophical implications, not a mode to entertain the senses.

Indeed, this is a large book, and for this reason, I was tempted to cut or to eliminate entire sections of this work which I now find indispensable because pertinent and relational to the core intention of reforming the concept of art. I felt the discourse must fulfill itself with maximum plausibility and flow of ideas. Elimination would be like depriving the reader of the opportunity to scrutinize the writer's process of thought in its entirety from which understanding and perception derives. For this reason, I feel that, philosophically speaking, all writings, as the late Derrida confirmed, should show motion toward expansion and refinement of both the idea and the language that identifies the intentional meaning. After all, the circular perceptual process must proceed progressively as a method much in the same way it occurs in the mind, and that is with the full participation of all the brain faculties. Consciousness has a specific cathartic function in its progressive embodiment of meaning, which must ultimately contribute toward the *arkhe* of art, namely the substance to be retained and projected toward the future.

As I have said before, the meaning of art can be found neither in the Old nor the New Testament. Art is a human invention that signifies something intended, conceived, and made by men, though different and qualitatively higher than ordinary things. We often speak of "state of the arts," the art of "this" or "that." Therefore, art has nothing to do with religion, but as I mentioned, it is often compared with it. Humans decide what art is in relation to general and universal intellectual needs, i.e., assigning proper humanistic and social functions in time and history. This is our time to decide what art should be in terms of fulfilling the intellectual and spiritual needs of our time.

The criteria of time should then meet the necessity and temporality as historical time, for history and anthropology are ongoing processes, and thus more than the quantitative concepts of *chronos*, in order to help us establish the qualitative standards of human values. This subject needed to be fully treated in this study because of the existential importance we give to the process of art history. The notion of time can be said to be rather controversial and, therefore, misunderstood to the point that some people know not in what period we live and cannot gauge their existence as process of becoming.

When it comes to time and history, we must expect art to carry forward the special meaning that our anthropological development requires. We want the language of art to communicate to us special meaning and to convey the same special feelings the author and the artist experienced. Communication in art means sharing one's experience intersubjectively, which means to bring the audience to the level of the artist's thought. The communication of a positive feeling, like that of a human emotion pregnant with positive meaning, is what we should consider at least to accompany all works of art. Because art is a humanistic activity covering the context of what humanity is about, we ought to explore the

feelings that animate our sense of humanity. We cannot call art that which communicates less than what human feelings or human thoughts can recognize as valuable, otherwise the feeling is something else, such as what we call emotions or mere physical stimuli, like bewilderment, fear, anxiety, etc., that have much to do with impressions of the psyche and little with thought. Feelings arise from experiential thought, for the latter is their real mold and that of all life experiences. That is why Freudian theories are less than useful when we come to determine the nature of art. They were designed after Freud's own psychological experiences and, thus, took after his very own idiosyncrasies. Thought produces feeling. All we feel about art was historically conveyed and bequeathed to us as thought and remembrances. As a result, we need to define our thoughts in order to understand correct feelings.

Again, art was born in the cradle of philosophy, understood as a highly conceptualized form of human expressions belonging to the highest form of reason, according to Kant's aesthetics and the highest sensibility of human nature. Anything outside these parameters is to be identified as psychological and pathological. Freud eluded this particular point and referred all art to Greek tragedies for their alleged psychological and mythical significance. The fact is that only processes of rational thought lead to the realization of true feelings, and like all thought, feelings seek the ultimate realization of logical completion and satisfaction. Example: we all want to know why we feel in a certain way rather than another; why we like or dislike a work of art, something, or someone.

This study shows that the correct interpretation of human feelings helps establish the correct evaluation of art from ontological and social perspectives. It is my belief that, because of the misinterpretation of human feelings, anything humanistic, desirable and good, which was displaced in the era of Modernism. Freudian theories were the major influences because of the confusion he made between feelings and emotions. The Surrealist manifesto, it is clear, was influenced by the same theories and by the methods of psychoanalysis. After Freud, the Jungian and Fromm's theories of the mythological and the unconscious were introduced, turning art into a *mélange* of confused ideas. Psychoanalysis grew at the time more complex and more invasive as well, claiming to have some bearings on the concept of art, but no theorist or historian could make anything of these writers. Even Gombrige was at loss when he came to define art by psychoanalytic means. Psychological theories normally come to a stop before any type of esoteric or metaphysical speculations. As a result, an array of psychological and historical fallacies has been introduced into art so as to confuse and reduce its

concept to an entirely abstract dimension.⁹² I have tried to establish in the main text some logical dimension of the psychological and philosophical understanding of the act of perception. A distinction between the scopes and methods of philosophy and psychology was then necessary. The natural performance of our intellectual faculties and our senses is discoverable scientifically now more than ever. We have now the scientific reasons that establish what goes on the mind of the perceiver, and with this knowledge, we can now rectify the perception of art for the good of humanity. There is no question in my mind that art must be perceived inside the mind as an idea encompassing the entire concept of humanity and anthropology, rather than as impression upon our senses. In the impression, the perceiver is not an active participant, but a targeted object, consumer, often a victim, like in commercial advertising. This is as good as a historical realization of the Newtonian theory of gravity or Einstein's theory of relativity. Most importantly, if we are rational beings, if we have a rational reason to define the perception of art, why in the world should we not use it?

Under the present condition, who is to say that we are not all affected by the psychopathology of art? The reader will do well to re-examine and compare, with the help of the text, the ideal notion of individuality from a phenomenological perspective as to come to know what it really means to be an "individual." The social individual can be described made of structural reason. I say that, if rationality is fully maintained as a self-conscious, logical structure of behavior, there is no room for pathologies to be accounted for. Actually, I say that, to this effect, there can be a single rational theory of art that reflects the sanity of the individual, which discounts what many believe about art being pathological in every sense. The psychology and the pathology of art can only start with unconscious irrational behavior—that is, with the belief that the unconscious is an inevitable component of the art process—while it is only a state of ignorance with respect to cognitive developments.⁹³

⁹² Among the many influential works that displaced and distorted the idea of art, I mentioned earlier was the work of historian E. H. Gombrich's *Art and Illusion* (1969). Representation is not only illusion, but for Gombrich, "any scientific study of art is psychology" (taken from his introductory quotation of Max Friedlander).

⁹³ In fact, I personally believe that self-consciousness is the cure of all mental illnesses. If that lady who drowned her own five children in Houston, Texas, in 2000 had the discipline to stop and think rationally about the meaning of her behavior, she would have not committed that horrible crime. If Jeffrey Dahmer, the serial killer, had exercised power of reflection and self-analysis, he too would not have committed his horrible crimes.

The concept of art cannot be abstracted or mythologized as a product of the unconscious and deprived of due reflection either—i.e., without the recognition of rational thought intervention, we may arrive at justifying these killers and say that art performances or making a work of art under these conditions is a “murder” of artistic intelligence. If everything can be art because one is an artist, the actions, I am sure, if taken as works of art, would not be reduced to pathologies but will end up in a fine art museum, rather than in a museum of natural history.

I mean to say that the general state of the arts is and remains pathological until there is a rational structure of thought in place. Under the existing belief of art as unconscious activity any process of thought may be rendered pathological. Then I ought to consider myself crazy as well for choosing the discipline of reason as proof of reality’s self-evidence. I feel the notion of ontology as a model of being and phenomenology being a method of research to establish such model of self-evidence to be identified after the writing of this book because it helps identify art history’s misleading notions, false beliefs, idiosyncrasies, and fallacies. The moment we consolidate the belief that artistic expressions, in order to bear value, cannot but be the products of consciousness, its historical fallacies are automatically corrected.

Phenomenology can prove that the written history of art is a history of illusions, of false geniuses, and of unearned fame and glory. If we have arrived at the conclusions that there are more logical and necessary reasons for making art, what is written in this treatise becomes a part of a corrective historical process—a process of historical realization and a firm desire for accuracy and truth—not for the sake of fame and fortune, but for the sake of new constructive developments of humanity. If we may say that the birth of Arteology as the science of art represents a historical beginning of study and research, we may also believe that history, not glory, is being made here. Shakespeare, in *Henry VI*, mentioned that glory is a “circle in the water” because it overturns all virtues and everything else in ways of illusion.

One of the most enticing and powerful thoughts to be found in the text is Heidegger’s concept of the *equipmental* qualities of *Dasein*, whose “*most-potentiality-for-being*” manifests itself as *resoluteness* of intents, typical of the character of the *genius*—a character holding a strong belief and resoluteness of being like a soldier in battle. Resoluteness is a state of mind that brings to a whole and completion a positive thought and projects the same forward thus another virtue of the good soldier.

What is the individual quality that provides the powers of change? Let me reiterate that the understanding of the individual is what Heidegger brought to completion (1962, p. 386) since he understood the powers of directive imagination, a power that has its basis on reason, perception, and understanding. His view of the

individual *ahead-of-itself* as *anticipation* of the future of being is the most important tenet to passed onto the contemporary artist, because the potential qualities of being can be held true by projecting the temporality of understanding and perception, by manifesting that which implements the future as present, and consequently, by bringing changes into existence. I have put to work this important concept as erection of the artist's individuality in the text, which, I hope, will rekindle the reader's interest.

This is an important point that raises artistic individuality to a virtue. The virtues of mankind are represented only by those qualities brought to the level of higher nature, which bring metaphysical values to a reachable limit for both art and life. Reality of being is a condition we as humans can overcome. We must begin to perceive reality at its inception, not at its ends. From the illusions of "creation" (*creare*) arise the ubiquitous freedom and the false values of Modern Art; from the humility of human existence, instead, arises the truthfulness of being human. One, for instance, may be under the illusion of "creating" when intuition and imagination strike as an idea coming from the outside of our process of thinking. Illusion is to believe that something is occurring out of the dynamic of logical thought. A search for the objectivity of an idea should then be mandatory so as to produce an assessment of its true worth before undertaking the production of art.⁹⁴

I have tried to provide ample proof that what is wrongly attributed to "creativity" should instead be attributed to the capacity of all the faculties to produce new ideas by working in perfect synchronism and not just by the imagination alone. The capacity, in a nut shell, is structural coordination, rational organization, deductive and inductive capacity of mental resources. In other words, artists, like any other individuals, need both hemispheres of the brain working in perfect harmony and a holistic mental organization exerting maximum efficiency. I believe I have proved satisfactorily that such synchronism arises as a set of efficient causes and under a discipline of intentions; thus, when art is intended as the result of accidental or even supernatural events, it is like turning the organization of the mind into a metaphysical abstraction. In the sum, art manifests itself as conscious, analytical, synthetic capacity and projection of the faculties towards new developments, just like an architect or an engineer building a bridge. Allowing the natural organization of the mental faculties to satisfy the potentialities of freedom of expression is to exploit their full potential.

⁹⁴ Nietzsche, in *Twilight of the Idols* (1986, Expedition of Untimely Man), mentioned that a genius is a prodigal being who "expends himself" in the acts of reason and understanding, which leaves us perplexed, since he always believed in the Dyonisian-Apollonian dialectic as the internal conflict of the artist. Thus hope is on the way, for the dialectic can have conclusive ends.

I want to show that, under the wise direction and coordination of a rational consciousness, there are no conflicts among the faculties of reflection, reason, perception, intuition, cognition, judgment, and imagination. The production of a work of art is thus a conscious desire of the will to seek communication of knowledge under a single conscious command. This harmonic work of the faculties is a natural mental predisposition that equates with the Heideggerian term *equiprimordial*, which clearly explains what we refer to as “creativity.”

We see in children such predisposition to potential development more often than in adults, but even in them we must not forget that there is a consciousness in the making. However, only in a mature mind we find the magnitude and refinement of conscious knowledge. The systematic and qualitative growth in young Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (1756-1791) or young Felix Mendelssohn (1809-1847), for instance, demonstrates constant projections of enrichment of the harmonic qualities of the faculties, which shows that even though they were considered geniuses at an early age, their mature works are infinitely greater than the ones produced in childhood. The causal perceptual circularity concept is, therefore, sufficient proof that intellectual development is a natural process of enrichment and self-assurance, which produces the so-called “geniuses.”

The work of a genius could be measured except *vis a vis* his intellectual accomplishments. This is the case of all geniuses, from Da Vinci to Einstein because in a mature work the intellect is both the source and the receiver of substantive thought.

Nietzsche, again in *Twilight of the Idols*, had difficulty in defining the work of a Genius, especially after his disappointing assessment of Wagner. The apes are not geniuses because they do not hold ideals and neither do those actors that recite a script without interpreting it. Artistic behavior can take many forms in society so as to perform any part from which nothing of value emerges. The artist as shown in history strives for greatness and takes on many contrasting roles that dilute the intellect. In *The Birth of Tragedy* (1967), Nietzsche denounces the artist-actor “buffoon” who uses very popular instruments as pretension and who hypocritically makes people think he can set himself above human understanding.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ This is the case of Marcel Duchamp who, like a child, took pleasure in playing with images, ridiculing history and calling it art. The worst part of history is that critics and historians took him seriously and they too joined “the game of art.” Of course, art can be also a “urinal” or a Mona Lisa with mustaches, which shows how far an artist can go in implementing freedom of expression, but how many children have drawn mustaches on the face of the Mona Lisa before Duchamp? If the unfettered freedom of a child in the artist decides to do such things, we recognize and admit it as such, but if Duchamp attempts the same he purportedly is declared a “superior” artist and is able to initiate a whole tradition of contemporary trends.

What meaningful thing can be said about a urinal hanging in a museum, meaningful to humanity, historically and anthropologically valid, one must wonder. Do we want blind acceptance or analysis to precede qualitative judgments in the work of art? Some would like to see the two Mona Lisa's hanging side by side in the Louvre. At best, Duchamp action used a clever exploitation of the dichotomies, ignorance and pretension that distinguish the "gurus" of art. Duchamp was the first of an array of clever artists, who recognized that misappropriation of notable images such as the Mona Lisa, The Virgin Mary or the other masterpieces of the Louvre, can be excellent vehicles for obtaining notoriety and fame.⁹⁶

It was Hegel, and then Husserl and Heidegger, who taught us to perceive a phenomenon for its essential nature, so it would be arbitrary for a phenomenologist to see in Duchamp's work what is not in the picture of his Mona Lisa. Therefore, as in any other work of art, an insignificant phenomenon can only initiate a causality of more insignificant phenomena. This is the case of Duchamp and Picabia, who can be said to be the predecessors of Pop Art and to have initiated a tradition of insignificant phenomena. Art critics and art historians found DaDa artists to be extravagant at first, but as usual, the market has shown to be capable to absorb a variety of art works, especially when the purpose is to satisfy the bourgeoisie's needs for entertainment. In fact, Duchamp, after the initial rejections and controversies, was finally granted recognition, and his work began to sell.

It was Leibniz who taught us to understand the monad in relation to and how it can affect an entire *monadology*. According to this principle, Duchamp must be judged from the perspective, not only of art, but of world history, and a universal history, since his work is now in every major museum of the world. The question is: What can the world learn from Duchamp's work today and what are the values he has bequeathed to humanity? The artist by his behavior remains insignificant, for there is no contribution of real knowledge and no constructive humanistic quality expressed in his work as an individual monad. Therefore, we cannot continue to enlarge, mystify, or even transcend a metaphor of stupidity as if it contained historical values.

Phenomenology asks us to interpret reality for reality's sake, which is the same as dealing with a phenomenon as such. One cannot change iron into gold or recognize human values where there are none. The context of a stupid work of art is its stupidity as such because it provides us neither with a particular nor universal

⁹⁶ I must mention that many Impressionist, Post-Impressionist and Cubist artists, including Picasso used on a regular basis easel and brushes to copy masterpieces such as Goya (1746-1828), Diego Velázquez (1599-1660), Jacques-Louis David (1748-1825), et al.

value. In Duchamp's case, we must relate the work he left to the world as such, i.e., in the context of art as part of a natural human history and anthropology. We cannot do the opposite and judge human nature from the perspective of the subjectivity or stupidity of the critic who too is in search of same notoriety. To pursue an illusion or a false value and project the same in history is a dangerous idea, but this is what the history of art is about.

As to the notion of illusions, Husserl made the perceptual analogy of a cube in space: at a distance, the cube looks spherical and does not show itself as an angular shaped object until we come close to it. Only then can we perceive the phenomenon as phenomenon. Of course, from afar, one can fantasize and produce numerous interpretations of art works, until we come close to the artist's mind and relate the intention with the expression of art. Only then we can deduct its essential values—in other words, after we identify the phenomena that have brought the work into being.

An object made by a human is not only a volumetric addition to the physical world, but something that initiates physical, cultural, and psychological causalities. We learn in Chapter Seven that a critical interpretation must be based on these substantial interpretations. Ultimately, the work of art must bring to the mind of the viewer the true perception of the original phenomena perceived and interpreted by the artist, and most importantly, it must convey the intentional message, exactly as to what the artist wants to say with a particular work of art.⁹⁷ Two important questions of a work of criticism should be present: In what context does the work acquire value? For what reasons should the work be preserved?

In order to pass the test of time, a work of art must satisfy not the limited notion of "creativity," but the principles, a universal history, since in this era we must speak in terms not only of "globalization" of the world's economies, but of "cultural integration." Any other comparative critical analysis about its appearance, mode, and style becomes irrelevant to the idea of preservation, and I mean preservation to infinite posterity.⁹⁸

The preoccupation of an inquiring consciousness is always to establish the causal and objective links of all perceptual projections and perceptual experiences, and this would be the work of a critic or a historian. In our case, Duchamp produced no alteration of the perception we possess of the original *Mona Lisa* painting. A distinction of historical reality between the two works still exists, and Duchamp's *Mona Lisa* has not replaced the real one, which is still hanging in the

⁹⁷ The critic that changes the context, who brings similarities of colors, of hues or of styles, who associates appearances to produce a "trend" or a "school," or who wants to generate a "movement," simply de-contextualizes the work and strips it of its original humanistic value.

⁹⁸ It was Dilthey who affirmed that we put a great deal of emphasis on the word *art*, for we simply call "creative" everything beyond common understanding, which would be rather contrary to Locke's explanation of the continuous complexity of the traits of human understanding.

Louvre. We all would like to entertain the thought that “creation” is possible through perceptual practices, which says that the mind cannot produce anything positive beyond that which can be deduced or induced by causal explanation. Obviously the true deduction we obtain from Duchamp’s work was his incapacity to surpass the art and the mastery of Leonardo, so he made a fun copy of the masterpiece. At this point, it hard to tell Duchamp’s psychological status, for no psychoanalyst has ever entered into this psychological reality.

To establish a logical necessity between causal antecedents and consequents means to acquire true reason of existence. Establishing truths is how the faculty of reason constitutes and preserves the notion of existence as sanity of the human mind. This is the way we recognize “sanity.” Logical necessity is what binds all things in nature, whether physical or spiritual. Phenomena, whether noumenal (psychic) or physical, are there to define and determine the eternal succession of events in nature, and there is no evidence that art is excluded from this rule—I say this because certain people in the arts claim to understand the source of “creative” energy while misplacing any reasons for being. Historians’ simplistic ways of dealing with causative matters of life and art are dangerous to humanity. Anything that cannot be logically determined should be given a hypothetical status. To this effect, Gombrich believed that art is a psychological rather than rational activity, which makes art hypothetical, which is the reason the majority of thinkers and workers of art show the utmost ignorance. I have shown in the text that there are plenty of good explanations for the so-called “creative” process of art. Kant arrived at logical explanations of the productive imagination and intuition in the categories of reason and provided us with a way of establishing their natural necessity. This to me was sufficient to explain the art process. I then was able to prove the Kantian theories of aesthetic (and its contradictions) phenomenologically, which substantiated my hypotheses and gave even greater weight to my theories of art.

The important realization to be made now is that “creativity” is not a faculty, but a historical invention. The word “creativity” does not exist in Kant’s vocabulary, for he said “everything must come from somewhere” interiorly, established by some natural necessity even in psychological states. Kant showed us how human knowledge is both disseminated and incoherent, and especially, how disconnected psychology is from its rational basis of a constituted philosophy of human nature. Human knowledge needs to be retrieved and organized before it is stored in memory. By this, I mean that it is historically imprudent to infuse works of art with the fatidic aura of spirituality and mystery when we try to move on with the scientificity and the positivity of existence in every other field of knowledge. If there is a causal explanation for all things in the world, there is also a causal explanation for the necessity and production of works of art, and I think I have proved that this can be done. If there is a higher reason for the existence of

art, such reason must also be found self-evident in the art work. If the work originated in the artist's mind, (not copied) must re-ascend the phenomena to meet the original intention; if it came about accidentally that multiple natural phenomena need to be determined then, this analytical work must yield a synthesis of value.

Art expressions, like all other human expressions, emerge from a specific genealogy of thought. The absence of thought brings about nothing substantial. J.-P. Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* does not produce alternative conditions of existence. Nothingness is existential nullity, and we have to accept it not as a form of existence, but one of non-existence. Thought and non-thought must be identified for what they are. We cannot define one as a function of the other, because by that we would turn thought into some strictly empirical practice. Positivism and skepticism contradict each other as *Protagoras* and *Hippias* in Plato's dialogues. This is to say that we cannot fantasize upon either of them. If we want to help the knowledge of art, we must open its perception of reality and of the world. The potential meaning and expressive force of art works can only be determined by the artist because it is a direct product of his or her substantial development and his or her intellectual faculties.

A rule can be satisfactorily established here: that, although we are dealing with a complex causality of subjective-objective relations of phenomena, the causal psychological problematic of art cannot be simply dispelled or disposed of as mystical or mysterious. The questions of the work of art from beginning to end, rest on the fact whether the artist is a positive thinker or an instinctive initiator of thoughtless actions. Psychoanalysis has attempted presumptuously to establish unconscious sources of actions and behaviors in subjects by tracing child remembrances and determine obsessive disorders. When we deal with art, we must instead be steadfastly attached to its original concept and establish the continuity of phenomena which generated the art expressions in the first place, namely, with or without purpose; with or without intentions. Psychoanalytical work failed miserably because its practitioners failed to establish comparative conformity. This is needed in the production of art works at all times, especially in the production of critical and historical works. The concept of art must be well established in the mind in both the artist and the critic as a pre-conscious condition in order for anyone to move body and mind toward the correct interpretation of the art expression.

Imagine Jackson Pollock, laying the canvas on the floor and preparing his body for his "drippings." It is always best to depart from the preconception that all art expressions rely on the intention to express something that relates directly to the original concept and that accomplishes a movement of thought and substance, but one must keep in mind that nothing is ever unconscious in the human mind. All

actions are determined or pre-determined by certain levels of thought, which is the case of “automatism” or spontaneous actions. Jackson Pollock, too, tried to accomplish with his drippings that which in my opinion had a low level of thought. Nevertheless, one can disagree with me that his mind was conscious when prepared the physical conditions for his work to be performed. However, conceptualization, often resting on the binomial of “*sense-reference*,” was at the lowest level for dripping paint on a canvas, because does not invoke complex dynamic phenomena. The expressive linguistic force of the work of art is manifested in the profundity and in the vast reservoir of meaning that defines purpose and that fully justifies the original intention. The movement, as I said before, from the conscious intention to the utterance of the final deliverance of the paint, can be explained phenomenon by phenomenon as causally determined. All physical dynamics can actually be proven and his dripping made no exception.

In addition, science could identify the flow of neurotransmitters from that part of the brain to the hand being brought into action. What provided the conditions for the experiment was logical planning of utterances of pre-set conscious conditions and of the foresight about possible outcomes. In other words, Pollock prepared the conditions for the experiment that would allow a phenomenology of chances but he could not predict scientifically the outcome of his actions. And please, do not as Leonardo da Vinci to enter into this discourse, because he would not approve. He believed that the artist must be in total control, not at the mercy of accidental phenomena.

It is natural to believe that high art emerges from a highly conceptualized structure of thought even if the world is now persuaded that Pollock was one of the most influential artists of our time. I explain in the text that ontological capacities do not forfeit the spontaneity and the novelty of his productive imagination, which is generated by thought processes. The value of his imagination, however, was productive to a certain extent, because he knew what he wanted, although what he wanted was rather childish and had little humanistic value. His expectations of the work depended on the element of surprise, which must have excited him only partially. In fact that specific body of work was in storage in a crummy garage for several years, until Sidney Janis discovered it.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ The visual result of drips of paint onto a canvas would excite any child since the combination of composition is infinite, but at the same time in France artists had shot bullets filled with paint to a canvas and to spinning surfaces with amazing results. In the text I retrace the phenomenological movement of Pollock’s development and it looks like Pollock used to be an “Orphic” painter that could sell any of his works, until he met Peggy Guggenheim.

It is just as important to understand the genesis and the objectivity of a work of art as to understand the artist's perceptual developments. We can now, with all the knowledge available, overcome the pseudo-psychology of the work of art that attributes value to anything a critic cannot understand. To uncover the logic (if one exists) or the genesis of the art object, and organize its meaning, before and after execution, on a universal scale of validity. This action is imperative because a historian or critic must bring the work to the level of world countenance. Here is what Diltthey (1978) said:

When we understand expressions, 'naturally' we accomplish their meaning in being directed to the 'what' which is expressed. This 'what' is an objectivity, not simply a set of engendering psychological acts. (p. 283)

This point expands my view on the inadequacies of some common and recurring beliefs, such as: "art can be anything but...", "art cannot be known," "art is a supernatural mysterious manifestation", etc. We must, instead, go back to the ontological source and the early development of the idea to determine what we can value as art and how we can establish the historical phenomenological continuity of art's humanistic qualities. Only then may we judge and assess the authentic humanity fermenting in the artist.

As noted in the main text, one of the major fallacies of Modern and Post-Modern art is their reliance on novelty. Value can only be assessed on continuity, rather than discontinuity. We cannot associate the word "development" with that of "discontinuity." As treated in the study, the Husserlian causal relation of *retentions* and *protentions* substantiates all I have said about fulfilling the conscious potentialities of the art expression as ontological development. Rosenberg's noted essay "Art for the Sake of the New brings to memory my reflection that the "new" must be worthy for the kind of beliefs is able to change or revolutionize. A reinterpretation of the old should also be considered if the topic is of historical importance. Again, the above-stated Husserlian binomial reiterates the Kantian belief that what the mind apprehends may come out of the mind as an art expression. The art object is a synthesis of perception of the incoming and existing information in memory. If the information is obtained at face-value by-passing the due synthesis, it means that the resulting art object will present a prejudicial character, such as a copy or a copy of a copy, etc. bearing nothing constructive or new. The human mind that by-passes the process of synthesis ends up acting on prejudicial conditions, being indoctrinated and entertaining by false beliefs.

The knowledge that can be acquired on the nature of human language is enough to render an accurate conception of the art expression. That is why the

problems of art can be addressed as linguistic problems in a variety of ways. What is accrued and processed in consciousness through language can however be reconstructed in the mind and communicated as any form of expression. This means that, absolutely, from ideation to performance, we can identify and each phenomenon and have a perfect knowledge of the art process.

So another major fallacy is to exalt the “mystery” of art and to bring it to the temple of metaphysics (the museum) with such false attributions. Phenomenologically speaking, the meaning embodied in the work is exactly the meaning that resides in the mind of the artist before conception. This means that each phenomenon that traversed Pollock’s mind from the inception of his intention to the making of the canvas, the selections of the colors, the movements of his body, etc., until the work was completed, can be brought to light and assessed for its ontological worth. All works of art can be assessed in the same way. This is a debt that must be paid to the true history of art and is yet to be done.

Aside from detecting the mental dynamics of the artist, it is possible to arrive at the same conclusions by retracing thought as a verbal process, for there can be no separation between verbal and visual language. Verbal language always antecedes and completes all the other forms of language. Husserl made us reflect on this point in his phenomenological studies. He wanted us to understand that all that is retained in memory is coordinated and projected objectively with the use of verbal language. There are no doubts that logical and conscious verbal productions are a part of the art process. This means that in practice we can trace the words of Pollock’s thoughts, the same when he spoke to himself just before approaching each moment of his work as to what he wanted his body to do. This causally explains the nature of art expression as well as establishing the subject’s full identity in ways that only what is retained in memory as structural consciousness stays as meaningful factuality. It also shows that that which is constituted in consciousness becomes a part of the individual’s verbal vocabulary.¹⁰⁰ Emphasis on “styles” does not bring out substantive meaning, which is the essential component of language. Undoubtedly, Pollock generated a new style of paintings. “Style” is not an essential component of art. All art works possess a certain “style,” regardless of their substantial level of thought and meaning. The meaning of the work did not depend upon changing the manner in which Pollock distributed the pigment on the canvas. He could have thrown the paint against the wall, like

¹⁰⁰ In other words, Pollock, even if he did not speak to himself with sound voice, set his mind to think in verbal ordinary language and commanded his body to prepare the canvas, mix the pigments, select the dripping bottles, etc. This seems to give an even more extended explanation to what are wrongly generalized as unconscious actions.

Sam Francis. To support this statement, obviously, is the clear idea that Pollock's work did not perform a complex conscious act by telling himself to pour paint on the canvas. Conscious acts means that the entire consciousness of the individual, and here Hegel's universal concept comes into play, is at work. There is no more substance in Pollock's work than what the work shows, according to Hegel's concept of consciousness.¹⁰¹

Some say he was trying to overcome the Cubist idea still imbued in Abstract Expressionism or, historically, erase the residues of his old Orphism. Whatever the reason is, the work shows no more than what can be manifested as phenomenology of language, that is, what can be imagined step by step when tracing antecedent phenomena all the way to the original intention. Many critics have tried to analyze endlessly Pollock's drip paintings from various psychological standpoints without reaching plausible explanations.

The argument of defining Pollock's level of thought, I am afraid, is more complex, and the reader would have to read my entire book to arrive at that. Indeed, the only valid argument applicable is ontological and anthropological, and at this level, his works shows total linguistic displacement of human concerns. There is no reason why the artist's consciousness should be assessed differently from that of any other human, but this appears quite evident in art's literature. This means that consciousness of art should be assessed qualitatively beyond the notion of styles, no matter how complex. For that purpose, consciousness and behavior are like the curves of the asymptote that approach each other nearer and nearer but never converge because of their infinitesimal angle.

There is no doubt that I am trying here to establish that, in the sum, the art expression represents the positing of the subject's totality of consciousness before the world. Pollock can be of no exception. I mean that we must assume that his lifelong acquired perceptual knowledge materialized in the work he did at the time, which did not transcend subjectivity. The experience of pouring paint onto the canvas is certainly not a superior, intellectual, and especially meaningful act, and certainly not a "transcendental ritual experience" as has been defined by influential critics. Objectivity of consciousness is the conviction that a tangible body of organized logical thought furnishes the mind before execution of the object attempting to deliver a meaningful work of art.

¹⁰¹ Some would object to my statement but agree that we must examine the general reasons as to why he did it. Certainly he did not do the dripping because he wanted to send a message to the world and vindicate his rights to fame and notoriety, since he kept the dripping paintings in a garage for years until Sidney Janis discovered them and decided to show them in 1952. In his case these art works had become a forgotten language of which he thought nothing.

This realization opens our eyes and suggests the need for an accurate and interdisciplinary rethinking of what it means to perceive a work of art in light of a totality of available knowledge, including the latest findings about brain physiology and cellular biology. Additional knowledge always changes the perceptual spectrum and opens the possibilities of what is presented as actual, and pre-set, spontaneous cognitive conception of the object.

The understanding and the perception of an actual being will always be relative because knowledge is infinite. In short, human life is an open-ended possibility because of the infinite duration of human life. There will always be new ground to be uncovered in the future and new hypotheses to be formulated toward the identification of work possessing substantial dynamism. It is precisely this sense of incompleteness that compels us to seek secure existential grounds. Similarly, the realization of a holistic, homogeneous human knowledge induces the integration of the perception of art into the universal realm that takes into account new world developments in science and philosophy that better sustain its *raison d'être*. The work of art is an integral part of human life. That is why we can begin to judge works of art in relation to an entire natural history of humanity.

I wrote this book because I realized the need to redefine the perception of art along phenomenological lines. Heidegger makes a clear distinction between what is the assumed logical conception of science and what has logical value—namely, that which defines the true existential qualities of being in the world (1962, p. 408). Heidegger saw the fundamental notion of science as transcending human endeavor, universalizing both the purposes and values of knowledge as it applies to mankind. There is no plausible reason as to why art should not go along with this thought. Cognition of the higher scientific meaning of life does not run counter with the nature of art, since art is made by humans for humans. We must think along these lines, especially when both art and the human sciences depend upon each other for their conscious realignment. The scientist's and the artist's mind belong to the *telos* of nature as a discipline for obtaining the knowledge of positive and efficient causality in the world. Art must have a cause and a purpose to be of value in the world, just as all things in the world have purposes and ends. Can science and philosophy tell us what are the true purposes and ends of both nature and art? Only those who equally understand the higher significance of art and life can exercise the right to make good of both art and science. What we can understand and prove is mankind's existential presence and capacity to achieve the highest good in the world with the best possible knowledge.

Today, some art theorists deny artists even the right to employ the faculty of cognition, so well founded is the credence that art emerges from the depths of the unconscious or from the right hemisphere of the brain. The questions that I raise in the text are: Is art primarily a cognitive experience? Gablik thinks so. Can

cognition be separate from perception? Gablik does not think so. Many see cognitive knowledge not as a challenge, but as a threat to the spontaneity of unconscious art, but when asked whether they can place the unconscious mind within the structures of the sane individual, they disavow their argument.

Are artists to be considered sane individuals? The threat of these questions is represented by the damage of an anomalous *status quo* that manifests itself in every possible way as market hegemony rather than demand for cognitive experience. Are artists supposed to entertain rather than to educate or inspire? In simple words, the fear of the industry is that if you confuse the collector with some of these ideas, commerce will suffer. This condition defines art's intellectual inertia and accentuates the negative forces driving art into a corner of limited and reductive possibilities. An artist cannot be denied the right to enrich the mind and gather the intellect upon new knowledge, to reflect, analyze, synthesize, judge, and project new ideas.

It would be hard to imagine an artist of this type during Greenberg's time survive during Abstract Expressionism—that is, trying to move beyond the field of visual abstraction. He or she would be banned from the profession. This, which I define as the hegemony of ignorance, is a reductive and forceful prejudice that damages the intellectual development of art and artists. I believe that a good artist must have the freedom and the opportunity to strive towards the universality of knowledge and to advance the idea of art.

Entrepreneurs should not have the power to halt the intellectual advancement of art and the world in order to maximize profits and add value to their private art collections. In the text, I explain how art and the world are interdependent in their notion of humanity. Art cannot grow intellectually and help the world under a faulty system of support. The mental state of the artist is commensurate to his or her belief in humanity, thus to what indeed constitutes the expansion and implementation of knowledge and individual freedom. To be free, for an artist, is to incorporate the potential qualities that determine the meaning of humanity. Rejection of the idea of humanity as a universal project harbors insecurity and deprives the artist of those legitimate logical convictions that support and advance the arts and the world intellectually.

From a sense of insecurity to prejudice, the distance is infinitesimal. The art world, as an industry producing material wealth, holds a deceptive attitude toward individuality. In the main text, I explain that a being cannot be in-itself and for-itself an entity of power without constituting a precondition of prejudice with regard to humanity. Under these conditions, the artist is precluded from implementing the true significance of individual freedom in society.

Prejudice, as in the case of Galileo, represses the edification of knowledge, restricts the conditions of individual freedom, and produces intellectual stagnancy.

The inability to take on the development of an idea, to support a social issue, or to address a political problem leads to regression and ignorance, which is what prevents artistic development at this time in history. The autocrats who exercise material power over freedom of expression in the name of free enterprise often tell others what they are told, and what they are told often lacks rational reflection. Free enterprise for an intellectual activity is another form of despotism that places monetary interest above all other matters of humanity.

This is what Kant and Hegel described as a state of *tutelage*. This means that the idea of art is not advancing, because it is subject to the will of few individuals. How dichotomous is it to institute a body of epistemological knowledge that has no authority and allows subjectivity to exercise its powers over reason? This points the argument toward a paradox that renders all art institutions being run under a free enterprise system contradictory and somehow counterproductive because they retard the movement of humanity as a whole. And believe me, there is no such thing as a “non-profit” organization, or an organization without any private interest.¹⁰²

The true knowledge of art is not to be found ready-made or in ready to be handed down prejudicial support by institutions, because the same will not sustain research and the earned support of new ideas. If they did so in the present system, they would dig their own grave as tax deduction enterprises and people would realize the lack of purpose in their actions.

In spite of this situation, this book shows that there is out there potential for a changing world whose knowledge must be coped with, analyzed, synthesized, and rendered plausible in order to serve the legitimate purposes of art. There are out there humanistic ends to be fulfilled, while artists are forced into being passive under deleterious social conditions—namely, forced into the production of imagery to merely serve the whims of the bourgeoisie. This brings intellectual poverty and prejudicial hegemonies primarily preoccupied with material gain to the foreground of public support. In order to transcend this state of affairs, artists must act on the entire historical consciousness and find the courage to assert their true freedom of expression as a political right.

This right requires all types of cognitive knowledge, which must be brought to the causal ground of ontology in schools and universities so as to acquire special interactive, socio-political, teleological significance. All disciplines of knowledge contribute to a cognitive and critical formation of the mind of the artist under a unity of purposes. Heidegger referred to knowledge as possessing *equipmental* qualities and as “*at-handedness*” for being available to the mind. Cognitive knowledge furnishes the instrumental body of meaning needed to instruct

¹⁰² We shall see to establishing a first example serving 100% of public interest.

conscious political behavior in the artist's mind. The word "political" intended as collective effort toward producing society's greater good through knowledge should not be undervalued.¹⁰³

Cognition, this important faculty that prospects and synthesizes conceptual and perceptual knowledge, is at the basis of the art critical judgments. How the critic uses the power of cognitive knowledge as synthesis of history, philosophy, science, and art determines the new conceptual structures of reality of the art work. Reality, especially social reality, we learn in hermeneutics, must be constantly reinterpreted, but also re-conceptualized.

There is a much needed linguistic and perceptual transition of art from "conceptual" to "conceptional" work, which connotes with the generalized regeneration of the humanistic idea. The name *conceptional*, defines the conception of the new projective ideas that carry the changes required by socio-historical and humanistic ends. History demands the changes and humanity needs them. I explain this transition in the main text by premising that there cannot be a concept of art without a humanistic developmental conception of what constitutes the potential values of art.¹⁰⁴ In short, to conceive an art that will fulfill the final purpose of humanity answers the requirements of the natural history of humankind. The transition requires reformulation of art's reason for being after an ontological model of existence that will allow art to reach legitimacy as an intellectual force.

Considering all that has been said in this introduction and in the main text, the forming concept of a New Humanism requires "conception" of an intentional consciousness capable of changes in the intentional phase of the perception of art, a condition to motivate the production of works that will serve the causes of humanity. What art can accomplish in history, beyond the simplistic perspective

¹⁰³ Dilthey instead said, "Cognition is neither sheer 'inside' affirmation nor 'outside' negation, but recognition defined by critical contrast" (*Ib.*, p. 315). This is more than an empirical statement because it expands the notion of the Cartesian *res-cogitans*. Cognition is a clear mental picture and the precondition of perceptual apprehension, as it is explained by the Kantian noumenon and phenomenon relation, which I have expanded in the text under the thesis of a united perceptual *continuum*. Gadamer (1977, p. 93) said that cognition represents "a particular form of hermeneutic reflection, one that seeks to dispel a certain class of prejudices through critique." I would like to extend his thought to the comprehensive functions that a phenomenological hermeneutics can perform in the arts and in the sciences as a function of uncovering the truths that defines the existential being of the artist in the future (*Ib.*, p. 96). The artist can function as a committed monadic participant in the world by extending the search for the underlying primary values and functions of art in the world.

¹⁰⁴ Conception does not mean "creation." With this transition, I substitute the term "creation," which manifests something generated from nothing, with the term "conception" as something generated by developments of events in society and in the history of art. The history of art requires linguistic and perceptual change; humanity needs such change.

of styles, can now be rendered tangible. That which helps extract the meaningful from the existential, the universal from the particular, that which frees us from historical prejudice and distortion of reality, can now be a part of this artistic intention. This means that what the concept of a New Humanism contains can be embodied in the intentionality of the artist preceding the art work as new projective thinking. The synthesis of what it means to be artists and to be humans and the implemented thought and action must reveal itself as such as self-evident cause of action.

This idea finds correct justification because it brings about the universality of art as a substantial medium of anthropology. The study shows that the causal relation of art to anthropology is real and that it amounts to the engagement of the entire being of the artist moving toward higher significance of life in general. *Conception* is the word that embodies art and anthropology, which commands to be treated synonymously in this study, in order to corroborate the foresight of humanity, and to broaden and consolidate the artistic intention.

Above and beyond the sensuous external qualities of the object, anthropology represents the only justifiable end of art, intended as the incarnation of the greatest potential meaning “conceived” as human existence. This is because artistic intention can carry the weight of the cognitive synthesis of the greatest human knowledge to be actualized as art for the world; the art work can be the driving force behind social consciousness inducing meaningful and purposive political actions, and with this new context, become a positive force of human understanding and social renewal.

The artist must imagine with the eye of reason a harmonious world, free from wars, famine, pollution, and social conflicts, as a possibility for humanity and make artworks toward this end. This is accomplished with the help of a purposive imagination as the special tool for implementing a broad vision of rewarding life, while applying reason as the tool that moves the mind toward actualization of the plan. This notion of a purposive imagination provides art with new light and new meaning in art, but it can be appropriated and adopted only by the cultivated mind of the artist.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ As I mentioned earlier, the discourse on the nature of the imagination finds its apotheosis of meaning in the difference between directional and non-directional imagination, between unproductive and productive imagination, which may otherwise render consciousness lethargic and off the center of being. A. Malraux also made the same reflections; see: *Metamorphosis an Imagination* by F. Dorenlot, NY Literary Forum, 1979.

A. Einstein acquired the expanded knowledge of physical and mathematical variables in time-space relations and the notion that there are no absolutes in the physical laws by directive imagination. If all things are interdependent, all things have also relative value. All truths are relative to a chosen reference point. Likewise, the truths of art find validity only within the relativity of the reality of the physical world — no truths could ever be established in the metaphysical world, except of the infinity of space and time of the universe. In other words, there are greater possible ends to be entertained by the minds without falling into a metaphysic of illusion. Mankind must find harmony, balance, and happiness here in this world, not in other imaginary worlds. If the art work is a “play” and the stage is the world, the artist must know the part he or she is to play within an epistemological space. If this thought makes no sense, the script of art must be rewritten to implement greater knowledge of the world and to fulfill life’s destiny.

In phenomenology, perception means transcending a state of consciousness, but also maintaining a possible vision of reality, for consciousness cannot extend beyond the limits of the world and be constructive in terms of helping anthropology. I take example from Husserl and Heidegger who founded their phenomenology on the relativity of the world by advancing the notion of the perception of truth and existence, establishing our potentialities as humans. Clearly, this conception of humanity can be applied in art. By resting on these premises, artistic behavior is not just another ordinary mode of being, but existential intelligence that the artist can use in a universal framework, which makes it valid for all human beings.

The principle of reality is that all that is a product of all that was, which is given internally by the perception of all causal phenomena interacting in the world. If the reader is a bit confused at this point, it is because causal interaction—that which establishes reality—encompasses our entire existence and it is difficult to maintain in consciousness all the complexity of the causal world at once. In fact, this notch was never fully unraveled by philosophical thought in spite of its extended universal countenance and applicability. Any time we inquire into the nature of things, we actually delve into connections of causal phenomena that constantly challenge our space-time intuition and change our perception of the world. It takes an extended productive imagination to envision a work of art as effective interaction in the world under the parameters of the universal law of causality—that is, to be able to see the final phenomenological effects of a work of art. This is so, because I believe in the linguistic power of art changing the world.

Art is a part of the script of human nature, a script that cannot be changed, but art can enact it with its power of the imagination. This is a faculty that animals do not possess. As conscious individuals, we cannot afford to change the laws of nature simply to accommodate the play of an unreflective dream-like culture that

cherishes and amazes itself over its own passive imagination. By any existential phenomenological standard, indulging in play and passive imagination is to negate the duty and responsibilities of every individual to act according to the script of nature. If nature and natural processes proceeds in accordance with natural laws, art and artists have only a script to play and that is, to enact the laws of nature and find beauty and purpose in them as required by the higher purpose of nature. Yes, because the motto is and remains: "be all that you can be."

Under the relative referential ground of interpretation of the world, I cannot but identify Modernist and Post-Modernist artists as players without rules, or actors without a script. Acting is not the preponderant feature of lying to oneself; human existence truly and fully is a lie if not conducted with conscious rational thinking. Both the actor and the script can be grounded forms of existence as for their objective ends: one of a physical, animate nature, and the other as substance of thought seeking to be animated. We can see in a good performance the genre of the script being overridden by the forceful objectivity of the actor matching his or her own internal objective existence. In other words, a good actor can embody into his or her own work the necessary objectivity to overcome his or her own subjectivity and even the subjectivity of the script. In sum, the actor must relinquish his or her own subjectivity and adopt the objectivity of the script with humility and pride in order to obtain the best performance. Matching and perhaps moving beyond the degree of the subjectivity of the scriptwriter is a possibility only for the great actor. This is because, before interpreting the script, the actor must, at times, be able to divest him or herself of his or her own subjectivity and embody a greater interpretive objective capacity to overcome the script.

Gadamer moved this discourse toward higher ends of the script in interpreting the notion of art. Art is a script written by humankind, and with this, he simply believed that higher moral forms of existence may be found as ultimate realizations of any script, especially the script of nature, but this can only happen when the actor's consciousness surpasses that of the author. However, knowledge of the natural laws brings the hidden reality of the script to higher cognitions. It is not possible to make art into an expansive intellectual discipline without the application of the natural laws, which in their omnipresence operate in every stage of the process.

The imagination brings about the visualization of an expansive realization of the script. Simply, there are no *ifs* when trying to make art abide by the natural laws. Without this rule, we would return to primordial times. When we take Kant's assertion that everything has causes and ends, we know that causality is the only applicable discipline of reality that directly or indirectly makes possible the

achievement of any ends both in life and in art. Through a causal reasoning, art and artists can see the realization and the ends of a project coming into being.¹⁰⁶

I have mentioned that bad art possesses the same characteristics as bad literature, and both can have negative repercussions in history and in the psyche of individuals. Schopenhauer, in an essay on “Books and Reading” (1891), said, “You can never read bad literature too little, nor good literature too much.” Bad books “destroy the mind.” Bad art does the same thing. On the other hand, good books are “inexhaustibly readable,” said Mortimer Adler (at a lecture I attended in Washington D.C. in 1985). Good books are those which communicate the most, but of course, meaning cannot be defined quantitatively, but only qualitatively. So, a “good book” is not one that communicates the most, but the best—not the most with the least language, but the best with the language it takes as causal necessity and causal projections, which exceed the effort of complying with dactylic rules of poetry. It is true, we live in a fast-paced world, and no one has any time to read. When we read we want to get things right and quick to the point. I do not believe that the writer should be entertained with metaphor which dilutes attention required by an important subject. On the other hand, the writer must agonize in perfecting the language that fits the structure of reason. Writing always produces irreversible changes in the psyche or in the consciousness of the reader. Important messages demand precise language and effective arguments. Elaboration of meaning is allowed in the text, but only with the consent of the reader interested in the process. The reader has the right to receive from the writer ready-made arguments and reject the writer who writes for his own self. This is what I have tried to take into account in this work. I hope my readers are interested in the process since I have to show an agonizing process that has been going on for 45 years.

Derrida believed that writing is communication that relies on precise language. However, contradictions may rest on language’s peculiar generalities; simple terms cannot carry complex meaning. Necessarily, the fundamental character of a good book is that which expands the understanding of whatever form of language being employed as long as the rule of sense-reference is observed. The consciousness of the author, to begin with, has to do away with analysis and synthesis at all times, and this procedure must be exercised within a linguistic necessity. The contextual basis of the argument can be expanded only in conformity with the objective capacity of the interpreter. When the term is reduced to generality without particularity, or vice versa, because of the

¹⁰⁶ This possibility obviously recalls certain anachronisms existing between the rightful existential conscious expression obtained with the disciplines of thought versus the subjective claim of anyone being able to write one’s own script on the stage of the world’s representation and call it art.

interpreter's inadequate interpretive tools, the rules of linguistic discourse are surely being broken. The marvel of literature rests on the author's opening the doors of contextual relatedness and validity and on the reader matching and overriding the objective capacity of the text. This says that interpretation should not omit the substance that constitutes the original intention of the author at whatever linguistic level is expressed. Both literature and art rely primarily on the smooth passage of substance from writer to reader and, only secondarily, on the measure of the text's linguistic or stylistic worth.

We learn from analytical linguistic philosophy that the economy of language is not only based on grammar and syntax, but on a variety of cultural and predicative necessities that antecede styles, usage, and vernacular modes.¹⁰⁷ Languages are imperfect structures, more so because they are so well adaptable to descriptive modes. One may be able to say almost anything with ordinary words and images, and that, I believe, is a literary skill. The meaning attributed to words varies in accordance to usage, connotations, and denotations, which carry the metaphors, the myths, the customs, and the traditions of cultures. It may take much effort to unravel the philology and the history of a single word, but we have hermeneutics, the science of interpretation, providing the method for linguistic analysis that fulfills communication and reaches synthetic substance.

Some words are like bacterial cultures. They grow abnormal meaning or allow it to shrink and fade away. Some other words, especially those with Greek or Latin roots, remain erected in time like etymological monuments.¹⁰⁸ Their substance is even better preserved when buried in sand or at the bottom of the ocean like Spanish galleons. This is why the loss of language in art and literature, especially that which gave their birth, is a terrible tragedy, not altogether irreparable, though.

This point is well taken into consideration in the study, for it is my belief that a revival of the lost language of art signifies perceptual enrichment of same, and the revival of the injection of new and philosophical language provides substantial historical durability like the Roman bronzes of Pompeii. Certain terms become more complex as more and more philosophers and psychologists re-adapt them or re-appropriate their meaning. This fact should not be necessarily so. That is why, often, one finds misplaced terms in art literature. Art is not a mere linguistic exercise, like a puzzle.¹⁰⁹ This is because there cannot be sense without

¹⁰⁷ The word *lingo*, I believe, embodies in itself an ordinary necessity for communication, though it often hides obscure slang connotations.

¹⁰⁸ At this point would like to mention my sculpture project of forgotten Greek language that carry the substance of our civilization.

¹⁰⁹ From this perspective, I must reject Adler's idea because there is a better way to define the particular qualities that make a good book: a good book should be phenomenologically reductive and epistemologically expansive at the same time. In this sense, why not use the most advanced methods of thinking, like phenomenology?

reference. Language, especially in art literature, should be phenomenological and hermeneutically centered on human substance to advance the meaning of the art object: the more centered the language, the more expansive is the meaning of art in general.

Obviously, something understood is something that has acquired reasonable, objective determinability and validity of existence in the mind; but from understanding a conviction for the same there is an odyssey of hardship and concretization of the ideas that establish convictions. Can we, at one point or another, be sure that what we understand is all there is in a text? If we say that books can be “inexhaustibly readable,” it is because they contain rich and profound meaning that invites infinite reflection, more than infinite interpretations.¹¹⁰ The language of a book is not accurate if it does not prospect analysis and synthesis of the subject in question. Moving from analysis to synthesis constitutes a movement from externality to the substantiality of being, thus separating sense from language form and empirical from phenomenological experiences. We must remember this distinction when we read a book.

Analytical philosophy neglected this consideration. True meaning is constituted in language by the exercise, which determines the logical necessity of linguistic phenomena that ascertain it. It must be so even in narrative writings. It is easy to be partial to pleasurable linguistic expressions or to be induced into accepting pre-packaged, well-orchestrated linguistic expressions, especially if they come from reliable sources. Prejudicial choices of language often lack analytical reasoning and synthetic structural necessity. Humanity all too often suffers from the consequences of linguistic fallacies of any kind.

We read to be informed, but also because we want to be persuaded or reassured about our doubts. Aristotle called Rhetoric “the art of persuasive argumentation,” and in this exercise he included the effort of persuading oneself about something we do not believe. A causality of reason should convince anybody, which was what Kant believed and masterfully expressed in the categories of reason. After Kant, we can say that there can be no persuasion without causal reason. Misunderstanding of history, of sciences, of philosophy, of art gave rise to the socio-political and environmental consequences of our time.

Most tragedies could have been avoided under the belief that all things and therefore all disciplines of knowledge are interdependent. The history of humankind has been taught as a storytelling, which often left out causal analysis and synthesis. This way, at a distance of time, events seem charged by the arcane forces of destiny, if they happened inexplicably, when it could be ascertained that they were the result of logical causes, even if unreasoned and irrational at times.

¹¹⁰ This makes Adler’s statement all the more problematic because the recognized quality of being is inexhaustible, but the hermeneutical exercise must show it.

Often manipulation of reality is our way of dealing with and defying the natural laws rather than obtaining pure understanding of the same. We have not even begun to reach the understanding of the potentialities of nature. Let us reflect that science is entirely devoted to the specific research and exploitation of matter rather than to the understanding of the interdependence of phenomena; philosophy is still understood as a mere linguistic exercise rather than as a mastery of causal reason; and art is understood as decoration and a status symbol rather than as a vehicle of spiritual and intellectual growth. In sum, these disciplines divert from their *logos* and establish a contextual basis for an elite society to rule without reason, which does not pursue the universality of knowledge as ultimate end.

The intellect must be given a chance to face the real world, to understand its own nature and its own potentiality, in order to advance to a higher consciousness and higher reason. The main text fully explains why higher reason needs the collective work of all the faculties of the intellect and all the disciplines of knowledge aiming at the same ends in order to advance.

The understanding of nature and the correct application of its laws determine the quality of human existence in the world. A price is paid by humankind every time the specificity of scientific knowledge is not met by philosophical and ethical assessment. We learn about the latest products of scientific research, but not about their universal meaning and validity in time. No scientific knowledge can guarantee human existence in the world. Science (*scientia*), as Heidegger (1962, p. 408) characterizes it, is the “connection of being and truth” as we understand it. The truth of nature is to be understood and accepted – not denied. We determine how well we understand it when we can integrate the microcosm into the macrocosm, relate specificity with universality; etc., so as to preserve unity and achieve global consciousness. The individual being, an artist, a poet, a writer must be seen in these terms as an active part in the world in order to be preserved in its totality, significance, and function. The art, the poem, and the text are the vehicles of transformation of humanity.¹¹¹ On the contrary, when these disciplines are not acting in unison and in their full potential capacity, they exercise a reductive action upon humankind with consequent retardation of the anthropological process. A book that does not propose knowledge of such universal validity only contributes to the loss of human intelligence.

Universal language, the unreachable end of analytical philosophy, arises precisely from the true understanding of the intrinsic phenomenological necessity of nature, but this branch of philosophy is yet to understand what Heidegger called “the equipmental qualities of equipment.” Perhaps the knowledge of a tool is just a

¹¹¹ A good book is inexhaustibly readable as long as it is inexhaustibly meaningful. This means that science, philosophy, and art can come together to promote a universal integration of human nature into nature itself.

difficult as the knowledge of its action of material transformation, and this is when the problems of an artist, a poet, or a writer arise.

The task to set the premises of a literary undertaking and at the same time achieve the knowledge of the tools that will carry the reader's understanding from level A to level B is difficult, but it is a part of the writer's project to consider thousands of years of epistemic evolution in a comprehensive and interrelated fashion. I attempted this project in such holistic way, but the results remain to be seen. The book may contribute in some way to a magnitude of ends or remain dormant, gathering dust in a bookshelf. In addition to envision the magnitude ends, maximum consideration must be given to the discipline and to what may reinforce the effort to steer human knowledge toward its logical evolution. Only such effort may activate the dynamic potentiality of human substance.¹¹²

The task of the philosopher is to undo thousands of years of language philosophy, but not to substitute ideal language with ordinary traits that would diminish the worth of human substance. Language must be evolved, not suppressed. Terms must not be discarded, but etymologically and epistemologically recharged with newer meaning or realigned to their original significance. This is why I mentioned that a writer may have to refer to the entire course of human knowledge in order to endow a word of new meaning. Heidegger did so in his project of *Dasein*. Philosophical discourse often demands transposition of meaning. One word, like *being*, for instance, as Heidegger asserted, may be used to upset an entire philosophical tradition and bring back metaphysics to its original ontological roots.¹¹³

The decision to write or to read a difficult book may be an act of faith or an act of duty that encourages both the writer and the reader to overcome linguistic

¹¹² If Wittgenstein were alive today, I would call upon his intelligence to render this ontological thesis with an ordinary language philosophy, since from my phenomenological perspective, what is ordinary should provide a capacity to reduce the conceptuality of language to its natural necessity, which I do not possess. Language that does not have the desired effects may cause a "*fallness*" of being, Heidegger would say. In case of Wittgenstein's failure, I would pose the same problem to W. V. O. Quine (1908-2000), A. J. Ayer (1910-1989), or even Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) to determine the linguistic necessity that activates human substance after considering that in the *Tractatus*, (1961) Wittgenstein defines the limits of ordinary language but does not take into account the limitations of ordinary language philosophy.

¹¹³ This is exactly what he did. *Being and Time* is an inexhaustibly readable book because it addresses a universal question and thousand of years of applied thought, which requires at least two lives in order to be understood. I say so because so far, very few authors have been able to provide the correct interpretation of this masterpiece.

barriers and reach a common logical and critical level of thinking. The interpretive problems of language are treated, like any other topic with limited but hopefully sufficient space in order to transport the reader to another level of thinking.

To delve into someone else's mind or explore someone else's thoughts may not be worth one's while unless there is a common interest that bonds writer and reader. In the absence of such ideal conditions, the writer may have to overcome common widespread apathy and indifference that stands in the way to the search of new meaning in a field of knowledge. Many believe that everything has been written about, whence the general readers' skepticism and the arising question: Why write such a monumental work? The answer is: The character of monumentality is precisely what determines the need for monumental writings. A monument stands as an epistemological turning point in history, in time and space. That is why every reading should be more than a search into the mind of the writer, insofar as monumentality of writing is also a search for the ideal vehicle, namely, the universal language that carries the universal value. This means that the reason as to whether to place much effort to overcome metaphor must be determined by the reader, after the writer's declared effort toward achieving universality of knowledge, i.e., that benefit humanity as a whole.¹¹⁴

Apathetic audiences may dismiss a work that addresses the universality of knowledge -- dismiss in one moment what took decades of reflection and effort to write unless a special warning has been sent. Many artists and writers were neglected and ignored during their lifetime. Even Michelangelo's work was often ignored and/or rejected during his lifetime.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ The term "universality" may seem a bit too large and pretentious, but one man's expression is another man's mere diversification unless the writer's spirit of research and enterprising sense are found to meet the desire for objectivity and universality of meaning in the reader.

¹¹⁵ Michael Brenson (1984), critic for *The New York Times*, reinforced this point in his article "Seeing Contemporary Art in the Light of Michelangelo." He said:

In the wake of a late modernist period, success depended upon an increasing destruction and ignorance of cultural memory [...] But inevitably each generation of mainstream artists and critics read less, saw less and as a result, despite a commitment to the iconoclastic and the new, had an increasingly narrow sense of what art has been and could be. (p. 23)

Brenson also affirms that Michelangelo was well read and highly conscious of the goals he conceptualized and sought to achieve. The reader is invited to reflect on this point—namely, on the implied specific set of causal phenomena that turn perceptual, cognitive, spontaneous knowing into direct action. Dissatisfaction about the uncertainties of the state of the arts is still legitimate after more than twenty years from Brenson's article. The art intelligentsia must be blamed for the stagnant ignorance and

for the historical and philosophical fallacies of our time, for failing to open the critical discourse to research and development of the very idea of art, and for ignoring the necessity of art to advance intellectually. We must now correct these fallacies if we want to rediscover and preserve the authentic structure of meaning and values of art. How can we ever understand art's humanistic potentiality if we neglect or deny its philosophical development

2. Some Definitions of Terms.*

- Note: Definitions of terms have been obtained from various sources not necessarily generated by the writer.

Definitions are to provide heterogeneous and homologous representations of the intended meaning. They are pre-constructed propositions that help the reader to achieve a correct interpretation of the text. More properly, they are both implicit and explicit of the meaning intended by the author. Raziel Abelson (1957), in his dissertation on *Analysis of the Concept of Definition and Critique of Three Traditional Philosophical Views Concerning Its Role in Knowledge*, said:

Explicit definitions [... that formulate] the actual rules of use of expressions are [...] of fundamental importance [...] They have an important bearing on the interpretation of the nature of the method of philosophical inquiry, and its role in the advancement of human knowledge. (p. 1)

When new knowledge is being expounded, new definitions become mandatory.

Aletheia: Heidegger's idea of "aletheia" or disclosure is an attempt to make sense of how things in the world appear to human beings as part of an opening of intelligibility, as "unclosedness" or "unconcealedness." The word is closely related to the notion of world disclosure and the way in which things get their sense as part of a holistically structured, pre-interpreted background of meaning. Initially, Heidegger wanted *aletheia* to stand for a re-interpreted definition of truth. However, he later corrected the association of *aletheia* with truth.

Apophantic: An assertion (as opposed to a question, a doubt, or a more expressive sense) is apophantic. It is a statement that covers up meaning and just gives us something as present-at-hand. For Instance, “The President is on vacation“, and, “Salt is Sodium Chloride“ are sentences that, because of their apophantic character, can easily be picked-up and repeated in news and gossip by ‘The They.’ However, the real *ready-to-hand* meaning and context may be lost.

Authenticity: This word has special significance for this author even beyond its etymology. It reflects a specific correct and undisputed existential quality of behavior already manifested in Heidegger’s *Dasein* from his book *Being and Time* and a self-constituted metaphysical and epistemological being that constitutes oneself in order to be oneself at all times, authentic and faithful to one’s principles. The author uses this particular model of *Dasein* to reconstruct artistic behavior in order to provide a true aesthetic and ethical model of behavior for the artist in society

Being: A general, individual entity, animate or inanimate, but endowed with tangible existence.

Being-in-the-World: (*German: In-der-Welt-sein*) Being-in-the-world is Heidegger’s replacement for terms such as subject, object, consciousness, and world. For him, the split of things into subject/object, as we find in the Western tradition and even in our language, must be overcome, as is indicated by the root structure of Husserl and Brentano’s concept of intentionality, i.e., that all consciousness is consciousness of something, that there is no consciousness, as such, cut off from an object (be it the matter of a thought, or of a perception). Nor are there objects without some consciousness beholding or being involved with them. At the most basic level of *being-in-the-world*, Heidegger notes that there is always a mood, a mood that “assails us“ in our unreflecting devotion to the world. A mood comes neither from the “outside“ nor from the “inside,“ but arises from being-in-the-world. One may turn away from a mood, but that is only for seeking another mood; Ultimately, the full sentence is part of our facticity. Only with a mood are we permitted to encounter things in the world. *Dasein* (a co-term for being-in-the-world) has an openness to the world that is constituted by the attunement of a mood or state of mind. As such, *Dasein* is a “thrown“ “projection,“ projecting itself onto the possibilities that lie before it or that may be hidden and interpreted, or understood in terms of possibilities. Such

projection has nothing to do with comporting oneself toward a plan that has been thought out. It is not a plan, since Dasein has already projected itself existentially. Dasein always understands itself in terms of possibilities. As projecting, the understanding of Dasein is possibilities. One can take up the possibilities of “The They,” and the self, or merely follow along or make some more authentic understanding. “Being-in-the-World” is Heidegger’s concept of a finite, historical, and philosophical individual existence living and operating in the world. Although Heidegger refers to *Dasein* as an “it,” I like to refer to it as a person, thus as a he or a she. Under this concept the subject is fully conscious of whom and what he or she is, and, therefore, such life is “authentically” lived. He or she is there embodying all the inherited history, knowledge, and experience as a continuator of an ontological and anthropological movement. Being-in-the-world constitutes a social presence and a conscious individual entity, which means that the knowledge and the experience he or she embodies has intersubjective communicative powers—powers to expand and communicate qualities, meaning, values, and potential for being to others.

Being-toward-death: (*German: Sein-zum-Tode*) Being-toward-death is not an orientation that brings Dasein closer to its end, in terms of clinical death, but is rather a way of being. Heideggerian terminology refers to a process of growing through this word when a certain foresight guides the Dasein towards gaining an authentic perspective. It is provided by dread or death. In the analysis of time, it is revealed as a threefold condition of Being; Time, the present, and the notion of the “eternal” modes of temporality. Temporality is the way we see time. For Heidegger, it is very different from the mistaken view of time as being a linear series of past, present, and future. Instead he sees it as being an ecstasy, outside-of-itself, of future projections (possibilities) and one’s place in history as a part of one’s generation. Possibilities, then, are integral to our understanding of time; our projects, or thrown projection in-the-world, are what absorb and direct us. Futurity, as a direction toward the future that always contains the past—the has-been—is a primary mode of Dasein’s temporality. Death is that possibility which is the absolute impossibility of Dasein. As such, it cannot be compared to any other kind of ending or “running out” of something. For example, one’s death is not an empirical event. For Heidegger, death is Dasein’s ownmost (it is what makes Dasein individual), it is non-relational (nobody can take one’s death away from one, or die in one’s place, and we cannot understand our own death through the death of other Dasein), and it is not to be outstripped. The “not-yet” of life is

always already a part of Dasein: “as soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die.” The threefold condition of death is thus simultaneously one’s “*ownmost potentiality-for-being, non-relational, and not to be out-stripped.*” Death is determinate in its inevitability, but an authentic Being-toward-death understands the indeterminate nature of one’s own inevitable death—one never knows when or how it is going to come. However, this indeterminacy does not put death in some distant, future “not-yet;” authentic Being-toward-death understands one’s individual death as always already a part of one’s life. With average, everyday (normal) discussion of death, all this is concealed. The “they-self” talks about it in a fugitive manner, passes it off as something that occurs at some time but is not yet “present-at-hand” as an *actuality*, and hides its character as one’s ownmost possibility, presenting it as belonging to no one in particular. It becomes devalued—redefined as a neutral and mundane aspect of existence that merits no authentic consideration. When “One dies” is interpreted as a fact, and comes to mean “nobody dies.” On the other hand, authenticity takes Dasein out of the “They,” in part by revealing its place as a part of the They. Heidegger states that *Authentic being-toward-death* calls Dasein’s individual self out of its “they-self,” and frees it to re-evaluate life from the standpoint of finitude. In so doing, Dasein opens itself up for “angst,” translated alternatively as “dread” or as “anxiety.” Angst, as opposed to fear, does not have any distinct object for its dread; it is rather anxious in the face of Being-in-the-world in general—that is, it is anxious in the face of Dasein’s own self. Angst is a shocking individuation of Dasein, when it realizes that it is not at home in the world, or when it comes face to face with its own “uncanny” (German *Unheimlich*: “not at home”). In Dasein’s individuation, it is open to hearing the “call of conscience,” which comes from Dasein’s own Self when it wants to be its Self. This Self is then open to truth, understood as unconcealment (Greek *Aletheia*). In this moment of vision, Dasein understands what is hidden as well as hiddenness itself, indicating Heidegger’s regular uniting of opposites—in this case, truth and untruth.

Being-with: (German: *Mitsein*) Both modes of “present-at-hand” and “ready-to-hand,” are distinguished from how other things are primarily encountered. While all entities (non-Dasein, other Daseins, and itself) are encountered in these modes, the mode of “being-with” and all the emotion, loneliness, and togetherness that it implies, is a unifying mode of being for Dasein and its world. Being-with is a nuanced concept for Heidegger, made especially difficult for readers because of his writing style and the challenge of translating his works into English. However, in describing the Dasein’s fundamental mode of being-in-the-world as Care (German: *Sorge*), for example “Dasein cares about its own Being,” it could be said that

being-with is a fundamental way of understanding Dasein's character as a being that is *interested in its world*; it is not a secondary role, but a descriptive characteristic.

Care or Concern: (*German: Sorge*) A fundamental basis of our being-in-the-world is for Heidegger, not matter or spirit, but care: "Dasein's facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining. . . ." All these ways of Being-in have concern (*Fürsorge*, care) as their kind of Being. Just as the scientist might investigate or search, and presume neutrality, we see that beneath this term there is the mood, the concern of the scientist to discover, to reveal new ideas or theories, and to attempt to level off temporal aspects.

Cognition: It is synonymous with thinking, but indeed, it is the act of knowing and understanding independently from and/or preceding perceptual experience. It develops, as in Descartes *cogito*, through all forms of thought and of reasoning, thus producing extension of perceptual data under the stimulus of the same, of intuition and imagination.

Consciousness: A constituted and well-organized body of sensuous, perceptual, cognitive, and combined experiential knowledge governing individual thought, action, and behavior. Consciousness is more than awareness, as it includes the capacity to reflect, analyze, synthesize, discern, and evaluate all sensorial experiences so as to distinguish feelings and emotions from sensations and passions. It is always intentional and relational: intentional because it directs its full body of perceptual knowledge and experience toward a newer perception of the object to arrive at newer judgments, and thus moving the body toward controlled action and behavior, interacting knowledge and experience before the object, thus constituting a phenomenological causal relatedness with the same. In synthesis, consciousness, is a body of perceptual knowledge and experience, constituting an active temporal, causal force in its own right, as an individual entity that can determine positive intersubjective changes in the world (as it has been understood by Husserl and Heidegger). This problematic, explained in Leibniz'

concept of the single monad as well as that of a monadology Chapter XI, distinguishes an individual conscious monad from a community of monads bound by social consciousness. Consciousness, being synthesis and active sedimentation of the apprehended essential, experiential knowledge of the object, is always a consciousness *of* something—i.e., logically expansive and transcendental of something and of itself (self-consciousness) can become a fertile terrain for intuition and imagination.

Dasein: *Dasein* is a German word, sometimes translated as “being-there” or “being-here.” (The root of the word “*da*” combines in its meaning “here” and “there,” excluding the spatial-relational distinction made by the English words; *Sein* is the infinitive of the verb “to be.” Heidegger used the word as a synonym for “human being” or “human entity” (see main article on Dasein). A Dasein is then a new coinage for a human being that is there, *in a familiar world*, and in a mood. Dasein also has unique capacities for language, intersubjective communication, and detached reasoning. Furthermore, average humans have an understanding of being insofar as they understand *what* things are and *that* they are e.g. “My dog is brown” or “Today is Sunday.” Heidegger believed that this pre-reflective understanding of being, that which determines entities *as* entities, helps constitute our unique existence as human beings, thus the coinage of “Dasein. Our nature is to be a world disclosure. That is, by means of our equipment and coordinated practices, we human beings open coherent, distinct contexts or worlds in which we perceive, feel, act, and think. Heidegger’s scholar Nikolas Kompridis writes: “World disclosure refers, with deliberate ambiguity, to a process which actually occurs at two different levels. At one level, it refers to the disclosure of an already interpreted, symbolically structured world; the world, that is, within which we always already find ourselves. At another level, it refers as much to the disclosure of new horizons of meaning as to the disclosure of previously hidden or unthematized dimensions of meaning.”

Equipment: (*German: das Zeug*) is an object in the world with which we have meaningful dealings with. A nearly un-translatable term, Heidegger’s equipment can be thought of as a collective noun, so that it is never appropriate to call something ‘an equipment.’ Instead, its use often reflects it to mean a tool, or as an

“in-order-to“ for Dasein. Tools, in this collective sense, and in being *ready-to-hand*, always exist in a network of other tools and organizations, e.g., the paper is on a desk in a room at a university. It is inappropriate usually to see such equipment on its own or as something *present-at-hand*.

Event-Coming into View: (*Ereignis*), better understood in terms of something “coming into view.” It comes from the German prefix, *er-*, comparable to ‘re-’ in English and *Auge*, eye. It is a noun coming from a reflexive verb. Note that the German prefix *er-* also can connote an end or a fatality. A recent translation of the word by Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad renders the word as “enowning,” that is, in connection with things that arise and appear, arising ‘into their own’. Hubert Dreyfuss defined the term as “things coming into themselves by belonging together.” *Ereignis* appears in Heidegger’s later works and is not easily summarized. The most sustained treatment of the theme occurs in the cryptic and difficult *Contributions to Philosophy*. In the following quotation he associates it with the fundamental idea of concern from *Being and Time*, the English etymology of *con-cern* is similar to that of the German: “...we must return to what we call a concern. The word *Ereignis* (concern) has been lifted from organically developing language. *Er-eignen* (to concern) means, originally, to distinguish or discern which one’s eyes see, and in seeing calling to oneself, appropriate. The word *con-cern* we shall now harness as a theme word in the service of thought.”

Existence: Simply put, Heidegger uses this word only to denote the noun—that something *is*. Two related words, *existenziell* and *Existential*, are used as descriptive characteristics of Being. To be *existenziell* is a categorical or ontic characteristic: an understanding of all this which relates to one’s existence, while an *Existenzial* is an ontological characteristic: the structure of existence.

Hermeneutic: An ancient term derived from the term *Hermes*, the messenger of the Gods. It stands for a method of interpretation and comprehension of texts. Under this method, all objects, books, works of art, and the world as a whole are texts, as well as language in need of interpretation. Text and context is the relation determining the interpretive space in which the text must be understood. The method seeks original, necessary, cultural, etymological, phenomenological meaning in all human expressions, human endeavors, and objects from the standpoint of intention, existence, history, substance, essence, purpose, value, finality, and so on, in their legitimate contexts of existential human validity.

Historicism: A term mostly used in postmodern philosophical literature defining the way history is narrated, rather than representing factual truth or historical significance. It is often connoted with subjective narrative and associated with the negative aspect of the same.

Impressions: Generally speaking, they are unidentified, general stimuli upon the senses or upon the mind, emerging from external or internal sources—i.e., directly from and to the senses, the mind—resulting ultimately in cognition and perception, once the mind is able to assign meaning to them. Otherwise, they are often confused with sensations, emotions, and all sorts of other physical stimuli and responses. David Hume (1711-1776) is the source of the basic knowledge of impressions, but Husserl brings the notion of them to a phenomenological status. When they originate in the body, the mind just recognizes them, like the raw feelings of pleasure and pain; when they originate or enter the mind, the same must be treated rationally—i.e., the mind must apply rational thinking in order to identify and make some sense of them. Conversely, whether acting upon the body or upon the mind, once experienced, they are recorded in the memory field, and they will bear more or less definite referential identity, which can mingle with complex psychological language.

Intentionality: It stands for a willing disposition of the mind to pursue specific interests, aims, or ends under conscious conditions. It represents the total knowledge constituted in the conscious mind addressed and directed as intention to act, to do, etc., and that is why it is said that consciousness is always intentional. Intention of what is consciously intended moves consciousness to analysis, synthesis, expansion, consolidation, and fulfillment of meaning to expression, and to action. Thus intentionality is consciousness's own intentional force that strengthens with the depth of meaning, thus always being a consciousness *of*. Consequently, it is a substantial movement and, therefore, a source of feelings and emotions that arise as responses to all that is constituted in consciousness.

Intersubjectivity: We may interpret it as a transposition of consciousness or a conscious communication of meaning from being to beings - perhaps, a transplant of meaning from one subject to another. This term, used by Husserl, extends and transfers meaning, validity, or modes of existence from one being to another or to the collective whole. Accordingly, A. Gurwitsch (1971, 1974) explains that intersubjectivity corresponds to an “inter-linkage between a plurality of egos.” As in the *Lebenswelt* concept, it is primarily a communication among beings, the establishing of common validity and agreement, of a collective consciousness about philosophical truths, art, life, and so on.

Language: A conventional or unconventional signification, codification, symbolization manifestation or abstraction of human substance carried out by signs, symbols and concepts whether formal or informal, modal or non-modal, etc.. It is manifested by causation: intentionally or non-intentionally, the same being ontological or psychological denoting true etymological meaning (*logos*), or mere abstractions- or connoting similarities of expression

Life World (*Lebenswelt*): The existential world of natural beings made of humans, animals, plants, etc., their common existence, as well as perception of the scientific proto-structures and superstructures of knowledge, ideal constructs, beliefs, myths, cultures, and religions.

Naturalism: From a philosophical perspective, it is intended as anti-phenomenological and, thus, as phenomenal psychology often referred to as the typical Freudian approach to psychic phenomenal behavior rather than to the conscious and intentional behavior of the subject; from the historical artistic perspective, it is intended as mere external representation and mimesis of natural appearances.

Notion: As used in this study, it refers only to a cognitive conception or idea (*qua* notion)—namely, that which is objectively known neither as a substantive nor as a propositional judgment, but as assumed approximation of truth.

Objectivity: The determinable, tangible meaning and value of existence within human possibilities, thus limited acceptable validity; the content of progressive analytical, causal, or synthetic judgment that can be recognized and extended to all human beings. (Not used here as a scientific attribution of objects, but of subjects.) Example: the subjectivity of a subject changes into objectivity of the subject through learning and acquisition of objective, tangible knowledge. Objectivity is also that which reason can establish by way of deductive or inductive logic of reasoning.

Ontic: Heidegger uses the term ontic, often in contrast to the term ontological, when he gives descriptive characteristics of a particular thing and the “plain facts” of its existence. For example, the objects that are studied by physics or chemistry are ontic; they are certain given things in the world that are studied without necessarily raising more general ontological questions. Ontic also stands as pre-ontological nature referred to as natural state of things and of human life, the receptive nature in man, comprising the tamable instinctual, physiological body and the sense faculties. Mankind is hereby referred to as ontic, positive, dynamic, natural, uneducated, but receptive substance—phenomenal matter as opposed to phenomenological substance.

Ontological: (German: *ontologisch*) As opposed to “ontic,” ontological is used when the nature, or meaningful structure of existence is at issue. Ontology, a discipline of metaphysics, focuses on the formal study of Being. Thus, something that is ontological is concerned with understanding and investigating Being, the ground of Being, or the concept of Being itself.

Ontology: From the Greek *Onto* (the meaning of man). In the Heideggerian sense, a historical, existential, phenomenological, linguistic, substantive knowledge embodied in the universal meaning of the individual being. A construct of the notions of culture and the nature of man as anthropological development from the ontic state. Phenomenology of perception could be seen as a general attempt at

reconstructing the essential nature of ontology thus the capacity of the mental faculty to apprehend reality correctly.

Perception: Apprehension of the knowledge and the existence of objects, of people, of ideas, of concepts in experiential form, thus a complex experience of thought, sense data, and understanding. It is a process of reflective thought manifesting reality of being and furnishing meaning to physical, sensuous apprehensions (sensations). In fact, sensation depends upon perception for the identification and assessment of the external-internal qualities of sensuous response and for the incorporation of meaning into consciousness.

Phenomenology: In Husserl's view, it is a descriptive and a transcendental method of eidetic reduction (*epoche*), or a science of the essential knowing of the qualities of phenomena (the things-in-themselves). It is an instrumental method for narrowing down the perception of things to their essential forms of existence. In addition, Heidegger ascribes to phenomenology the capacity to "uncover" what would otherwise remain hidden through the causal chain of phenomena, and thus the capacity to structure a new ontology of being-in-the-world. This, in Heidegger's view, is bringing being from a metaphysical to an existential dimension of meaning. In the study, the meaning of phenomenology is used more as a causal method to determine objectivity, thus, in my opinion, resolving the Husserl-Adorno controversy of descriptive phenomenology versus epistemology.

Presentness: This term is used by Heidegger to mean being present with all capacities of a conscious knowing. It implies potential being and contemporariness of being within the reality of the world—that is, being present before the object or the world with the full power of the conscious will; the capacity to act with the power of knowledge or interpret the object from the

standpoint of the consciousness of the world and with the finitude of a now-temporality means to possess a knowledge current with world issues.

Present-at-Hand: (*German: vorhanden, presence-at-hand: Vorhandenheit*).

With the present-at-hand one is (in contrast to the ready-to-hand“ locution) merely looking at or observing something. In seeing an entity as present-at-hand, the beholder is concerned only with the bare facts of a thing or a concept, as they are present and in order to theorize about it. This way of seeing is disinterested in the concern it may hold for Dasein, its history or usefulness. This attitude is often described as existing in neutral space without any particular mood or subjectivity. However, for Heidegger the matter does not is not completely detached or neutral. It is overwhelmed by mood, and is part of the metaphysics of presence that tends to level all things down. Through his writings, Heidegger sets out to accomplish the *destruktion* (see above) of the metaphysics of presence. Presence-at-hand is not the way things in the world are usually encountered, which is only revealed as a deficient or secondary mode, e.g., when a hammer breaks, it loses its usefulness and appears as merely there, present-at-hand. When a thing is revealed as present-at-hand, it stands apart from any useful set of equipment but soon loses this mode of being present-at-hand becomes something, for example, that must be repaired or replaced.

Ready-to-hand: (*German: zuhanden, readiness-to-hand, handiness: Zuhandenheit*).

However, in almost all cases we are involved in the world in an ordinary and more intense way. We are usually doing things with a view to achieving something. Again, take for example, the hammer: it is ready-to-hand; we use it without theorizing. In fact, if we were to look at it as present-at-hand, we might easily make a mistake. Only when it breaks or something goes wrong we might see the hammer as present-at-hand, just lying there. Even then, however, it may be not fully present-at-hand, as it is now when showing that something is to be repaired or disposed of and therefore a part of the totality of our involvements may be relinquished. In this case its Being may be seen as unreadiness-to-hand. Heidegger outlines three manners of unreadiness-to-hand: Conspicuous (damaged, e.g. the lamp's wiring is broken), Obtrusive (a part is missing which is required for the entity to function e.g. we find the bulb is missing), Obstinate (when the entity is a hindrance to us in pursuing a project, e.g. the lamp blocks my view of the

computer screen). Importantly, the present-at-hand only emerges from the prior attitude in which we care about what is going on and we see the hammer in a context or world of equipment that is handy or remote, “in order to” do something. In this sense the *ready-to-hand* is *primordial* compared to that of the present-at-hand. The term primordial here does not imply something Primitive, but rather refers to Heidegger’s idea that Being can only be understood through what is everyday “close” to us. Our everyday understanding of the world is necessarily essentially a part of any kind of scientific or theoretical studies of entities the present-at-hand might be. Only by studying our “average-everyday” understanding of the world, as it is expressed in the totality of our relationships to the ready-to-hand entities of the world, can we lay appropriate bases for specific scientific investigations into specific entities within the world. For Heidegger in *Being and Time* this illustrates, in a very practical way, the way the present-at-hand, as a present in, a “now” or a present eternally (as, for example, a scientific law or a Platonic Form has come to dominate intellectual thinking, especially since the Enlightenment. To understand the question of being, one must be careful not to fall into this leveling off, or forgetfulness of being, that has come to assail Western thought since Socrates, see the metaphysics of presence.

Self-consciousness: The knowledge that consciousness has of itself as a constitution of being, as a complex, finite, adequate, or inadequate existence, as Hegel distinguishes it in his concept of “*unhappy consciousness*.” It is the necessary or unavoidable condition for *being* to be conscious of the object. The *self*, being aware of itself before the object, constitutes another aspect of physical acknowledgment of presence before the object of perception, as explained in Hegel’s concept of *sense perception*. Consciousness is what confers objective qualities to perceptual experience; self-consciousness confers the same onto itself, though becoming conscious of itself only after being conscious of the object.

Social Reality: Social reality is intended as the acceptable truth of the condition of existence from the context of a single individual and a community of individuals. In social reality, each individual being is endowed with a conscious apparatus that consents objective perception of the part and the whole. It is phenomenally and phenomenologically constituted as a sociological field of interactive experiences comprising psychological and pathological behavioral conditions, which are

detectable, but dubiously analyzable. Social behavior determines social reality, either as a rational or irrational order. Consequently, the level of rational substance is determinable by the degree of reason and vice versa.

Subjectivity: In the study, it is used as limited validity of judgment and unproved objectivity. It is understood, by Merleau-Ponty, to relate directly and solely to the body and to all the stimuli and sensations without objective meaning. Subjectivity is the geographic bodily space of the individual related to his or her intrinsic instinctual, sensuous, and overall somatic character. It is also understood as comprehending all that belongs to the subject. We cannot speak of meaning without rendering the same objective, and this renders subjective judgments insufficient. This is why, as opposed to objectivity, it is associated with relative and prejudicial judgments.

Subject-Object Relation: This term is used as objective movement and as a conscious condition between subject and object. Consciousness of the object depends upon the entire relationship between subject and object. It is a conscious condition of objectivation of the subject, and not the reverse. Traditional philosophy saw it as a dialectic relation with an implied dichotomy, but, in the

study, the dichotomy is overcome with the help of Husserl's new notion of perception.

‘The One’ / ‘the They’: (German: *Das Man*, meaning *They-Self*) One of the most interesting and important ‘concepts’ in “Being and Time” is that of *Das Man*, for which there is no exact English translation; different translations and commentators use different conventions. It is often translated as “the They” or “People” or “Anyone” but is more accurately translated as “One.” *Das Man* derives from the impersonal singular pronoun *man* (‘one’, as distinct from ‘I’, or ‘you’, or ‘he’, or ‘she’, or ‘they’). Both the German *man* and the English ‘one’ are neutral or indeterminate with respect to gender and, even, in a sense, of numbers, though both words suggest an unspecified, unspecifiable, indeterminate plurality. Heidegger refers to this concept of *the One* in explaining inauthentic modes of existence, in which *Dasein*, instead of truly choosing to do something, does it only because

Transcendence: This term is intended both in the Kantian and Husserlian sense, as ontological, epistemological, moral, ethical enlightenment or enhancement of being or as an act extending the limits or the horizons of ordinary perception, consciousness, and existence. In both cases, growth and advancement of meaning are also implied in this term.

Worldhood and View of the World: (*Weltanschauung*) The “World“ is used by Husserl and Heidegger as an ontical concept, and signifies the totality of things which can be present-at-hand within the world.

“**World**“: functions also as an ontological term, and signifies the being of those things we have just mentioned. And indeed ‘world‘ becomes a Dasein for the artist. It is essentially a term for any realm of existence, which encompasses a multiplicity of entities: for instance, when one talks of the ‘world‘ of a mathematician, ‘world‘ signifies the realm of possible of mathematical calculus. “World“ can be understood in another ontical sense -- not, however, as those entities which can be encountered within-the-world, but rather as the *wherein* a factual Dasein as such can be said to ‘live in a “World“ that has for Heidegger a pre-ontological existential signification. Here again there are different possibilities: “world“ may stand for the ‘public‘ we-world, or one’s ‘own‘ closest (domestic) environment. Finally, “world“ designates the ontological-existential concept of *worldhood*. Worldhood itself may have as its modes whatever structural wholes

“That is what one does“ or “That is what people do.“ Thus, *das Man* is not a proper or measurable entity, but rather an amorphous part of social reality that functions effectively in the manner that it does through this intangibility. ‘*Das Man*‘ constitutes a possibility of Dasein’s Being, and so *das Man* cannot be said to be any particular someone. Rather, the existence of ‘the They‘ is known to us through, for example, linguistic conventions and social norms. Heidegger states that, “The “they“ prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and determines what and how one ‘sees.’“ To give examples: when one makes an appeal to what is commonly known, one says “one does not do such a thing.“ When one sits in a car or bus or reads a newspaper, one is participating in the world of ‘the They.’ This is a feature of ‘the They‘ as it functions in society, an authority that has no particular source. In a non-moral sense Heidegger contrasts “the authentic self“ (*my owned self*) with “the they self“ (“my un-owned self“). A related concept to this is that of the Apophantic, assertion

any special ‘worlds’ may have at the time, but it embraces in itself the *a priori* character of worldhood in general.

© Raffaele Martini Pandozy. Ph.D.

Revised on June 2017

Please send your feedback to:

Rmpandozy1@aol.com

Dallas, Texas USA – Phone: 001 469 650 5933